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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2010, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral arguments for
McDonald v. City of Chicago to determine whether the Second Amendment is
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and applies directly to the states.1
Coming less than two years after the Court’s landmark decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller,2 the issues affecting the Fourteenth Amendment are two-fold.
First, the Court will determine whether the Second Amendment is incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Second, the Court will
determine if the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. While the “privileges and
immunities” issue will receive the overwhelming attention of the legal community,
what will seemingly be ignored is the history of the Anglo-American tradition of
“having arms,” for its history may prove crucial as to whether the Second
Amendment is incorporated through either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process or Privileges and Immunities Clauses.
In the wake of Heller, the first and only court to issue an opinion incorporating
the Second Amendment was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ vacated decision in
Nordyke v. King.3 In incorporating the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court determined that “the right to keep and
bear arms is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” and “is necessary
to the Anglo-American conception of ordered liberty that we have inherited.”4 There
is no denying that the limited “individual right” to defend against standing armies—
foreign or domestic—predated the Constitution. However, there is no substantiating
historical evidence that a right to own and use guns in the home was ever meant to be
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”5 Given the Supreme Court’s
holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Nordyke court’s conclusion was not at
all surprising. The Court majority had already determined that the “District’s ban on
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the
purpose of immediate self-defense.”6
The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”7 Most legal scholars and historians argue that this right mirrors a
provision in the 1689 English Declaration of Rights, which ensures that “subjects
which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions

1

NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5150 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1521).
2

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).

3

Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
16908 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2009) (No. 07-15763).
4

Id. at 457.

5

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

6

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.

7

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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and as allowed by law.”8 It is more than reasonable to assert that this provision
heavily influenced the Second Amendment, because the Founding Fathers viewed
the American Revolution as a reaffirmation of the Glorious Revolution.9 Therefore,
it is fair to say that the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” guarantee was the
precursor to, if not the inspiration for, the Second Amendment.
This fact is not only historically significant, it is also legally significant. It was
the means by which the Supreme Court majority came to its determination in Heller.
The Court stated that the English “right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’
abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right
protecting against both public and private violence.”10 In other words, the Supreme
Court majority interpreted the English “have arms” provision as a right to personal
armed self-defense—an interpretation it thought the Founders understood to be the
Second Amendment’s “central component.”11
This historical interpretation of the “have arms” provision laid the foundation for
the decision in Nordyke. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not touch upon the
history of the English right to “have arms.” Instead, it merely took the Heller
majority’s analysis as sufficient to prove that an alleged right to own a gun for
defense of the home was firmly rooted in the Anglo-American tradition. Both the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court majority have been misled.
They have relied upon incomplete and misguided research of both the English “have
arms” provision and the Founders’ understanding of that limited right.12 Both courts
have been led to believe that lower-status Englishmen’s discontent with the gaming
laws, coupled with their required duties in the militia, created a constitutional right to
own arms to defend the home—a right that has never historically or legally existed.
The problem is that Individual Right Scholars have seemingly ignored the
abundant sources that explain exactly what the English allowance to “have arms”
was meant to protect. First, the provision is an allowance—not a right—because it
states that Protestants “may have arms.” Furthermore, it was conditioned on the
arms being “suitable to their condition and as allowed by law.” Both phrases greatly
limit an individual’s ability to possess arms. This was done intentionally, for the
“have arms” provision was an affirmation of preexisting law and custom. This

8
1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.) (emphasis added). This is commonly known as the 1689
Declaration of Rights.
9

There are countless reaffirmations of this in the Founders’ writings. See PATRICK J.
CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 55-64 (2008) [hereinafter CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES].
10

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798-99 (2008).

11

Id. at 2801 (emphasis omitted).

12

See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT (1994). The Court also cites WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS
ON POLICE 59-60 (London, Baker & Galabin 1785) and GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS,
CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE
MILITIA 17-18, 27 (3d ed. London, n. pub. 1782) both of which were written well after the
adoption of the English Declaration of Rights. Neither is historically significant in examining
the original intent of the English “have arms” provision. Nevertheless, both will be addressed
later in this Article to refute the Court majority and Malcolm’s contentions.
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included allowing qualified Protestants to “have arms” in defense of the realm and
check tyrannical standing armies.
To some, these historical facts may seem like a moot point considering the
Supreme Court has already given its opinion. This is not necessarily the case. As
seen in the stayed Nordkye, the legal debate of the history of the Second Amendment
is still alive. There is no question that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on
Heller’s history of the Second Amendment, but the court did open the door for
refutation when it stated, “[Santa Clara] County does little to refute [the] powerful
evidence that the right to bear arms is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the
Republic, a right Americans considered fundamental at the Founding and
thereafter.”13
Furthermore, litigation of the history of the “right to keep and bear arms” is
prevalent because the Supreme Court never affirmatively answered whether the
Second Amendment is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.14 The Nordyke court mistakenly assumed that the holding
in Heller was meant to overturn the late nineteenth-century cases that addressed this
issue.15 However, before that decision was stayed, it was the only circuit to do so.
Both the Second16 and Seventh17 Circuits have held that the Second Amendment does
not apply to the states. They rely on the fact that Heller stated that the Supreme
Court’s nineteenth-century case precedent “reaffirmed that the Second Amendment
applies only to the Federal Government.”18
Therefore, given these interpretational differences and the Supreme Court
granting certiorari on this issue, a detailed look into the history and original intent of
the English Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision is significant. Both cases
before the Court are arguing that the Heller majority’s understanding of this history
is adequate to incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This is not necessarily true. The first test in
determining if a right is incorporated under the Due Process Clause is whether it is
13

Nordyke v. King, 536 F.3d 439, 456 (9th Cir. 2009).

14

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18; see also PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009)
[hereinafter CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT]. There has been much speculation by lawyers
and legal scholars as to whether the Second Amendment is a right that would be incorporated
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, all those who
have addressed this legal issue have done so prior to the Heller decision. See Michael
Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1 (2007); David A.
Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring Rationale for Excluding the
Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1079 (2005); Koren Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The Second Amendment and the
Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 177
(1998).
15

See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
16

Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009).

17

NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2009).

18

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.22 (2008).
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“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”19 In conducting this test, the Court
has traditionally examined the Anglo-American tradition of the right being asserted.
For example, in determining whether the right to a jury trial met this test, the
Supreme Court traced its roots back to Greek and Roman history, the Magna Carta,
through the English Declaration of Rights, and to the colonies from the
Commentaries of William Blackstone.20 Although it is true that the Heller majority
did briefly examine these historical issues, no historian, besides Joyce Lee Malcolm,
who specializes in seventeenth-century English history, has supported the Court’s
contentions. In fact, the most prominent historian that specializes in this era and the
Glorious Revolution—Lois G. Schwoerer—has persistently refuted the Heller
majority’s interpretation.21 Therefore, it is most likely that the Court will need to
address these historical issues again and with more specificity.
Not to mention, the four dissenting Justices in Heller will have no qualms about
revisiting this issue. There can be little doubt that not only will the English history
of “having arms” be reexamined, but perhaps the entire history of the Second
Amendment as well. The historical and constitutional inconsistencies within the
Heller majority’s opinion are all too clear. While these inaccuracies are significant,
what is more relevant is the Court’s misinterpretation of its constitutional
predecessor—the English allowance to “have arms,” for by starting off its historical
analysis on the wrong foot, so to speak, the Court ultimately reached a textually
perplexing conclusion. It was this initial step toward an inaccurate historical
interpretation of the Declaration of Rights that allowed the Court to incorporate the
faulty holding in Heller. Thus, it is essential that the original intent of that right be
examined in exacting detail and the Court follow its well-established precedent of
reesamining the history of constitutional provisions in light of recent scholarship. 22

19

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

20

Id. at 151-52.

21

See Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, in THE
SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207, 207-21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000). Carl Bogus also addresses
this. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
309 (1998).
22
See Smith v. Alright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575 (1985); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 604, 611
(1971); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1985). Some of the
historical and constitutional inconsistencies within Heller are:
It does not examine any relevant legislative history immediately following the
adoption of the Constitution, but rather uses commentary and cases drafted at least
forty years later. It relies on state Constitutions’ “right to bear arms” provisions after
the adoption of the Second Amendment, without textually analyzing them or giving
them a plurality meaning. Furthermore, the holding ignores the states’ ratification of
convention amendments that contradicted the individual right theory, but still
erroneously inferred that these conventions all point to the individual right model. It
added the word “because” to the beginning of the prefatory clause (“A well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”), changed the word “State” to
“country,” argued the word “against” would had to have been incorporated for the
amendment to have some form of a collective right interpretation, and added a selfdefense exception that never historically existed. In short, the opinion was a selective
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II. THE 1689 ENGLISH DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
On February 13, 1689, the Declaration of Rights was presented to the soon-to-be
sovereigns of the three kingdoms—William and Mary.23 The Declaration is
undoubtedly a statement of rights that the members of the Convention deemed
necessary for the future governance of England. Whether the rights listed therein are
an affirmation of preexisting fundamental rights or newly avowed rights has been the
issue of debate.24 For example, the protection “[t]hat the raising or keeping a
standing Army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of
Parliament” was a newly avowed right and a response to the discontent felt over
James II’s standing army.25 There was certainly nothing contrary in the statutes
about the manner in which James II maintained his standing army.26 It had
traditionally and legally been a power that the sovereign maintained.27 Parliament
incorporation of the evidence to ensure the Second Amendment protected an
“individual right” for self-defense in the home.
CHARLES, supra note 14, at 9-10. .
23

LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION
SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS].

OF

RIGHTS, 1689, at 11 (1981) [hereinafter

24
Thomas Macaulay wrote, “Not a single new right was given to the people. The whole
English law, substantive and adjective, was, in the judgment of all the greatest lawyers, of
Holt and Treby, of Maynard and Somers, exactly the same after the Revolution as before it.”
THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 2 MACAULAY’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 377-78 (1906). G.M.
Trevelyan wrote:
The Declaration of Right was, in form at least, purely conservative. It introduced
no new principle of law . . . [f]or the Convention had wisely decided that alterations in
the existing laws would require time for debate, and not another day could be spared
before the throne was filled, without great risk to the public safety. Therefore the
Declaration of Right had been framed as a mere recital of those existing rights of
Parliament and of the subject, which James [II] had outraged, and which William must
promise to observe. All further changes, however pressing their need, must wait till
Parliament should have time to discuss and pass them, and till there was a King to give
them statutory force by royal assent to new laws.
GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1688-1689, at 150-51 (1938).
Lois G. Schwoerer has taken a more objective and accurate approach. She has affirmatively
shown that eight of the thirteen rights listed in the Declaration of Rights were not ancient or
preexisting. SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 100-01.
25
LOIS G. SCHWOERER, NO STANDING ARMIES!: THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 147-54 (1974) [hereinafter SCHWOERER, NO STANDING
ARMIES].
26

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-74. Schwoerer states:
The Militia Act of 1661 unequivocally confirmed the monarch’s right to sole
command of the military forces of the nation: “the sole supreme government,
command and disposition of the militia” as well as, so the act ran, “of all forces by sea
and land . . . is, and by the laws of England ever was, the undoubted right” of the
crown.
Id. at 72; see also CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 64-69; TIM
HARRIS, POLITICS UNDER THE LATER STUARTS: PARTY CONFLICT IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 16601715, at 134 (1993).
27
13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.) (“[T]hat both or either of the Houses of
Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same; nor can nor lawfully may raise or levy any
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was merely distrustful of the sovereign given the oppressive use of standing armies
during the Cromwellian Protectorate. Therefore, when the danger of Monmouth’s
Rebellion subsided,28 and James II refused to disband his standing army, a tension
developed between Parliament and the King. This issue would be settled upon
William and Mary’s accession to the throne on April 11, 1689, for the Declaration of
Rights created a newly avowed parliamentary power, thus settling the dispute of
standing armies during times of peace.
Meanwhile, unlike the protection against standing armies, the allowance to “have
arms” was a preexisting fundamental right. It had been reaffirmed many times since
the Middle Ages by England’s continuous reliance on the hue and cry, assize of
arms, and the militia.29 For centuries, laws permitted qualified Englishmen to
maintain arms30 for the defense of the realm31—an allowance that had always been
War offensive or defensive against His Majesty.”); see also SCHWOERER, DECLARATION
RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 72.
28

BARRY COWARD, THE STUART AGE: ENGLAND, 1603-1714, at 338 (2d ed. 1994).

29

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 74.

OF

30

According to Giles Jacob’s 1729 A New Law Dictionary, the definition of arms
“extended to any Thing that a Man wears for his Defence, or takes into his Hands, or useth in
Anger to strike or cast at another.” GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “Arms” (n.p.,
E. & R Nutt 1729). The definition makes no mention of the 1689 Declaration of Rights or a
right to self-defense. Moreover, there is no mention of the Declaration of Rights or the “have
arms” provision at any of the following 1729 dictionary entries: “self-preservation,” “se
defendendo” (self-defense), “defence,” and “game.”
However, the dictionary does make mention of the Declaration of Rights at the entries of
“convention parliament” and “dispensation by non obstante,” thus giving weight to the
argument that armed individual self-defense was not linked to the “have arms” provision. In
fact, in all the subsequent editions up to his death in 1744, Jacob’s legal dictionary never
modified the “arms” entry to include the “have arms” provision or change the other entries—
“self-preservation,” “se defendendo” (self-defense), “defence,” and “game.” See GILES JACOB,
A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,”
“defence,” “game” (n.p., Henry Lintot 5th ed. 1744); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY,
at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., Henry
Lintot 1743); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “selfpreservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 4th ed.
1739); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se
defendendo,” “defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 3d ed. 1736); GILES JACOB,
A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,”
“defence,” “game” (n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 2d ed. 1733); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW
DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms,” “self-preservation,” “se defendendo,” “defence,” “game”
(n.p., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 2d ed. 1732). Following Jacob’s death, subsequent editions
of A New Law Dictionary continued to be published. It was not until 1773—after William
Blackstone had published his Commentaries—that the “arms” entry included: “As to arms for
necessary defence, vide Black. Com. 1V. 143.” A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and
arms” (Owen Ruffhead & J. Morgan eds., Dublin, n. pub. 1773). The cite to Blackstone’s
Commentaries is significant because it shows that the editors interpreted the “have arms”
provision as Blackstone understood it—as the “fifth auxiliary right” to resist and overthrow
tyrannical government, not as armed individual self-defense. See infra Part VII. With J.
Morgan remaining as the editor, the 1782 edition of A New Law Dictionary also included
the Blackstone reference. A NEW LAW DICTONARY, at “armour and arms” (J. Morgan ed.,
London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1782). However, in 1797, T.E. Tomlins expanded A New
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conditioned upon hierarchal and socio-economic status.32 This right, however, came
with great social responsibility. An individual could not have just any arms per se.
Arms were regulated by law and deemed an allowance that could be taken away.33
Furthermore, with this allowance came certain duties and restrictions, which will be
discussed in great detail, but for our purposes now, it is significant only in
understanding why the “have arms” provision was drafted.
A. The Road to an Affirmed Allowance to “Have Arms”
What has been forgotten in the debate over the meaning of the English “have
arms” provision is that the Declaration of Rights was the documentary means that
justified the removal of James II as King.34 It was drafted as a conditional charter of
liberty by which William and Mary had to abide in order to maintain parliamentary
support. By contemporary standards, the Declaration’s grievances may seem to be
broadly worded, but the grievances had a uniform meaning in the Seventeenth
Century.35 This broadness has confused Individual Right Scholars and has begotten
debate on the practice of disarming that happened under the Stuarts. The threshold
question is whether the disarming happened on the scale that Individual Right
Scholars have implied.
As previously addressed, James II’s maintenance of a standing army was more of
a fabricated grievance than an actual one. There is no denying that a standing army
was maintained.36 However, it is just historically and legally inaccurate to state that
James II violated the fundamental laws of the land by doing so. The Declaration’s
“have arms” grievance is similar if we examine it as a contemporary phrase. This is
because the historical record provides us with no ironclad proof of James II actually
“disarming” large numbers of Protestants in England. Thus, one may argue that the
disarming of Protestants was more of a fabricated grievance than a real one.
Law Dictionary into two volumes. Tomlins removed the Blackstone reference and replaced it
with the actual statute. It read:
By the Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2, It is declared that “the subjects which are
Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition as allowed by
law.” See stat. 33 H. 8. c. 6. and tit. Game and Constable III. 2.
T.E. TOMLINS, 1 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (London, Andrew Strahan
1797). Similar to Jacob’s previous editions, neither the Bill of Rights nor the “have arms”
provision was listed in the 1797 dictionary entries “homicide,” “self-defense,” “defence,”
“self-preservation,” or “game.”
31

See 1 Jac. 2, c. 8 (1685) (Eng.); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.); 4 & 5 Phil. & M., c.
2 (1557-1558) (Eng.); 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-1397) (Eng.);
12 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1388) (Eng.); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1351) (Eng.); 2
Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 2 (1285) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.); 7 Edw.
(1279) (Eng.).
32

Id.; see also SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 77.

33

See supra note 31.

34

See Lois G. Schwoerer, The Bill of Rights: Epitome of the Revolution of 1688-89, in
THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 225 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980) (agreeing
that the Declaration of Rights lists grievances that were “both alleged and real”).
35

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 100.

36

SCHWOERER, NO STANDING ARMIES, supra note 25, at 139-44.
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In fact, there is substantially more evidence that the disarming provision was
based upon the fear that it could occur on a massive scale rather than on an actual
occurrence of the event. First, this is supported by the fact that we have only scant
evidence of this disarming.37 In every instance where “disarming” is mentioned, it is
done briefly either in unreliable political pamphlets of the period or within the
records of Convention on the Declaration itself—neither of which provide concrete
examples. In fact, one pamphleteer even described the disarming grievance as being
a grievance of which he “[did] not know the time it was done in England.”38 He
knew “it was twice done in Ireland . . . after the suppression of Monmouth’s
Rebellion” but could not recollect such an instance occurring by James II in
England.39 Second, no list or any detailed accounts of arms being confiscated by
James II exist.40
37

5 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 54-55 (London, T.C. Hansard 1806); 9 ANCHITELL GREY,
DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 31, 32 (London, D. Henry & R. Cave 1769); 2 JOHN
SOMERS, NOTES OF THE DEBATES, MISCELLANESOUS STATE PAPERS, FROM 1501 TO 1726, at
416, 417 (London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell 1778). The best evidence of disarming occurs in
J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 30-40, 48 (1965). While
Western’s research in this area gives us the greatest amount of evidence regarding this, he
points out disarming only during Charles II’s reign. This still leaves us with no substantiated
evidence of actual disarming by James II. Not to mention, there is nothing in the records of
Parliament that there was dissatisfaction with the disarming of insurgents or individuals that
were disaffected to the crown. If anything, the evidence shows that Parliament supported it.
38

CHARLES CAESAR, NUMERUS INFAUSTUS: A SHORT VIEW OF THE UNFORTUNATE REIGNS
OF WILLIAM THE SECOND, HENRY THE SECOND, EDWARD THE SECOND, RICHARD THE SECOND,
CHARLES THE SECOND, JAMES THE SECOND 46 (London, n. pub. 2d ed. 1689).
39

Id. Regarding the disarming of Protestants in Ireland, this was a reference to Richard
Talbot, the Earl of Tyrconnel. Talbot disarmed the Protestant soldiers and officers and
replaced them with Catholics. Out of the eight thousand troops raised, less than one hundred
were English Protestants. Protestant soldiers were continuously replaced by papist substitutes.
See AN ACCOUNT OF A LATE, HORRID AND BLOODY MASSACRE IN IRELAND OF SEVERAL
THOUSANDS OF PROTESTANTS, PROCUR’D AND CARRY’D ON BY THE BY THE L[ORD DEPUTY]
TYRCONNEL AND HIS ADHERENTS 2 (n.p., n. pub. n.d.). Another account by Anon describes the
disarming as follows:
And so it proved, for Talbot, by this time made Earl of Tyrconnel, causing them to be
drawn up in Companies, commanded them to lay down and quit their Arms; which
done, they were expresly told, that it was the King’s Pleasure to have none but Roman
Catholicks in his standing Forces of that Kingdom, and as many as would comply with
it, might return to their Arms, and those that would not might depart.
THE POPISH CHAMPION, OR, A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND MILITARY ACTIONS OF
RICHARD EARL OF TYRCONNEL 13 (London, John Duton 1689). Another disarming occurred
when Talbot learned of Protestant noblemen scheming against him. He disarmed “the
Protestants that lay within the Circle of his Command”—the Protestants in the army that had
not laid down their weapons in the first instance. Id. at 18. Talbot then used these arms to
equip “his Souldiers that came in unarmed.” Id. at 19. Both disarmaments equate to the
disarming described in the 1689 Declaration of Rights and the 1689 Scottish Claim of Right—
that arms were taken from Protestants who were serving in a military capacity and given to
Catholics.
40
This means that there is nothing of substance on the historical record that James II
actually disarmed English Protestants in large amounts. Lois Schwoerer lists the “Popish Plot
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Despite this historical uncertainty, it is clear why the Declaration’s “have arms”
provision was drafted. Although there are no concrete examples of Protestants being
disarmed, the record shows that the “have arms” provision was directly linked to the
dispensing of the Test Act to employ Catholic military officers.41 To be more
precise, it was the power military Lieutenants possessed in arming the militia and
disarming disaffected persons that perpetuated a fear among the Protestant elite that
disarming could occur on a massive scale. It was this fear that would lead to the
drafting of the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision.
As early as 1680, Francis Winnington conveyed his concern for disarmament by
a Catholic army.42 He knew the “Militia of London” could “disarm men at
discretion” if they pleased.43 The concern was that if the militia was composed of
Catholics, then papists could disarm all the Protestants at any time.44 The fear of
disarming by papists reached new heights upon James II’s accession to the throne in
1685, for the King had employed Catholic military officers to suppress Monmouth’s
Rebellion, and he planned on keeping them.45
and Exclusion Crisis in 1678-81, the Rye House Plot scare in 1683, and Monmouth’s
Rebellion in 1685” as instances where “Charles, and, later, James II” used the militia to disarm
Protestants. SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 76. She, however,
provides no sources to this fact. She relies on its mention by the Convention’s members in the
rights committee when they debated the Declaration of Rights. 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 31,
32; 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416, 417.
41

25 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (1672) (Eng.). Entitled An Act for preventing Dangers which may
happen from Popish Recutsants, it required “all and every persons or persons that shall be
admitted entered placed or taken into any Office or Offices Civill or Military . . . shall take the
said Oaths aforesaid in the said respective Court or Courts.” Id. The Militia Act of 1662,
entitled An Act for ordering the Forces in several Counties of this Kingdom, which preceded
the Test Act, dually required it. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 18 (1662) (Eng.). The employing of
Catholic military officers was also highlighted due to the events of the Seven Bishops case. In
that case, James II prosecuted seven bishops for their petitioning that the dispensing of the
Test Act was against law. The court rejected that the bishops had a right to petition, and
James II continued to dispense with the Test Act. See THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 406-11 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 1966); see also SCHWOERER,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 69-70.
42
8 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES ON THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE
YEAR 1694, at 165 (London, n. pub. 1769).
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

This was a direct violation of the Test Act of which the King was all too aware. James
II wrote to Parliament:
Let no man take exception, that there are some Officers in the Army not qualified
according to the late Tests for their Employments: the Gentlemen, I must tell you, are
most of them well-known to me; and, having formerly served me on several occasions,
and always approved the loyalty of their principles by their Practices I think them now
fit to be employed under me; and will deal plainly with you, that after having had the
benefit of their service in such a time of need and danger, I will neither expose them to
disgrace, nor myself to the want of them, if there should be another Rebellion to make
them necessary to me.
4 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1370-71 (London, R. Bagshaw 1808).
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James II knew “some men may be so wicked to hope and expect that a difference
may happen” over the Catholic officers’ employment.46 He just hoped Parliament
would view this as a non-issue. He believed “when you consider what advantages
have a risen to us in a few months, by the good understanding we have hitherto had;
what wonderful effects it hath already produced in the change of the whole scene of
affairs” that the Catholic officers did not affect the security of the nation.47 What
may have been the most shocking statement of the speech was James II’s dismissal
of the militia system. He hoped that Parliament would “be convinced, that the
Militia, which [had] been so much depended on, [was] not sufficient” for occasions
such as Monmouth’s Rebellion.48 Only a “good force of well-disciplined troops in
constant pay” could defend England from these continuous threats to the “peace and
quiet of [his] subjects, as well as for the safety of the government.”49
It must be noted that James II neither disbanded the militia nor said he would not
employ their services. He was merely stating that the threats that the nation was
facing required a professional fighting force, as well as the militia. The House of
Commons did not take the King’s speech as an attempt to disband the militia either.
It was primarily concerned with the employment of Catholic officers and the
maintenance of a standing army. One member reminded the House “that no Papist
[could] possibly creep into any employment” because of the Test Act.50 He felt a
“great difference” toward such an action and was personally “afflicted greatly at this
breach on [their] Liberties.”51
Another member of the House could not agree more. He viewed the employment
of Catholic officers as “dispensing with all the Laws at once.”52 It was “treason for
any man to be reconciled to the Church of Rome; for the Pope, by law is [a] declared
enemy to this kingdom.”53 The most interesting statement came from John Maynard.
He predicted these employments would lead to the disarming of alleged disaffected
Protestants. Citing the 1662 Militia Act, Maynard reminded the House that not only
was it illegal to take up arms against the King,54 but that “lords-lieutenants, and
46

Id. at 1371.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 1369.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 1373.

51

Id. (“I was here, and showed myself against it; the arguments for it were, ‘That we
should in case of a Popish Successor, have a Popish Army.’ You see the Act of the Test
already broken, but pray remember what the late lord chancellor told you, when the late King
(of blessed memory) pased that Act; the words were to this effect: ‘By this Act you are
provided against Popery, that no Papist can possible creep into any Employment.’ I am
afflicted greatly at this Breach of our Liberties, and seeing so great difference betwixt this
Speech, and those heretofore made, cannot but believe this was by some other advice. This,
struck at here, is our all, and I wonder there have been any men so desperate, as to take any
employment not qualified for it; and I would therefore have the question, ‘That a Standing
Army is destructive to the country.”).
52

Id. at 1374.

53

Id.

54

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.).
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deputy-lieutenants, have power to disarm the disaffected.”55 He felt that if
Parliament supplied an army employed with Catholic officers, it would just be
providing James II with the means to produce a destructive end. The Test Act was
not a “punishment for the Papists, but a protection for ourselves.”56 In other words,
Maynard feared that by allowing the King to maintain Catholic officers, Parliament
was putting the country in a perilous situation.
Based on the potential impositions on liberty the maintenance of a standing army
would produce, coupled with the illegality of employing Catholics as military
officers, the House prepared an address to the King asking him to remove the
Catholic officers.57 James II responded by stating that he did not “expect such an
Address from the house of commons.”58 He hoped he “would have created and
confirmed a greater confidence” of the House by then, and he refused to remove the
officers or even negotiate concessions to do so.59 Instead, James II reminded its
members that he had “warn[ed] of Fears and Jealousies amongst [themselves].”60 In
the King’s eyes, the security of the realm was more important than Parliament’s fears
and laws restricting papists. He was the sovereign. It was up to him to ensure the
peace of England by whatever means necessary.
The House of Commons’ address to the King shows just how interconnected all
the grievances that would make up the Declaration of Rights were, for it was through
James II’s dispensing of the Test Act that allowed him to employ Catholics, maintain
his standing army, and place Catholics in a position to disarm Protestants. More
55

4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1374-75. The power to search and seize arms of
disaffected persons can be found in 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.). See also 8 GREY,
supra note 42, at 359.
56

4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1375.

57

Id. at 1378-79. The address went as follows:
And as to the part of [the King’s speech], relating to the Officers in the Army not
qualified for their Employments, according to an Act of parliament made in the 25th
year of the reign of your majesty’s royal brother, Entituled, ‘An Act for preventing
Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants.’ [W]e do, out of our bounden
duty, humbly represent unto your majesty, That those Officers cannot by law be
capable of their Employments; and that the Incapacities they bring upon themselves
thereby can no way be taken off but by an act of parliament.—Therefore, out of that
great deference and duty we owe unto your majesty, who have been graciously
pleased to take notice of their services to you we are preparing a Bill to pass both
houses, for your royal assent, to indemnify them from the Penalties they have now
incurred; and, because the continuing of them in their Employments may be taken to
be a dispensing with the law without an act of parliament, (the consequence of which
is of the greatest concern to the rights of all your majesty’s subjects, and to all the laws
made for the security of their religion we therefore do most humbly beseech your
majesty, that you would be graciously pleased to give such directions therein, that no
apprehensions or jealousies may remain in the hearts of your Majesty’s most good and
faithful subjects.
Id. The House of Lords never approved this address. The House vote to concurrence with the
House of Lords was not necessary. Id.
58

Id. at 1385.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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importantly, the address shows that Parliament presupposed that James II would
disarm Protestants in large numbers even though it had no evidence to support this
fear. At no point during the debates did members of the House give examples of
either Charles II or James II disarming disaffected persons—let alone outstanding
Protestants.
B. The Creation of the Allowance to “Have Arms”
Parliament’s next mention of disarming Protestants would not come as a
hypothetical, but as a grievance. On February 2, 1689, a committee of thirty-nine
headed by George Treby, drafted twenty-three Heads of Grievances.61 In regards to
the disarming of Protestants, one grievance read, “[I]t [is] necessary to the public
safety that the Protestant subjects ‘should provide and keep arms for the common
defense, and that arms, which have been seized and taken from them . . . restored.’”62
The grievance claimed that Protestants had, in fact, been disarmed by James II.63
It made no mention of when or in what context this disarming occurred.64 Thus, it is
uncertain when, and if it ever, happened on the massive scale that the grievance
implies by contemporary standards. This may explain why the last portion of the
grievance—“and arms that have been seized from them restored”—was removed
five days later,65 for dissemination of James II’s disarming may have been based
primarily on political propaganda rather than fact. Also, if Parliament did not have
any documentation of Protestants being disarmed, what arms were taken by whom
and so forth, it could not keep the last section. It would be a grievance that only
asserted to return arms that were never taken on the large scale that the Declaration
of Rights would have implied.
Certainly, James II’s Catholic officers must have disarmed some disaffected
persons. Parliament had explicitly authorized this disarming with the adoption of the
1662 Militia Act.66 The Act set up the laws by which individuals were to provide
“Horse and Armes and Furniture.”67 First, the King appointed military Lieutenants
that had the power to call and assemble the militia, to “arm and array them”
according to hierarchal and socio-economic status, and “form them into Companies,

61
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, 1603-1689, at 151 (Robert H. Fritze &
William B. Robison eds., 1996).
62

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 75; H. RICHARD UVILLER &
WILLIAM MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT
FELL SILENT 53 (2002).
63

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, supra note 61, at 151.

64

On August 24, 2004, the Department of Justice, under the advisement of President
George W. Bush, constructed an opinion in favor of the “individual right” model. It claims
that Charles II’s 1662 Militia Act and 1671 Game Act were used to search and seize the arms
of individuals on a large scale. Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 41-42 (Aug. 24, 2004). It provides no substantiating evidence for its
claim other than citing Malcolm. See id.
65

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 75.

66

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.).

67

Id. § 2.
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Troops and Regiments . . . in case of Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion.”68 The
appointment of these Lieutenants was of particular importance,69 because Lieutenants
had the explicit power, or could appoint such deputies with such power, to “train
exercise and put in readines and . . . lead and conduct the persons so to be armed
arrayed and weaponed.”70 The only arming restrictions within the Militia Act were
that Lieutenants were required to ensure that only individuals of certain qualities or
conditions would be provided arms, weapons, horses, and furniture.71 Thus, through
the Militia Act, an individual did not have a right to arms. It was an allowance by

68

Id. § 1.

69

The appointment of lieutenants was an issue of contention between the king and
Parliament on multiple occasions. In 1641, Oliver Cromwell made mention of how the
“factious Parliament” wanted to know who the lieutenants were because this was the “Power
of the Militia.” Thomas Carlyle, Preliminary to Letter by Oliver Cromwell (May 3, 1641), in
1 THE LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER CROMWELL 103, 105 (S.C. Lomas ed., 1904). In a
petition to Charles I entitled Propositions Concerning the Security and Peace of the Kingdom
Parliament requested the following:
1. That men of honour and trust be placed lord lieutenants in every county; and that
direction be given to these lieutenants, to be careful in the choice of their deputies. 2.
That the Trained Bands be furnished with arms, powder, and bullet; and that they be
exercised and made ready for service. Also that an oath be prepared to pass both
houses of parliament, to be taken by the lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants, and other
officers of Trained Bands, to secure their fidelity in these dangerous times.
2 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 849 (London, R. Bagshaw 1807). This request shows just how
important the lieutenants were in arming and training the people as a militia.
70

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.).

71

Id. §§ 2-3.
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the Lieutenants, and it was a tax,72 a duty,73 and a privilege74 that was dependent on
hierarchal and socio-economic standing.75
Second, the Militia Act authorized Lieutenants to “employ such Person or
Persons as they shall thinke fit” to “search for and seize all Armes in the custody or
possession of any person or persons whom the said Lieutenants . . . shall judge
dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome.”76 This search and seizure provision was
72

Id. § 8. Those that failed to “provide and furnish such sufficient Horse and Horseman
Horses and Horsemen Armes and other Furniture or to pay such sum or sums of Money
towards the providing and furnishing as aforesaid” could be held liable to pay a penalty “not
exceeding twenty pounds.” Id. Lieutenants could place liens and take property of those who
did not comply to obtain this money, if needed. Id. The Act even stipulated the requirement
of providing arms as a tax. Section 25 stipulated that “nothing in this Act contained shall
extend to put any new charge of Armes upon the Tinners in the Counties of Devon and
Cornwall other then [sic] the Tax mentioned in the former Provisio.” Id. § 25.
73
Id. § 9. “That if any person or persons so to be armed arrayed and weaponed shall
detaine or imbezil his Horse Armes or Furniture,” Lieutenants may “imprison such persons
and persons.” Id. “[T]hat if any person so to be armed horsed or weaponed as aforesaid shall
not appear and serve compleatly furnished with Horse and Armes and other Furniture
wherewith he is intrusted,” Lieutenants may “imprison such person or persons for the space of
five dayes.” Id. “And if any person or persons so assessed or charged as aforesaid shall refuse
or neglect to send in or deliver his Horse Armes or other Furniture upon such summons or
other notice,” Lieutenants may “inflict a penalty not exceeding five pounds.” Id.
74
The Act stipulated what type of arms each person was to have, depending on that
person’s status. For example, a Foot Soldier was required to have “a Musquett the Barrell
whereof is not to be under three Foot in length and the Gage of the Bore to be for twelve
Bullets to the pound A Coller of Bandeleers with a Sword.” Id. § 20.

75

Lieutenants had:
[F]ull Power and Authority to charge any person with Horse Horsman and Armes or
with Foot Souldier and Armes . . . having respect unto and not exceeding the
limitations and proportions hereafter mentioned (that is to say) No Person shall be
charged with finding a Horse Horseman and Armes unless such person or persons
have a Revenue of Five hundred pounds by the yeare in possession or have an Estate
of Six thousand pounds in goods or money besides the furniture of his or theire houses
and so proportionably for a greater Estate in lands in possession or goods as the
respective Lieutenants and theire Deputies as aforesaid in theire discretions shall see
cause and thinke reasonable And they are not to charge any person with finding a Foot
Souldier and Armes that hath not a yearly Revenue of Fifty pounds in possession or a
personal Estate of Six hundred pounds in goods or moneys (other than the stocke upon
the ground) and after the aforesaid rate proportionably for a greater or lesser Revenue
or Estate . . . Nor shall they charge any person with the finding of both of Horse and
Foot in the same County.
Id. § 2. Lieutenants could also join “two or three or more persons together” to “impose
the finding and providing of Horse Horseman and Armes.” Id. § 3. Tenants could also be
required to provide arms. Id. § 15. It was lawful for them to even default on rent money by
using that money to buy the required armaments. Id. § 16. Nothing in the Act was meant to
“avoid any Covenant or Agreement which hath beene or shall be made betweene any Landlord
and Tenant concerning the finding Horses or Armes or the bearing or paying of any [Taxes
Rates or other charges by any Tenant either by generall or speciall Covenants].” Id. § 28
(alteration in original).
76

Id. § 13.
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“for the better securing the Peace of the Kingdome” and seems to have never been
questioned until the employment of Catholic military officers. 77 This is most likely
because the houses that were searched and seized—prior to James II’s accession—
were primarily those of Catholics. But historians have overstated this. As will be
shown, many Protestants were also disarmed in large amounts.
The 1662 Militia Act provision for the search and seizure of arms was a statutory
confirmation of what was already being done by the Restoration government. In
numerous instances, orders were issued to seize arms of disaffected and dangerous
persons, often without warrant.78 In fact, it became so common that it was petitioned
to Charles II that a proclamation be issued “forbidding the seizing of persons or
searching of houses without warrant, except in time of actual insurrection.”79 The
petitioner was concerned that continued searches without warrant could “renew the
war” and that future searches should not be conducted “without lawful authority.”80
It is uncertain what effect, if any, the petition had on Charles II. What is known is
that within a year after its submission, the 1662 Militia Act was adopted, and it
outlined the manner in which future searches and seizures of arms were to be
conducted.81
For the next six years, the historical record provides numerous instances of
disarming dangerous, disaffected, and unqualified persons—most of whom were not
identified as papists.82 On November 1, 1662, Charles II ordered Sir Thomas Peyton
77

Id.

78

1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1660-1661,
at 150 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 1860)
(stating that, in 1660, instructions were issued to the Lord Lieutenants that “the full numbers
to be kept up, well-affected officers chosen, the volunteers who offer assistance formed in
troops apart and trained, the officers to be numerous, disaffected persons watched and not
allowed to assemble, and their arms seized.”). In November 1660, Henry Croswick and others
of Bristol had petitioned for “leave to retain in the city armory 315 muskets, 126 pikes, 245
pairs of bandoleers, . . . belonging to the five companies of Sir Edw. Massey’s regiment,
disbanded; their arms were taken away during the troubles, and they are in want of them for
preservation of the peace.” Id. at 393. For other examples see id. at 472, 475, 481, 567 and 2
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1661-1662, at 125,
212, 248, 321 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts
1861).
79

1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 475.

80

Id.

81

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.).

82
See, e.g., 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II,
1666-1667, at 238 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman,
Roberts & Green 1864). On November 5, 1666, James Hicks reported that:
The house of Mr. John Digby, son of Sir Kenelm Digby, and a strong papist, living
near Stony Stratford, has been searched, and 300 arms found. They were not taken
away, but he took it so ill that he went away in his coach and six horses, with only his
coachman and postilion, and is supposed to be gone for Ireland.
Id. On December 11, 1666, Deputy Lieutenants were order to:
[S]earch for arms in the houses of Popish recusants, but there are only two or three in
the county. Searched that of his neighbour, Mr. Pulton, but found only two birding
guns and an old sword, besides his militia arms. Asks leave to restore him the two
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“to seize all arms found in the custody of disaffected persons in the lathe of
Shepway, and disarm all factious and seditious spirits, and such as travel with
unusual arms at unseasonable hours.”83 On April 27, 1667, a warrant was issued to
apprehend “Mason and others suspected of corresponding with him” and to seize all
“arms, papers, writings, [etcetera], belonging to him.”84
Three years later, on May 25, 1670, the Lord Mayor of London wrote to Lord
Arlington requesting a “special warrant” to “seize and secure all dangerous and
suspicious persons, with their arms, weapons, [etcetera], and to detain them so long
as his Majesty or the said Commissioners shall think fit; and to give to all
commanding officers and soldiers of the Militia orders requisite for the
accomplishment of the same.”85 No mention was made of papists. The Lord Mayor
was only concerned with apprehending his “Majesty’s enemies, rebels, traitors, and
offenders.”86 The next day, the King ordered the Lord Mayor and Commissioners
for the Lieutenancy of London to “make [a] strict search in the city and precincts for
dangerous and disaffected persons, seize and secure them and their arms, and detain
them in custody till our further pleasure.”87
The disarming of disaffected and dangerous persons was especially prevalent in
1683.88 The fears perpetuated from the Rye House Plot89 caused the disarming of
many persons suspected to be dangerous and disaffected.90 Also, these seizures were
not explicitly contingent upon the dangerous and disaffected persons being papists.
For example, Militia Colonel Robert West had two chests of arms seized and placed
in the Tower of London.91 Then, on July 12, Secretary Jenkins thanked the Earl of
guns, as he loves shooting, and also two birding guns taken from two day labourers’
houses. Enquires whether to search the house of Lord Cardigan, he being a peer.
Id. at 337.
83

2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 538.

84

7 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1667, at 57
(Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1865). For other examples of arms
being seized see 2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 78, at 434, 438, 525; 3 CALENDAR
OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1663-1664, at 44, 83, 346, 361,
525 (Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 1862);
and 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 82, at 91.
85

10 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1670, at 236 (Mary Anne Everett
Green ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswoode 1895) (emphasis omitted).
86

Id. (emphasis omitted).

87

Id. at 237.

88

See generally 24 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1683 (F.H. Blackburne
Daniell ed., 1933); 25 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, 1683 (F.H. Blackburne
Daniell ed., 1933) (mentioning numerous instances of disarming due to fear of popish plots
and preventing disaffected and dangerous persons from supporting the Duke of Monmouth).
89

The Rye House Plot was a conspiracy to murder Charles II and James II. It is unknown
whether the plot was real or a political fabrication. See Doreen J. Milne, The Results of the
Rye House Plot and Their Influence upon the Revolution of 1688 (1950), in 1 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 91, 91-108 (1951).
90

Id.

91

25 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 88, at 343.
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Shrewsbury for seizing the arms of suspected persons in Staffordshire.92 Meanwhile,
Captain Thomas Whitley had fifty muskets seized because he was suspected of
supporting the Duke of Monmouth.93
Seizures of arms continued up to James II’s accession to the throne. For
instance, on May 20, 1684, Charles II issued detailed orders to Lieutenants
throughout the kingdom to seize the arms from “dangerous and disaffected
persons.”94 Such arms that were deemed “useful for arming the militia” were to “be
deposited for that purpose in such a place as [they] think most convenient.”95 The
rest of the arms were to be “delivered to the keeper of the magazine[s]” at designated
locations.96
It is this massive disarming in 1684 that is of particular interest in understanding
the disarming grievance against James II, for this disarming, like its predecessors,
was never questioned by Parliament or even mentioned upon James II’s accession to
the throne. This is because Parliament did not have a problem with Protestant
Lieutenants seizing the arms of dangerous, disaffected, or unqualified persons. It
had been common practice throughout Charles II’s reign and had even been
supported by statute.97 James II’s employment of Catholics to military appointments
changed all of this. With Catholic officers now in charge of searches, the Militia Act
was no longer a protection against popery or the safety of the kingdom. It was now
seen as a means for Catholics to disarm qualified Protestants, thus, establishing a
Catholic England.98 This is exactly what men like John Maynard feared. He thought
Catholics would no longer be targeted—only Protestants.99 Conversely, there were
restrictions to the searching and seizing of arms. For instance, all searches required a
warrant from the King.100 The King, however, was also Catholic. Thus, one can
only imagine how members of Parliament who were easily paranoid could be
convinced of a potential plot to disarm all Protestants.
The fear of a Catholic plot to overthrow English Protestants provided the context
out of which the language of the “have arms” provision developed. The Declaration
of Rights states it was by “causing several good subjects being Protestants to be
disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to
law” that “subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to
their conditions and as allowed by law.”101 When James II appointed Catholics as
92

Id. at 310.

93

Id. at 293, 323, 389.

94

27 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series of the reign of Charles II, 1684-1685,
at 26-27, 83-85, 102 (F.H. Blackburne Daniell ed., 1933). These orders were given to over
thirty-four counties and eighteen Lieutenants, all of which gave locations for the depositing of
the arms seized.
95

Id.

96

Id.

97

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.).

98

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-75.

99

4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 1375, 1378-79, 1385.

100

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.).

101

1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
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Lieutenants, he subverted the Test and Militia Acts. It was these appointments that
“armed and employed” papists “contrary to law.”102 The mention of arming papists
was not referencing all Catholics in general but, rather, was specifically mentioning
Catholic military officers alone, for it was the newly appointed Catholic Lieutenants
that not only had the power to search and seize arms from disaffected and dangerous
persons, but also had the power to disarm Protestants through the militia laws.103
The Militia Act expressly stipulated that it was through the Lieutenants’ direction
that individuals were armed and arrayed.104 Furthermore, it was the Lieutenants who
trained and mustered the militia.105 These facts help place the Declaration of Rights’
“have arms” provision in its true context. The Declaration even mentions the
disarming of Protestants “at the same time” when Catholics were armed. The
grievance was not stating that Protestants were physically disarmed by Catholics per
se. Rather, the grievance was addressing the issue that Catholics were employed as
Lieutenants—a military position that only Protestants were legally allowed to
perform106 and a position that determined how individuals were to provide, use, train,
and muster arms in the militia. Therefore, the real disarmament was that Catholic
Lieutenants now had charge of the militia arms stores and magazines.
The Scottish Claim of Right supports this understanding of the Declaration of
Rights’ “have arms” provision.107 Like the Declaration, the Claim of Right states the
102

Id.

103

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, §14 (1662) (Eng.).

104

Id. §§ 3, 7-9.

105

Id. § 21.

106

See Gilbert Burnet, An Answer to the Disertion Discuss’d, (1688), in ELEVENTH
COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO THE PRESENT JUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS IN ENGLAND AND
SCOTLAND 1, 9 (London, Richard January 1689). This political tract read:
Upon the Disbanding of the Papists, the Discusser makes a special Observation, That
no Test-Acts nor any Others could barr the King from Listing them as Common
Souldiers. This perhaps may be true; that is to say, that a Protestant Prince may list
Papists, and a Popish Prince Protestants, to follow him in a lawful War. But when a
Popish Prince in a Protestant Nation had made his chiefs Levies of Popish Common
Souldiers to over-aw his Protestant Subjects, and put his sole Confidence in them for
his known and open Designs and manifest Endeavors to introduce Popery into a
Protestant Kingdom, contrary to the Law, ‘twas time then to think of disbanding such
Vermin, and ridding them out of the Land. And the reason why the Protestants could
not be trusted was as certain. For if the King would not trust his Protestants, nay
disarm’d them, when Papists were both arm’d and Employ’d, what reason had the
Protestants to trust the King.
Id.
107

The Claim of Right is an essential historical document that all previous
historians and legal commentators have utterly ignored regarding the “have arms”
debate, for what is lost in their analyses is that often the same policies that the Stuart
monarchy applied in England were also implemented in Scotland. As historian Tim
Harris informs us, “[B]y looking north of the border the English could see what was
in store for them under their popish king.” See Tim Harris, Reluctant Revolutionaries?
The Scots and the Revolution of 1688-89, in POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN
LATER STUART BRITAIN 97, 97 (Howard Nenner ed., 1997). In other words, Scotland was the
testing ground for most of James II’s policies—including the disarming of Protestants. Id.
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reason why the right exists.108 While the Declaration stipulates that it was by
“causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time
when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law” that Protestants “may
have arms,” the Claim of Right grievance provides a bit more detail. It claims that it
was by:
Disarmeing protestants while at the same tyme he Imployed papists in
the places of greatest trust, civil and military; such as Chancellor
Secretaries, Privie Counsellors, and Lords of Sessione, thrusting out
protestants to make roome for papists, and Intrusting the forts and
magazins of the Kingdome in ther hands [that the] Disarmeing of
Protestants and Imploying papists [was] Contrary to Law.109
The language of the Claim of Right makes abundantly clear that the main
grievance between the Parliament and James II was not the disarmament of
individuals, but the principle that Catholics were in positions whereby they, in
theory, could disarm Protestants. To be more specific, the grievance claimed that the
King was employing papists “in places of great trust, civil and military”110 and that
these employments were disarming Protestants. As the grievance states, the King
was entrusting the “forts and magazins” to Catholics.111 The seventeenth-century
line of thought was that if the Catholics had control of the arms it was a de facto
disarming of Protestants.112
What is unique about the Claim of Right is that it does not protect the allowance
to “have arms.” It was only “contrary to law” to disarm Protestants and employ
papists “in the places of greatest trust” and to entrust these papists “with the forts and
magazines of the Kingdome.”113 Arguably, due to textual construction, the Claim of
Right does not even offer the limited allowance to “have arms” that is protected by
the Declaration of Rights. Despite this fact, there is no doubt that the intents of both
documents’ provisions are synonymous. Both were concerned with the employing
of Catholics as military officers—a position that was responsible for the arming of
the militia and the keeping of its stores and magazines.
108

For the entire Claim of Right, see 9 Scot. Parl. Acts 28 (1822).

109

Id. Ultimately, the grievance remained the same as its first draft from the Committee
for Settling Government. It stated:
B[y] Disarmeing protestants while at the same tyme he Imployed papists in the places
of the greatest trust, civil and military; such as Chancellor Secretaries, Privie
Counsellors, Lords of Sessione thrusting out protestants to make roome for papist, and
Intrsuting the forts and magazins of the Kingdome in ther hands.
Id. For the adopted wording and language see id.
110

Id.

111

It was stated in Parliament as a grievance that “the militia armes by proclamation
[were] being taken out of protestants hands, and committed to his Majesties stores, and since
given out to papists.” Id.
112

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 71-77.

113

9 Scot. Parl. Acts 28 (1822) (“T[hat] the Disarming of protestants and Imploying
papists in the places of greatest trust, both Civil and military, the thrusting out protestants, to
make roome for papists, and the intrusting papists with the forts and magazines of the
Kingdome are Contrary to Law.”).
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Joyce Lee Malcolm is the only author to state that the Declaration of Rights’
grievance of disarming and the Protestant right to “have arms” did not have a limited
application. She believes that the redrafting process of the “have arms” provision
moved away from “private ownership of arms as a political duty and toward a right
to have arms for individual defence.”114 She comes to this conclusion because the
“sparse records of the Convention yield only an outline of the discussions which took
place and no account of what occurred either within the committees that drafted the
Declaration of Rights or at conferences between the committees for the two
Houses.”115 Despite the “sparse records,” Malcolm claims the “patchy evidence” that
is available “reveals the anxieties of Convention members and the compromises they
made to protect and strengthen the ability of Englishmen to have weapons.”116
This is quite a bold statement. Malcolm makes a large historical assumption
without sufficient documentation.117 “Patchy evidence” is never sufficient to support
an opinion as an historical fact. Despite the lack of direct and substantiated evidence
that supports this conclusion, Malcolm’s research infers that there is a solid
foundation of evidence that the drafters of the Declaration of Rights were looking to
incorporate the protection of armed individual self-defense.118 Nothing, however,
could be farther from the intent, meaning, and protection for which the “have arms”
provision was drafted. The evidence does not suggest that the drafters were
concerned with individual armed self-defense or the authority of military Lieutenants
to disarm. What the evidence does suggest is that the drafters merely had qualms
with Catholics performing it against Protestants without justification.
There is nothing in the Convention debates that proves otherwise. There are
three accounts of the debates, each of which connect the employing of Catholic
Lieutenants and the Militia Act with the disarmament of Protestants.119 For example,
Sir Richard Temple stated that the “Militia Act was made use of to disarm all
England.”120 What Temple meant by “all England” was what has already been
114

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119.

115

Id. at 115.

116

Id.

117

Lois G. Schwoerer correctly states the true purpose behind the “have arms” provision.
She writes that it “was, in a way, to reaffirm the value of the militia and to imply that
legitimate military power resided, not in a standing army, the creature of the executive, but in
the independent citizenry, embodied in the militia, the force of the parliamentary gentry.”
SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 76. If anything, the sources for this
period raise more questions than they provide definitive conclusions.
118

See generally MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 115, 119.

119

For Richard Temple’s account see 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 53; 9 GREY
supra note 37, at 31; 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416. For John Maynard’s account
see 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 407, 417. For Boscawen’s account see 4 COBBETT,
supra note 45, at 220; 9 GREY supra note 37, at 32; and 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at
416.
120
5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 54. Anchitell Grey’s account reads, “An Army was no
part of the Government till the late King’s tie. The Militia-Act was made use of to disarm all
England.” 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 31. Somers’ account reads, “Standing army settled
without consent of Parliament, though not part of constitution.—May be allowed in case of
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conclusively shown. By commissioning Catholics as Lieutenants, James II placed
the power of arming the militia in papist hands. John Maynard confirmed this when
he stated that James II’s use of the Militia Act was “an abominable thing” that the
King used “to disarm the nation, to set up a standing army.”121
Moreover, the Militia Act permitted these Catholic Lieutenants to search and
seize the arms of disaffected persons. Mr. Boscawen complained about such an
event when he stated, “The Militia, under pretence of persons disturbing the
government, disarmed and imprisoned men without any cause,” an action with which
Boscawen had a personal grievance since he too “was so dealt with.”122 Parliament
never had any quarrels with the Militia Act’s provision that disarmed dangerous
persons. What Boscawen was upset about was that he was disarmed and imprisoned
without any cause. He did not think the Lieutenants had any reason to believe that
he was “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome.”123
John Maynard also expressed this concern. He thought the Militia Act “was
made to disarm all Englishmen, whom the Lieutenants should suspect, by day or by
night[,] by force or otherwise.”124 It upset him that this was being done in Ireland
“for the sake of putting arms into Irish Hands,” and because it was being done by
Catholics without cause.125 Therefore, to the Convention, disarming dangerous
persons was supported, as long as did not occur to prominent members of Parliament
or the upstanding Protestant gentry.
At no time during the Convention’s debates did any of the members seek, state,
or claim that the disarming of “dangerous persons” provision in the Militia Act was
illegal, arbitrary, or against their alleged fundamental right to “have arms” for
war, invasion, or rebellion.—Militia bill.—Power to disarm all England.—Now done in
Ireland.” 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416.
121

2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 417.

122

5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 54. Grey’s, account reads, “The Militia, under pretence
of persons disturbing the Government, disarmed and imprisoned men without any cause: I
myself was so dealt with.” 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 32. Somers’ account reads, “Militia.—
Imprisoning without reason: disarming.—Himself disarmed.” 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at
416.
123

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662) (Eng.). This would become an issue of discontent
with the maintaining of a popish standing army. At the time the 1662 Militia Act was passed,
Parliament stated the following:
In the next place, we held it our duty to undeceive the people, who have been poisoned
with an opinion, that the Militia of this nation was in themselves, or in their
representatives in parliament; and, according to the ancient known laws, we have
declared the sole right of the Militia to be in your majesty. And forasmuch as our time
hath not permitted us to finish a Bill intended for the future ordering of the same; we
shall present you with a temporary Bill, for the present managing and disposing of the
Land Forces; and likewise another Bill for establishing certain Articles and Orders for
the Regulation and Government of your majesty’s Navies and Forces by sea.
4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 220.
124

2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 407.

125

Id. The fear of Catholics taking control of government may have been more prominent
than the disarming grievance itself. For this anti-Catholic sentiment see HARRIS, supra note
26, at 80-86.
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personal defense. They had always found the Militia Act “grievous” but not in the
manner that Individual Right Scholars claim. In the Heads of Grievances, the fifth
grievance stated that “[t]he Acts concerning the Militia are grievous to the
Subject.”126 What was “grievous” were the powers given to the King in the 1661 and
1662 Militia Acts. In the 1661 Act, Parliament had qualms with the provision that
gave the King sole command of the military forces, including the militia and “all
forces by sea and land.”127 The 1662 Act reiterated this legal right of the King and
stated that the King possessed “the sole and supreame Power Government Command
and Disposition of the Militia . . . and that both or either of the Houses of Parliament
cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.”128 What was also “grievous” was that the
1662 Act made it illegal for Parliament to “raise or levy any War offensive or
defensive against his Majesty.”129 Both Acts were “grievous” because Parliament
not only had no legal recourse to check the King’s power to raise military forces, but
it was also expressly illegal for Parliament to exert its right of self-preservation in the
scenario that the army subverted their liberties.
Furthermore, at no time after the inception of the 1662 Militia Act or during any
of the debates to revise it did either house of Parliament seek to alter the searching
and seizure of arms provision. In 1668, Parliament sought to reform only the tax
provisions of the Militia Act.130 Mr. Weller was of the opinion that the Act made the
militia “as burthensome to 50l. [per] man in the country.”131 The amount required to
be paid was “almost [as much] as all other taxes” combined.132 What he found
equally frustrating was that it was a tax that “the lords have gotten this advantage on
us” because “they touch not the burthen of it with their finger.”133 The taxes in the
Militia Act and the embezzling of other money to support Charles II’s army were the

126

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 117.

127

13 Car. 2, c. 6 (1661) (Eng.).

128

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.); see also ANTHONY FLETCHER, REFORM IN THE
PROVINCES: THE GOVERNMENT OF STUART ENGLAND 321 (1986).
129

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.).

130

4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 245-46. When the Act was adopted, Parliament
supported its provisions:
We have already, according to our duties and the laws, declared the sole right of
the Militia to be in your majesty: and now, with your permission, we humbly tender
your majesty a Bill for the better Regulation and Ordering the Standing Forces of this
nation; wherein we have taken care to make all things so certain, that your majesty’s
lieutenants and their deputies may know what to command, and all the people to learn
how to obey.—And because our late wounds are yet but green, and possibly, before
the body politic be well purged, may incline to break out again, whereby your majesty
may be forced to draw your sword before your treasury be supplied with Money; we
have consented that your majesty may raise, for the 3 next ensuing years, one month’s
tax in each year, after the rate of 70,000l. per mensem, if necessity shall so require.
Id.
131
Id. at 301. For further information on the militia taxes see FLETCHER, supra note 128,
at 326-27.
132

4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 301.

133

Id. at 391.
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primary reforms that were attempted until the ascension of William and Mary.134
The only other requests rested on why the Militia Acts were considered “grievous”—
this principle being that the King should rely on the militia rather than on a standing
army.135
In sum, the search and seizure provision never received a proposal for its
alteration. In fact, the disarming of disaffected people began two years prior to the
inception of the 1662 Militia Act136 and was undeniably supported by the
government. By 1666, it was even generally accepted that it was within the King’s
authority to place a “special watch on those of the disaffected who had horses or
arms above their station, which were to be taken from them.”137 This was affirmed
again in 1678 with the Popish Plot. The House of Commons authorized Lieutenants
to search and seize the persons of Sir Francis Ratcliffe and Lord Carrington, and to
“secure all their horses.”138 Sir Eliab Harvey reminded his fellow members that
Ratcliffe and Carrington were Catholic when he clarified that the “Papists generally
have now extraordinary horses; four or five more than ordinary.”139 Colonel Titus
did not want to punish the accused conspirators. He said he would rather “have their
horses secured, and a farther search for arms” conducted.140 Meanwhile, Sir Robert
Sawyer advocated calling up one third of the militia, the sheriff, and the posse
comitatus of the county to search and seize the arms of papists and other disaffected
Thus, Parliament
persons potentially participating in the Popish Plot.141
wholeheartedly agreed with the Militia Act’s search and seizure provision. Sawyer
eloquently summed up Parliament’s consensus on this matter, stating, “By Law,
when the Kingdom is in danger, those persons who are the authors of that danger
should be secured.”142
Even when William and Mary assumed the throne and Parliament debated and
proposed a new militia bill,143 the search and seizure provision was never the subject
of debate or even mentioned. William of Orange wanted to put the militia “into
134

WESTERN, supra note 37, at 46-48.

135
See 4 COBBETT, supra note 45, at 606, 666, 952, 1052, 1167, 1292, 1372-74; 2
ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR
1694, at 392 (London, n. pub. 1769); 3 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694, at 23-24 (London, n. pub. 1769); 9 GREY,
supra note 37, at 30; SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 75.
136

WESTERN, supra note 37, at 31-34.

137

Id. at 32.

138

6 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
THE YEAR 1694, at 211 (London, n. pub. 1769)
139

Id.

140

Id. at 212.

COMMONS, FROM

THE

YEAR 1667

TO

141

Id. at 215. Parliament resolved, “That an humble Address be made to his Majesty, that
the Militia of the several counties may be in readiness, and that a third part of them may be
raised for a fortnight, and that there be a farther search for Papist arms.” Id. at 216.
142

Id.

143

For the bill’s career, see 10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 102-03, 112, 137, 163, 169, 186, 192,
197, 199, 207, 212, 214, 223, 235 and 14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 284, 287, 302-03.
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some better Posture”144 and the House of Commons worked to accomplish this
objective. The bill was referred to a committee of thirty-eight members, including
Richard Temple, Mr. Sacheverell, Sir William Williams, and Mr. Boscawen,145 each
of whom had showed dissatisfaction with the disarming of Protestants at the
Declaration of Rights’ Convention.146 When the bill was sent to the House of Lords,
it had a provision that would have repealed all the previous militia acts.147 In other
words, the search and seizure of arms provision in the 1662 Militia Act would have
been negated absent a similar provision in the new bill.148 The bill, however, did not
pass. Thus, historians are unsure whether the final version of the new bill would
have included a search and seizure of arms provision.
Based on the information available, however, it is highly likely that a similar
provision would have eventually been incorporated. The legislative record shows no
dissatisfaction with the search and seizure of arms. If anything, the records of the
new militia bill show implicit support for it. On July 9, 1689, the House of
Commons put forth a provision in the bill for the purpose of “indemnifying and
saving harmless all Persons that have taken Arms on the Behalf of the King’s
Majesty” William of Orange.149 This shows that the Parliament supported the seizure
of arms; it just preferred to have the power to determine who could seize the arms
and to limit that it not be done by Catholics.150
144

14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 258-59.

145

10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 102-03.

146

For Malcolm’s account see MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 113-16.

147

10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 212.

148

WESTERN, supra note 37, at 86. For the Act’s contents see HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS
COMM’N, 12 HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1689-1690, at 206-17 (London, Byre &
Spottiswoode 1889). Its contents do not include a provision similar to the search and seizure
provision in the 1662 Militia Act. Nevertheless, the bill did not pass. Furthermore, if the
House of Lords chose to approve the bill, there was nothing to prevent it from amending it to
include one.
149

10 H.C. JOUR. (1689) 212. Language similar to this clause is contained in the bill that
was presented to the House of Lords. See HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMM’N, supra note
148, at 241 (“That all and every person and persons who have or hath taken arms on the behalf
of the King’s Majesty that now is, whilst he was Prince of Orange.”).
150

The search and seizure provision remained in force until the inception of the 1757
Militia Act. Lord Hardwicke initially gained some support for the defeat of the bill in 1756
because the Act did not have a provision for the search and seizure of arms. His fifth
grievance with the Act read:
In the Militia Act of king Charles 2, sect. 14, a power is given to the lord
lieutenant and deputy lieutenants to “search for and seize the arms of persons, whom
they shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom.” This power is totally
repealed by this Bill, and no such new power is given.
15 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 738 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813). The grievance helped
prevent the bill from passing in 1756, but due to pressure from the King and the people, the
bill passed in 1757. The search and seizure provision was removed. Nevertheless, the bill
gave arms to the militia only during times of drill. The people were required to return them
after muster. See 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 32-34, 36 (1757) (Eng.).
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The frequent search and seizures of arms during William and Mary’s reign gives
credit to this interpretation. These prove that the 1662 Militia Act’s seizure of arms
provision was not only frequently used, but it was also supported by both Houses of
Parliament. It was a useful tool to remove arms from individuals that were
dangerous to government, especially Catholics.151 In 1689, Mr. Smith wanted to
“know why persons have stopped the lieutenancy of Middlesex from seizing Papists,
and taking away their horses.”152 Papists were not the only conspirators who could
be subjected to search and seizure, for Smith and his fellow members knew that “ill
protestants join with” the papists.153 Thus, Protestants could also be subject to arms
being confiscated. This was reiterated when Parliament proposed “[t]hat all Papists,
and all such persons as are not qualified by law, be disarmed, disbanded, and
removed from all employments, civil and military.”154 Although the proposal’s main
purpose was to target papists, the phrase “such persons as are not qualified by law”
extended disarmament to Protestants and whoever else was deemed dangerous.155
Because of this threat, William Williams knew there was “no time to form a
[new] law for the militia.”156 He was for executing “the laws as they are, and . . . [for
151

On March 5, 1689, the House of Lords ordered the following:
This House being informed that there are divers Arms in the House of one Filkins, in
the Parish of St. Giles: It is thereupon ORDERED, by the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Doors of the Rooms where those Arms
are, be broken open by the Officers of the Ordnance, in the Presence of a Constable;
and that the Arms there found be taken, and sent to The Tower of London. This House
being informed that there are Arms in the Custody of Moleneux, a Pawnbroker: It is
thereupon ORDERED, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled,
That what Arms or Belts shall be found in his Custody, with the King’s Mark on them,
be taken, and sent to The Tower of London; and that such other Arms as shall be found
in his Custody shall be inventoried, and secured until further Order.
14 H.L. JOUR. (1689) 138-39.
152

5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 342.

153

Id. at 343. Smith also stated:
I would have the Papists seized, and I would address the king for a proclamation
limiting a time for those with king James: recall them by a day limited; if they
surrender not themselves, seize their estates. Let us know why orders to seize the
horses and arms of Papists have had counterorders. If that was done, I doubt not but
the king may appear at the head of the militia as well as at the head of a standing
Army.
Id. at 343-44.
154

Id. at 19.

155

Id. at 14 (“[A]ll Papists who shall be found in open arms, or with arms in their houses,
or about their persons, or in any office civil or military, upon any pretence whatsoever,
contrary to the known laws of the land, shall be treated by us and our forces, not as soldiers
and gentlemen, but as robbers, free-booters and banditti; they shall be incapable of quarter,
and entirely delivered up to the discretion of our soldiers. We do farther declare, that all
persons who shall be found any ways aiding or assisting to them, or shall much under their
command, or shall join with, or submit to them in the discharge or execution of their illegal
commissions or authority, shall be looked upon as partakers of their crimes, enemies to the
laws, and to their country.”).
156

Id. at 344.
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forming] the Militia as well as [the Lieutenants] can.”157
resolved:

377
Mr. Hampden then

1. That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, that the
considerable Papists, or reputed Papists, of this kingdom, may be
forthwith taken into custody; and the arms and horses of all Papists, and
reputed Papists, be searched for, and seized. 2. That whatever
Protestants, who shall own, protect, or conceal, any arms or horses,
belonging to Papists, or reputed Papists, shall be looked upon as enemies
to their majesties and this kingdom; and be proceeded against
accordingly.158
This address to William of Orange confirms that Protestants were not exempt
from the 1662 Militia Act’s search and seizure of arms provision. While it had
primarily been used to disarm papists since William and Mary’s accession,
Protestants were never exempt from being classified as disaffected or dangerous.159
In fact, there are numerous instances where individuals’ arms were seized without
regard to religion. For instance, when warrants were issued to search for arms at
“Queens Head Tavern” and the house next to “‘Anchor and Crown’ in Brewer
Street,” no mention was made of papists.160 The same was true when a warrant was
157

Id.

158

Id. at 344-45 (citation omitted). This address would lead to the adoption of An Act for
the better secureing the Government by disarming Papists and reputed Papists. 1 W. & M., c.
15 (1688) (Eng.); see also 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 168-71 (discussing debates relating to the
Act).
159
5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 153-54. William of Orange was cognizant of the
Declaration of Rights and the sanctions it imposed on government. For instance, the king
confided in Parliament about the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. He wrote to
Parliament:
That his majesty had credible information, that there are several persons in and about
this town, that keep private Meetings and Cabals, to conspire against the Government,
and for the assistance of the late king James: That his majesty has caused some of
those persons to be already apprehended and secured, upon the suspicion of High
Treason; and that, he thinks, he may see cause to do so by others, within a little time:
but that his majesty is between two great difficulties in this case; for that, if he should
set those persons at liberty, that are apprehended, he would be wanting his own safety,
and the safety of his government and people: on he other hand, if he should detain
them, he is unwilling to do any thing, but what shall be fully warranted by law, which
he has so often declared he will preserve: and that therefore, if those persons should
deliver themselves by the act of Habeas Corpus, there would be another difficulty.
That his majesty is likewise unwilling, that excessive Bail should be taken in this case;
his majesty remembering that to be one Article of the Grievances presented to him:
that ordinary Bail will not be sufficient; for men who carry on such designs, in hopes
of succeeding will not stick at forfeiting a small sum: and that, this falling out when
the parliament is sitting, his majesty therefore thought fit to ask the Advice of this
house therein; and intends to advise with the lords also.
Id. No such advice was sought when he requested that the arms of disaffected Protestants be
seized.
160
1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of William and Mary,
1689-1690, at 30, 292 (William John Hardy ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1895).
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issued for a man named “Smith.” His home was located at “‘the Crown and Thistle,’
Princes Street, in St. Ann’s Parish, and another home for concealed arms and
ammunition.”161 In both instances, no mention was made of religion.162
In comparison, when warrants were issued to search for the arms of papists, it
was expressly stipulated as such. On April 10, 1690, a warrant was issued “to search
for concealed arms belonging to papists, and to apprehend all Irish papists together
with other traitors and conspirators of whom . . . [the Colonel] shall have
information.”163 The Earl of Shrewsbury also made this distinction in an order to
Lord Lumley. It read “that something should be done to discountenance those
meetings of disaffected persons and papists . . . whether it may not be fit for the
justices of the peace and the deputy lieutenants to go through the county again and
give orders for disarming papists and their adherents.”164
The fact that arms were searched for and seized from both Protestants and
Catholics alike more adequately explains why the Declaration of Rights’ arms
provision stated that Protestants “may have arms.” The possession of arms was
surely a duty and a tax through the respective militia laws, but it was primarily a
privilege “suitable to their condition” and “as allowed by law.” It was a privilege
because the government could seize arms from disaffected or dangerous persons—
Catholic or Protestant. All that was required was a warrant and good cause.165
The restrictions the House of Lords placed on the “may have arms” provision
also helps explain its language. The arms had to be “suitable to their condition” and
“as allowed by law.”166 The phrase “suitable to their condition” unequivocally shows
that the House of Lords wanted to maintain the hierarchal “chain of being” and the
cultural status quo. Laws concerning the militia, defense of the realm, game, and
weapons all incorporated provisions stipulating “condition” or “quality” as a factor
in applying and structuring them. For instance, the militia laws stipulated who was
to be provided what arms based on one’s revenue and landed estates.167 In game,
161

Id. at 195.

162

There are other examples of arms being seized of “dangerous” or “disaffected” persons.
See id. at 165, 206, 329.
163

Id. at 548. There are other examples of papists’ arms being seized. See 2 CALENDAR
Series, of the reign of William III, 1696 (William John Hardy ed.,
Kraus Reprint 1969) (1895).
OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic
164

1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 160, at 554.

165

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14 (1662) (Eng.).

166

1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.).

167
Lieutenants had:
[F]ull Power and Authority to charge any person with Horse Horsman and Armes or
with Foot Souldier and Armes . . . having respect unto and not exceeding the
limitations and proportions hereafter mentioned (that is to say) No person shall be
charged with finding a Horse Horseman and Armes unless such person or persons
have a Revenue of Five hundred pounds by the yeare in possession or have an Estate
of Six thousand pounds in goods or money besides the furniture of his or theire houses
and so proportionably for a greater Estate in lands in possession or goods as the
respective Lieutenants and theire Deputies as aforesaid in theire discretions shall see
cause and thinke reasonable And they are not to charge any person with finding a Foot
Souldier and Armes that hath not a yearly Revenue of Fifty pounds in possession, or a
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deer, and hunting laws, individuals were allowed to maintain weapons, arms, and
tools only for hunting depending on similar factors.168 Finally, laws governing the
use, ownership, and privileges of weapons were almost always subject to the
individual’s degree, station, or condition.169
personal Estate of Six hundred pounds in goods or moneys, (other than the stock upon
the ground) and after the aforesaid rate proportionably for a greater or lesser Revenue
or Estate Nor shall they charge any person with the finding both of Horse and Foot in
the same County.
13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.).
The Militia Act set up the following socio-economic structure:
Every Man between fifteen years of age, and sixty years, shall be assessed and
sworn to Armor according to the quantity of their Lands and Goods; that is to wit,
[from] Fifteen Pounds Lands, and Goods Forty Marks, an Hauberke, [a Breast-plate]
of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse; and [from] Ten Pounds of Lands, and Twenty
Marks Goods, an Hauberke, [a Breast-plate of Iron,] a Sword, and a Knife; and [from]
from Five Pound Lands, [a Doublet,] [a Breast-plate] of Iron, a Sword, and a Knife;
and from Forty Shillings Land and more, unto One hundred Shillings of Land, a
Sword, a Bow and Arrows, and a Knife; and he that hath less than Forty Shillings
yearly, shall be sworn to [keep Gis-armes,] Knives, and other [less Weapons]; and he
that hath less than Twenty Marks in Goods, shall have Swords, Knives, and other [less
Weapons]; and all other that may, shall have Bows and Arrows out of the Forest, and
in the Forest Bows and [Boults.]
13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.) (alterations in original).
168

See 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25, § 2 (1670-1671) (Eng.) (“That all and every person and
persons, not haveing Lands and Tenements or some other Estate of Inheritance in his owne or
his Wifes right of the cleare yearely value of one hundred pounds per annu or for terme of life,
or haveing Lease or Leases of ninety nine yeares or for any longer terme, of the cleare yearely
value of one hundred and fifty pounds, other than the Sonne and Heire apparent of an Esquire,
or other person of higher degree. and the Owners and Keepers of Forrests, Parks, Chases or
Warrens, being stocked with Deere or Conies for their necessary use in respect of the said
Forrests, Parks, Chases or Warrens, are hereby declared to be persons by the Lawes of this
Realme, not allowed to have or keepe for themselves or any other person or persons any Guns,
Bowes, Grey hounds, Setting-dogs, Ferretts, Cony-doggs, Lurchers, Hayes, Netts, Lowbells,
Hare-pipes, Ginns, Snares or other Engines aforesaid, But shall be, and are hereby prohibited
to have, keepe or use the same.”); 3 Ja., c. 13, § 4 (1605-1606) (Eng.) (“That if any pson or
psons not having any Mannors Landes Tenements or Hereditaments of the cleere yeerly value
of Forty Pounds, or not worth in Goodes or Chattels the some of Two hundred Poundes, shall
use any Gunne Bowe or Crosbowe to kill any Deere or Connyes, or shall keepe any Buckstall
or Engine Hayes Gatenets Pursnets Ferrets or Conny Dogges, except such pson or psons as
shall have any Ground imparked with Pale or inclosed with Wall or Hedge as aforesaide used
for the keeping breeding or cherishing of any Deere or Connyes, the increase of which said
Connyes shall amount to the cleer yeerly value of Forty Shillings to bee letten at the leaste.”);
4 & 5 W. & M., c. 23, § 4 (1592) (Eng.) (providing that the 1692 Game Act permitted the
destruction of guns, weapons, nets, and dogs that were “prohibited to be kept by persons of
their degree”).
169
See 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.) (“[T]hat no psone or psonnes dwellinge or
resiaunte within Wales or the Lordshipps marches of the same, of what estate degree or
condition so ev[er] he or they be of, comynge resortinge or repayringe unto any Sessions or
Courte to be holden within Wales or any Lordshippes marches of the same, shall bringe to
beare or cause to be brought or borne, to the same Sessions or Courte or to any place within
the distaunce of two myles from the same Sessions or Courte, nor to any towne, churche,
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Malcolm’s account of these affairs is much different. The arms provision in the
Heads of Grievances used the phrase “should provide and keep arms,” but by the
time the provision made it through the House of Commons, it was changed to “may
have arms.” Malcolm contends that “should” was replaced by “may” because the
former “smacked too much of preparation for popular rebellion to be swallowed by
the more cautious Lords or, for that matter, by William.”170 There are no sources,
letters, or debates to back up this assertion. Such an historical interpretation
seemingly ignores all the laws that restricted arms by hierarchy and socio-economic
status—laws that William and Mary of Orange maintained and Parliament never
overturned. Malcolm attempts to counter this fact by arguing that the compromise to
create the “have arms” provision in the Declaration of Rights was the first step in
Parliament to modify and reform the Militia and Game laws.171 She believes that
although “the arms article declared a right that current law negated, [this was done]
with the understanding that future legislation would eliminate the discrepancy.”172
No historical evidence exists to support this assertion either.

fayre, markett, or other congregacion, except yt be upon a hute or outcrie made of any felonye
robberie done or perpetrated, nor yn the highe wayes yn affraye of the Kyng[’s] peace or the
Kyng[’s] liege . . . or any other maner of weapon, privye cote or armour defence.”); 25 Hen. 8,
c. 17, § 1 (1533-1534) (Eng.) (“[N]o pson or persons of what Estate or degree he or they be,
except he or they in theire owne right or in the right of hys or theire wyfes to hys or theire
owne uses, or any other to the use of any suche person or perons, have lands tenements fees
annuityes or offices to the yerely value of an hundred poundes, frome the furst day of June
next comyng shall shote in any [hangonne] or crosse bow, or use or kepe in hys or theire
houses or els where any crose bow or handgonne; upon payne to forfayte for every tyme that
he or they soo offende contrary to this acte . . . And that it shalbe lefull to every person that
may use or kepe any crose bowe or handgonne or that may shote in the same notwithstondyng
this Acte, to sease and take every suche crosse bowe and handgonne or any of theyme frome
the kepyng or possession of every suche offender, and the same to kepe or retayne to hys or
theire owne use.”) (second alteration in original); 12 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1388) (Eng.) (“That no
Servant of Husbandry, or Labourer, nor Servant [or] Artificer, nor of Victualler, shall from
henceforth bear any [Buckler,] Sword, nor Dagger, upon Forfeiture of the same, but in the
Time of War for Defence of the Realm of England.”) (alterations in original); 2 Edw. 3, c. 3
(1328) (Eng.) (“That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the
King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s Precepts, or of
their Office, and such as be in their Company assisting them, and also [upon a Cry made for
Arms to keep the Peace, and he same in such places where such Acts happen,] be so hardy to
come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing their office, with force
and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the
King’s Pleasure.”) (alteration in original); 13 Edw. (1285) (Eng.) (“It is enjoined that none be
so hardy to be found going or wandering about the Streets of the City, after Curfew tolled at
St. Martins le Grand, with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing Mischief, or whereof
evil suspicion might arise; nor any in any other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other
lawful Person of good repute, or their certain Messenger, having their Warrants to go from one
to another, with Lanthern in hand.”)
170

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119.

171

Id. at 120.

172

Id.
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If anything, given the legal and statutory record, “should” was replaced by “may”
because of the legal implications that the former would supply. If the Declaration of
Rights stated that Protestants “should have arms” it would have implied that every
Protestant had an affirmative right to arms for defense of the realm. Not to mention,
when “should” remained in the provision, it did not possess the language “suitable to
their condition as allowed by law.” Thus, the initial proposal in the Heads of
Grievances would have extended a right to “have arms” for defense of the realm to
all Protestants.173 The House of Lords’ alterations fixed this. It wanted to ensure that
not only did the current arms restrictions remain, but that future Parliaments could
curtail this allowance as they deemed necessary.174
For seventeenth-century historians, understanding the “have arms” provision in
such a light is not difficult. The provision was intended grant a limited right in
connection with the English militia system that would prevent the illegal
maintenance of standing armies and echoed the legal justification for armed rebellion
when government usurped the rights of the people.175 Although one may argue that
there is no mention of the militia in the “have arms” provision or the Declaration of
Rights, the three subjects are undoubtedly linked. One needs to look only at the
Heads of Grievances, which provides the following grievances in this numerical
order:
5. The Acts of the Militia are grievous to the Subject.
6. The raising or keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdom in
time of Peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against Law.
7. It is necessary for the publick Safety, that the Subjects, which are
Protestants, should provide and keep Arms for their common Defence:
And that the Arms which have been seized, and taken from them, be restored.176
As previously addressed, what was “grievous” about the Militia Act was not the
disarming of disaffected and dangerous persons, it was that the King had sole
authority over the armed forces177 and that the Act made it illegal to take up arms
against him.178 These facts were intertwined with the phrase “keeping a Standing
Army.” Parliament feared that if the King had sole authority of the militia—the
means by which Parliament was to check a tyrannical government—and there was
173

The right to have arms supported the “anti-army prejudice and pro-militia sentiment.”
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 21, at 207, 211. It was in no way
meant to extend to the “individual right” to have arms. Id. at 210.
174

Schwoerer contends “that the change was made to satisfy the Prince of Orange, who
objected to the idea that Protestants ‘should provide and keep Arms.’” Id. at 214.
175

See supra pp. 356-67.

176

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 131.

177

At the Convention, Sir William Williams even stated, “The Act of the Militia is worthy
your consideration, and he in whose hands you put it should be our Head. I take it to be your
security to settle your safety for the future, and then to consider the person.” 9 GREY, supra
note 37, at 30.
178

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.).
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no statutory check on the maintenance of a standing army, the potential usurpations
on liberty were philosophically endless.179 This is why the Heads of Grievances
conditioned a standing army on parliamentary approval, which ultimately leads us to
the “have arms” grievance. Parliament felt that by allowing the people to “have
arms” for “the common Defence”—i.e., militia—there would always remain a means
to check a standing army that refused to disband.180
Lastly, Malcolm’s interpretation does not support the fact that William used the
1662 Militia Act to disarm papists and dangerous persons on a massive scale nearly a
decade after the Declaration of Rights remained in force. For instance, in 1699,
William used the search and seizure provision to disarm “great numbers of papists
and other disaffected persons, who disown his Majesty’s government.”181 He
expressly authorized:
[The] mayor of London, and all justices . . . [to] put in execution the
statute[s] intituled, An Act for the amoving papists and reputed papists
from the cities of London and Westminster, and ten miles distance from
the same, . . . An act for the better securing the government by disarming
papists and reputed papists[, and] . . . An Act for the better security of his
Majesty’s royal person and government.182
The statutes that William authorized gave the government power to disarm not only
papists, but dangerous and disaffected persons as well.
In fact, in 1701, William even granted monetary rewards for arms seized from
dangerous or disaffected persons. On February 26th, he proclaimed: “And we
charge all lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants, within the several counties of
[England] and Wales, that they cause search to be made for arms in the possession of
any persons whom they judge dangerous, and seize such arms according to law.”183
179

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 73-74.

180

One may argue that if the three grievances were meant to be intertwined, they would
have combined as such in the Declaration of Rights. A valid point, but, nevertheless, the
Convention’s record also intertwined them. In most instances where disarming was
mentioned, the Militia Act and standing armies were mentioned right beside it. This was not
by chance. It was intentional. Sir Richard Temple stated that “to provide against a Standing
Army without consent of parliament, not in peace, when there is no war nor rebellion. An
Army was no part of the government till the late king’s time. The Militia Act was made use of
to disarm all England.” 5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 54. Anchitell Grey’s account of Richard
Temple reads: “An Army was no part of the Government till the late King’s time. The MilitiaAct was made use of to disarm all England.” 9 GREY, supra note 37, at 31. Somers’ account
of Richard Temple reads: “Standing army settled without consent of Parliament, though no
part of constitution.—May be allowed in case of war, invasion, or rebellion.—Militia bill.—
Power to disarm all England.—Now done in Ireland.” 2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 416. Mr.
Boscawen stated that it was “[t]he Militia, under pretence of persons disturbing the
Government, disarmed and imprisoned men without cause: I myself was so dealt with.” 9
GREY, supra note 37, at 32.
181
5 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of William III, 1699-1700,
at 79 (Edward Bateson ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1937).
182

Id. at 379.

183

6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, Domestic Series, of the reign of William III, 1700-1702,
at 234 (Edward Bateson ed., Kraus Reprint 1969) (1937) (alteration in original).
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As a result, warrants were issued for papists and persons suspected to be dangerous
or disaffected.184 Parliament did not object to these searches as a violation of the
“have arms” provision. In fact, the searches were applauded. The House of Lords
“humbly thanked his majesty for . . . order[ing] the seizing of all horses and arms of
Papists, and other disaffected persons, and hav[ing] those ill men removed from
London, according to the law.”185 Furthermore, the Lords hoped the King would
“give directions” for a further search of arms.186 This evidence is a far cry from the
“individual right” interpretation that Malcolm puts forward.
Therefore, the historical and legislative record of the “have arms” provision does
not support the “individual right” model of armed self-defense. Rather, the “have
arms” provision was a means to check arbitrary government—nothing more, nothing
less. Its “may have arms” language in no way implies that every Protestant
Englishman had a right to guns, weapons, or other instruments. It was a
governmental allowance that depended on hierarchal structure and socio-economic
status.187 Most importantly, it was an allowance that could be altered and regulated
“as allowed by law.” What could never be taken away, however, was the
philosophical right the “have arms” provision echoed—the right of the people to take
up “arms for their Defence” when all other means of redress to a tyrannical
government are exhausted. This is why William Blackstone labeled it the “fifth and
last auxiliary right,”188 for it should only be looked upon as the last option to secure
the liberties of the people.
III. CORRECTING THE “INDIVIDUAL RIGHT” INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONVENTION
The two best arguments that Individual Right Scholars make concerning the
legislative history of the “have arms” provision are taken out of context. The first is
their interpretation of Mr. Finch’s testimony at the Convention. Malcolm contends
that “[t]he need for the private possession of weapons to restrain the Crown was
pressed by Mr. Finch.”189 In John Somers’ account, he abbreviated Finch’s statement
as follows:
Question, If the King has lost his title to the crown?—I think no man
safe under his administration.—No safety but in the consent of the
nation.—The constitution being limited, there is a good foundation for
defensive arms.—It has given us right to demand full and ample
security.—If there be an expedient wherein all may be secure, and all
agree, that is the best.—1. We are to examine and inquire of the
succession.—2. Every man must swear to it as lawful and rightful.190
184

See id. at 239, 242, 259, 271, 531.

185

5 COBBETT, supra note 37, at 1236.

186

Id.

187

See supra notes 31-32.

188

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (Oxford,
Claredon 1765).
189

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 116.

190

2 SOMERS, supra note 37, at 410.
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Based on this account, Malcolm believes Finch was making the point that “there
was both a personal and a national interest in the ability of citizens to have
‘defensive arms.’”191 In making this contention, however, Malcolm omits all the
preceding and subsequent language of the quote.192 What Finch was actually
referring to was the “title to the throne.”193 His reference to “defensive arms” had
nothing to do with private possession of weapons but instead had to do with the
philosophical principle that Parliament may overthrow a tyrannical government. At
no time was Finch referencing anything except the succession conundrum that the
Convention faced: How would it legally proclaim William and Mary of Orange the
true sovereigns of England? Finch argued that if the English Constitution was
limited, then when James II dispensed and suspended those limitations, the
Constitution gave Parliament and the people the right to take up arms in its
defense.194
Individual Right Scholars’ misuse of historical context at the Convention does
not end here. They also believe that Thomas Erle’s draft of a speech which was
“probably presented . . . in one of the [Convention’s] early debates” gives weight to
the argument that the “have arms” provision protected individual firearm
possession.195 The portion of the speech to which they refer reads:
It will be convenient to make no man a militia officer but such as have
a good estate to bear the expense of such an office, as hath been in ancient
times; and it will prevent the misemploying the money gathered for the
service of the county if there be two treasurers appointed that are persons
of ability and known integrity to receive it, their clerks or servants to be
allowed some small rewards for disbursing and receiving the money;
commissioners to be appointed that are no militia officers for taking an
account and for the disposal of the militia money. Besides the militia
arms it will be convenient that every man that hath ₤10 and every
substantial householder in any town or city should be provided of a good
musket in case of an invasion: if it be said they will destroy the game,
there is a law made against it so that ’tis not the gun or musket that
offends but the man that makes an ill use of his arms and he may be
punished for it by the law.196

191

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 116.

192

In the text, Malcolm only included the phrase, “no safety but the consent of the
nation—The constitution being limited, there is a good foundation for defensive arms—It has
given us right to demand full and ample security.” Id.
193

THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 21, at 207, 210.

194

Somers’ account is a summation of what was stated. See also 6 GREY, supra note 138,
at 13-15 (examining Anchitell Grey’s account). This principle was well known from John
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, which was reprinted to retroactively justify the
Glorious Revolution. See SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 117.
195

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 116.

196

Mark Goldie, Thomas Erle’s Instructions for the Revolution Parliament, December
1688, in 14 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 337, 345 (Clyve Jones ed., 1995).
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Although Erle never delivered these sentiments in a speech to Parliament, there is
no denying that he would have expressed his opinion on these matters to his fellow
members.197 As historian Mark Goldie shows us, Erle’s speech was constructed in
the midst of the Glorious Revolution, meaning it was drafted around December
1688.198 But even if Goldie has miscalculated the date, the draft supports the limited
purpose of the “have arms” provision—defense of the realm against foreign
invasion. What makes this abundantly clear is the militia context that Erle mentions:
“[E]very substantial householder . . . should be provided of a good musket.”199 The
purpose of providing these muskets was “in case of an invasion.”200 It was not for
individual protection of the home whatsoever, a point Erle clarifies when he
mentions the game laws, for he knew the governments arming of the people—even if
it were to apply only to “substantial householders”—would be seen as a dangerous
proposition. He hoped to ease those fears by reminding Parliament that there were
already laws on the books regarding the unlawful use of arms.
Furthermore, the fact that Erle sought to arm only “substantial householders”
speaks to the “have arms” provision’s exception that it be “suitable to their
condition.” Erle was not asking Parliament to arm every man in England, nor was he
asking that they be allowed to arm themselves as the “individual right” view would
have it. Rather, he sought to arm only those who met certain hierarchal and socioeconomic qualifications. Just what would qualify as a “substantial householder” is
uncertain, but this does not mean that Erle’s use of language should be taken lightly.
It is significant that Erle’s arming proposal was placed immediately after his mention
of the Stuart Kings’ standing armies and his grievances with the Militia Act,
including the grievances that militia arms had been put into the hands of “lewd
dissolute persons’ custody.”201 Rather, Erle thought it was in the nation’s best
interest to “put the militia arms into such hands that have estates of their own.”202 He
reasoned that “lewd dissolute persons” were not to be trusted because they “have
nothing [and] do not care to preserve that for others that they have no share in
themselves.”203 Meanwhile, people of landed estates “have something to lose [and]
will be careful to preserve it.”204
In the end, Erle’s proposal that every “substantial shareholder” be provided a
good musket did not pass. His recommendations may have led to the Heads of
Grievances’ language that Protestants “should provide and keep Arms for their
common Defence.” These words articulate what Erle sought to propose: it was every
Protestant’s duty to protect against invasion. The language was substantially
changed to “may have arms,” though, articulating that having arms was an allowance
by law—not a right per se.
197

See THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 21, at 207, 217.
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See 14 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 196, at 337, 340-42.
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Id. at 345.
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Id.
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Id. at 344.
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Id.
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Id. at 344-45.
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Id. at 344.
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IV. THE GAME ACTS AND UNDERSTANDING ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE
Individual Right Scholars contend that the passing of the “have arms” provision
should have negated the 1671 Game Act’s restrictions on weapons. Otherwise, with
the Game Act still in force, the “have arms” provision would be a right that “merely .
. . [protected] the wealthy.”205 First and foremost, there is nothing in the drafting
history of the Declaration of Rights that extended the right to “have arms” to hunting
or game. None of the grievances or debates even mentioned it in passing. The right
to “have arms” was expressly linked to the employing of Catholic Lieutenants, and
no substantiating historical evidence exists to prove otherwise.
In fact, the Heads of Grievances stipulated the possession of arms for “their
common Defence,” a phrase that even Joyce Lee Malcolm believes speaks of arms
ownership as a “public duty.”206 The only public duties that involved the possession
of arms were connected to the defense of the realm through the assize and militia
laws.207 The phrase “for their common Defence,” however, was altered by the House
of Lords. Its final language dropped the word “common” so it read “for their
defence.”208 Malcolm and other Individual Right Theorists believe that this change
“marked a final shift away from the private ownership of arms as a political duty and
toward a right to have arms for individual defense.”209
This interpretation, however, does not adequately explain the House of Lords’
decision to add the phrase “suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.” As
has already been shown, the term “condition” was frequently used in weapon,210
militia,211 and game laws.212 In every instance, the term referenced hierarchal and
socio-economic status—the chain of being.213 The clause was not “vague,” as
205
MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 120. Here Malcolm is showing her twentieth-century
bias. The Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision and the Game Acts were in fact
adopted to protect the interests of the wealthy. The 1690’s Parliamentarians were primarily
concerned with the landed gentry’s interests.
206

Id. at 118-19.

207

See supra note 31.

208

Id. at 119.

209

Id.

210

See supra note 30.

211

13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 2 (1662) (Eng.); 13 Edw., c. 6 (1285) (Eng.).

212

22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25, § 2 (1670-71) (Eng.); 3 Ja., c. 13, § 4 (1605-06) (Eng.). The
1692 Game Act permitted the destruction of things such as guns, weapons, nets, and dogs that
were “prohibited to be kept by persons of their degree.” 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 23, § 4 (1692)
(Eng.).
213
The “chain of being” was a hierarchal conception. The classical expression of this idea
was the Anglican Homily of Obedience, which was read to the churches:
ALMIGHTY God hath created and appointed all things, in heaven, earth, and
waters, in a most excellent and perfect order. In heaven he hath appointed distinct (or
several) orders and states of archangels and angels. In earth he hath assigned and
appointed kings and princes, with other governors under them, all in good and
necessary order. . . . The sun, moon, stars, rainbow, thunder, lightning, clouds, and all
birds of the air, do keep their order. The earth, trees, seeds, plants, herbs, corn, grass,
and all manner of beasts, keep themselves in their order. . . . And man himself also
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Malcolm contends, nor was it included to allow for “legislative clarification and for
perpetuation of restrictions such as that on ownership of handguns.”214 It was
intended to clarify just how limited one “may have arms for their Defence.”
The next contention made by Individual Right Scholars is the argument that the
lingual understanding of “arms for their Defence” clearly speaks to individual selfdefense, whether it is of the home, person, or property. Historian J. R. Western
believes that the removal of the word “common,” “suggested only that it was lawful
to keep a blunderbuss to repel burglars: ‘Subjects which are protestants may have
arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.’”215
Malcolm takes Western’s analysis a step further by claiming that the shift protected
an individual’s “right to have arms for individual defense.”216 Neither interpretation,
however, is correct. While Western accurately includes the hue and cry217 as one of
the allowances by law that Protestants “may have arms . . . suitable to their
conditions,” he did not adequately articulate the protective scope of the right to
“have arms.” Not to mention, even the hue and cry limited what types of arms one
may possess.218 Meanwhile, Malcolm assumes that “for their defence” spoke to
individual firearm ownership without providing any use of this language—in
contemporary seventeenth-century law or literature—that proves her assertion.
A look at the books, pamphlets, and literature prior to, contemporaneous with,
and after the Glorious Revolution actually shows that the phrases “arms for their
common defence” and “arms for their defence” were synonymous in meaning. Both
referenced the use of arms for military purposes, defense of the realm, or that the
people have a right to overthrow tyrannical government, in the philosophical context.
For instance, in his treatise on the art of war, Roger Boyle, the Earl of Orrey, wrote
that it was the duty of the “[s]oldiers [to] carry Arms for their Defence.”219 In 1623,
Richard Jobson wrote of “Ferambra” the “Lord of his Country” putting “himselfe
[and] Country in armes for their defence.”220 In 1674, Blaise Monluc wrote of his
personal experience of going to the Court of French Parliament to convince it to
hath all his parts both within and without . . . members of his body, in a profitable,
necessary, and pleasant order. Every degree of people, in their vocation, calling, and
office, hath appointed to them their duty and order. Some are in high degree, some in
low; . . . and every one have need of other.
An Exhortation concerning Good Order and Obedience to Rulers and Magistrates, in 1 THE
TWO BOOKS OF HOMILIES 105 (Oxford, n. pub. 1822).
214

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 121.

215
J. R. WESTERN, MONARCHY AND REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH STATE IN THE 1680S, at 339
(1972).
216

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119.

217

The hue and cry laws always limited what arms individuals were allowed and
prescribed to own according “to the quantity of their Lands and Goods.” See 13 Edw. 1, c. 6
(1285) (Eng.).
218

Id.

219

ROGER BOYLE, A TREATISE OF THE ART OF WAR 75 (London, T.N. 1677).

220

RICHARD JOBSON, THE GOLDEN TRADE 100 (Charles G. Kingsley ed., Devonshire, E. E.
Speight & R. H. Walpole 1623); see also SAMUEL PURCHAS, PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMES 1456
(London, William Stansby 1625).
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“take up arms.”221 Monluc argued that it was the Parliament’s duty to “encourage the
people” to defend France.222 In order for Parliament to convince the people, though,
he believed it must “see those who have power over their lives and estates take arms
for their defence.”223 The use of the phrase in these examples was purely military in
context. However, this use of “arms for their defence” was not common.
In most instances, “arms for their defence” referenced the people—either in a
militia or military context—standing up against tyrannical oppression. For example,
in 1585, when Thomas Bilson addressed whether it was lawful to resist tyrannical
princes and magistrates, he stated that the Protestant “subjectes taking armes for their
defence in such a case” was “in no way to be accounted treason.”224 This philosophy
of lawful rebellion with the phrase “arms for their defence” was reiterated in multiple
tracts. In 1608, Jean Francois Le Petit wrote that rebellion against tyrannical
government was “permitted both by godly, naturall, and humaine laws.”225 This
made it lawful “by authority of the councell of [the] state then ruling to take armes
for their defence and securities.”226 In 1643, William Prynne wrote of the duty of
Parliament to engage with “open Force of Armes” when the King “betray[ed] [its]
trust, yea the whole kingdome too.”227 Prynne explained that Parliament must
“defend their owne and the Subjects Liberties, persons, privileges, . . . against his
Majesties offensive Armies which invade them.”228 The power to engage in such
rebellion was “agreeable to the very Law of nature and reason,” and, therefore,
Prynne explained it was “lawfull to take up Armes for their Defence when it was
needful.”229
Many other examples of the phrase “arms for their defence” exist in this
context,230 but there are two that are particularly important. The first is a
221

BLAIZE DE MONTLUC, COMMENTARIES 306 (London, Andrew Clark 1674).

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

THOMAS BILSON, THE TRUE DIFFERENCE BETWEENE CHRISTIAN SUBIECTION
UNCHRISTIAN REBELLION 508 (Oxford, Barnes 1585).

AND

225
FRANCOIS LE PETIT, GENERALL HISTORIE OF THE NETHERLANDS 610 (London, Edward
Grimbstone trans., A. Islip & G. Eld 1608).
226

Id.

227

WILLIAM PRYNNE, THE THIRD PART OF THE SOVERAIGNE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS AND
KINGDOMES 4 (London, Michael Sparke 1643).
228

Id.

229

Id.

230

THOMAS BAKER, THE WICKED MANS PLOT DEFEATED 62 (London, n. pub. 1656)
(stating “shall therefore make no Bones of provoking their most Potent Neighbors to take up
Armes for their Defence”); ELIE BENOIST, THE HISTORY OF THE FAMOUS EDICT OF NANTES 57
(London, John Duton 1694) (stating “often gives them cause to take up Armes in their
defence”); EDMUND BORLASE, BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON THE EARL OF CASTLEHAVEN’S MEMOIRS
OF HIS ENGAGEMENTS AND CARRIAGE IN THE WARS OF IRELAND 20 (London, n. pub. 1682)
(stating “[t]hat the whole Nation took up Arms for their defence”); ROBERT CODRINGTON, A
DECLARATION SENT TO THE KING OF FRANCE AND SPAYNE FROM THE CATHOLIQUES OR REBELLS
IN IRELAND 3 (Paris, n. pub. 1642) (stating “those only excepted who shall be declared
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contemporaneous 1688 pamphlet by Peter Pett entitled The Happy Future State of
England.231 Pett discussed how the papists brought almost as much alarm and fear
throughout the kingdom as a foreign invasion would.232 In fact, the fear was so
extreme that it caused the government to “occasionally lay[] a Tax on men to buy
what Arms for their defence the Law allowes.”233 The pamphlet’s use of the phrase
“arms for their defence” perfectly captures what the Declaration of Rights’ “have
arms” provision protected. This is because the allowance that Protestants “may have
arms” was more of a tax than anything else. Through the militia acts, the hue and
cry, and the assize of arms, individuals were required to possess arms depending on
their quality or condition.234 Moreover, Pett makes reference to “as the law allowes,”
further showing the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.”235 The
government could always change what types of arms persons were allowed to
provide depending on their quality or condition.236
The second example is a 1649 work by James Howell describing the events of
the English Civil War and Charles I’s fleeing to the Isle of Wight.237 Howell wrote
that Charles I was “contented to declare, That the two Houses [of Parliament] were
necessitated to take Armes for their defence”—a connation that clearly speaks of
military defense.238 What is particularly interesting is that Howell would further
write about “self-defence.” To Howell, “self-defence” is “the universall Law of
Nature, and it extends to all other creatures, as well as the rationall.”239 It is not a
written principle:
[B]ut a Law born with us; A Law which we have not learnt, receiv’d
or read, but that which we have suck’d, drawn forth, and wrung out of
Nature her self; A Law to which we are not taught, but made unto,
wherewith we are not instructed, but indued withall, that if our lifes be in
jeopardy, [etcetera] we may repell force by force.240

enemies to the common cause, or shall refuse to take armes for their defence”); PHILIPE DE
COMMINES, THE HISTORIE OF PHILIP DE COMMINES KNIGHT, LORD OF ARGENTON 69 (London,
Ar. Hatfield & I. Norton 1596) (stating “the Bishoprick . . . commanded them to take armes
for their defence”); MARTIN FUMÉE, THE HISTORIE OF THE TROUBLES OF HUNGARIE 162
(London, Felix Kynston 1600) (stating “[a]nd because in this towne where many persons, who
willingly, or by compulsion of the Turkes, had taken armes for their defence”).
231

PETER PETT, THE HAPPY FUTURE STATE OF ENGLAND (London, n. pub. 1688).

232

Id. at 60.
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Id.
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See supra notes 31-32.
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PETT, supra note 231, at 60.
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Id.
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JAMES HOWELL, AN INQUISITION AFTER BLOOD (n.p., n. pub. 1649).
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Id. at 4.
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Id.
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Id. at 4-5.
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Howell rightfully believed that Parliament exercised the principle of the natural
right of “self-defence” when it took “arms for their defence,” and Charles I “was
content[] to acknowledge.”241 Individual Right Theorists will argue that Howell’s
analysis proves that “self-defence” and “arms for their defence” were synonymous
phrases—that the latter spoke to armed individual self-defense. This, however, takes
Howell out of context. Howell makes it clear that “self-defence” is an individual
natural right to defend one’s person when assaulted.242 The term can also be a
broader principle for revolution. It is this revolutionary context in which the people
may “have arms” to protect their liberties.243 It was this natural law principle that
prompted Parliament to take up “arms for their defence.” If the two phrases were
synonymous, Howell would have stated that “arms for their defence” “is the
universall Law of Nature.” He did not. Instead, he was clear to differentiate
between the two principles. “Arms for their defence” is in reference to organized
and justified rebellion or military action based on the principle of “self-defence.”
Meanwhile, “self-defence” often was in reference to an individual’s right to protect
his or her person when endangered, but this right was not absolute.244
If anything, Howell’s tract shows that “self-defence” was a common term used
prior to the drafting of the Declaration of Rights.245 And because it was common, it
begets the question, “Why was ‘self-defence’ not used in lieu of ‘arms for their
defence’?” The use of the former would have more adequately articulated an
“individual right” to “have arms” to protect their person, house, and property. The
truth of the matter is that “arms for their defence” was used because it properly
articulated the principle of defending the realm against outside forces and against
tyrannical governments. It had nothing to do with an individual’s protection of his
person, house, or property.
Parliament’s use of the phrase “arms for their defence” twice in 1642 supports
this understanding. The first usage occurred on January 12th in the House of Lords.
John Pym, responding to the charge that Parliament endeavored to raise a force of
men to remove Charles I, stated that it was “the king’s going into the North and
raising armies there” that preceded Parliament taking “any course, or [making] any

241

Id. at 5.

242

See id. at 4-5.

243

John Cartwright described the Americans’ actions at the Boston Tea Party as being
“done in self-defence, with the greatest good order and decency, and unaccompanied with
incivility to any one, or the smallest damage to any thing in the ships besides the treacherous
tea.” John Cartwright, Letter IX (Apr. 9, 1744), in ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM 1774-1778, at 173, 182 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1972). James Otis also described the
right to revolt as a right of self-defense when he paraphrased Blackstone. See JAMES OTIS,
THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764),
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 419, 428 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1965).
244

See JAMES HOWELL, DIVERS HISTORICALL DISCOURSES OF THE LATE POPULAR
INSURRECTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN, AND IRELAND 378 (London, J. Grismond 1661).
245
A search for “self-defence” provides 793 instances in 231 books, pamphlets, and tracts
from the years 1473-1700. Early English Books Online, http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home (last
visited Sept. 28, 2009).
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preparation to take up arms for their defence.”246 The second instance occurred in
the House of Commons. On November 18th, Parliament ordered that the inhabitants
of the Hamlets Popular and Blackwall:
[S]hall have Power to make Assesses, as well upon the Lands as the
Inhabitants, to the Value of One hundred and Fifty Pounds, for Providing
of Arms for their Defence, and Satisfying of the great Charge they have
been at for the Courts of Guard, and Posts, and other Necessaries for their
Security.247
Both examples limit “arms for their defence” to a defense of the realm context.
Individual Right Scholars have never explored the seventeenth-century
understanding of the phrase “arms for their defence.” They merely assume it equates
with armed individual “self-defence”248—a contemporary misunderstanding of
seventeenth-century terminology. Not even Cato’s Letters linked the two together.
In writing on self-defense in 1720, Thomas Gordon wrote that the “Law of Nature
does not only allow us, but oblige[s] us, to defend ourselves. It is our Duty, not only
to ourselves, but to Society.”249 Cato’s Letters and quotations like this have been
used by Individual Right Scholars to support their stance. What these scholars fail to
mention, however, is that Gordon was discussing a natural right, and he made no
mention of a right to weaponry or arms. There is not one instance in Cato’s Letters
that states that society cannot determine what means individuals may use to defend
themselves and society upon entering civilization. In fact, the first law of nature is
that “all Men are bound alike not to hurt one another.”250
There is not even a mention of the Declaration of Rights or a right to “have arms”
in any of the Cato tracts mentioning or examining self-defense. One may argue that
Gordon and Trenchard forgot to include it, or that it was just naturally understood to
exist. However, this does not explain why the authors went to great lengths to
include the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution when discussing other matters
of a constitutional nature. These other matters include the right to petition,
separation of powers in a limited monarchy, and standing armies—all of which are
expressly contained within the Declaration of Rights. The right to petition and
redress was a “legal Remedy at Hand: It is their undoubted Right, and acknowledged
to be so in the Bill of Rights passed in the Reign of King Charles the First; and since
by the Act of Settlement of the Crown at the Revolution.”251 In writing about the
246
3 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 58 (London, R. Bagshaw. 1806)
247

2 H.C. JOUR. 855 (1802).

248

MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 113-34;

249

John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Considerations on the Nature of Laws (Aug. 26,
1721), in 2 CATO’S LETTERS 64, 69 (London, W. Wilkins, T. Woodward, J. Walthoe & J.
Peele 3d ed. 1733).
250

Id. at 68.

251

John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Of the Natural Honesty of the People, and Their
Reasonable Demands (Apr. 8, 1721), in 1 CATO’S LETTERS 177, 182 (London, W. Wilkins, T.
Woodward, J. Walthoe & J. Peele 3d ed. 1733). Gordon later wrote:
By the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement, at the Revolution, a Right is asserted
to the People of applying to the King and to the Parliament, by Petition and Address,
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limited powers of the crown, Gordon wrote, “We have a Constitution that abhors
Absolute Power; we have a King that does not desire it; and we are a People that will
never suffer it.”252 For the unconstitutionality of standing armies, one need look no
further than the title of Trenchard’s 1697 tract, An Argument Shewing that a
Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive to
the Constitution of the English Monarchy.253
To be clear, neither Trenchard nor Gordon viewed armed individual self-defense
as a right—natural or civil. In a state of nature, it is undeniable that every person has
“a Right to repel Injuries, and to revenge them.”254 That is, people have “a Right to
punish the Authors of those Injuries, and to prevent their being again committed.”255
An individual, however, gives up this unfettered natural right to the government
upon entering society. As Gordon wrote, “[I]t is absurd to suppose that National
Legislatures, to whom every . . . [person’s] private Power is committed, have not the
same Right, and ought not to exercise it on proper Occasions.”256 In society, the
people also turn over justice to the government. Gordon felt that the natural right of
“repelling and revenging Injuries, in such [a] Manner as every [person] thought best,
is transferred to the Magistrate, when Political Societies are formed.”257 It only
returns to “private [individuals] again, when the Society is dissolved.”258
This dissolution of society and government can occur with a lack of proper
succession or when society restrains “the great End of their Trust, in protecting the
Innocent; an End for which alone Men part with their natural Rights, and become the
Members and Subjects of Society.”259 When this trust is broken and government is
oppressive, the people “have a Right to defend and preserve themselves” because
“there is no other Power in Being to protect and defend them.”260 In other words, the
people have a right to revolt against unjust rule. Even Trenchard knew it was
difficult to imagine that “any Number of Men [would be] formidable enough to
disturb a settled State” given the “Artillery, and all the Magazines of War” at the
for a Redress of publick Grievances and Mismanagement, when such there are, of
which They are left to judge.
The Right and Capacity of the People to judge of Government (July 22, 1721), in 2 CATO’S
LETTERS, supra note 251, at 34, 42.
252

Considerations on the Destructive Spirit of Arbitrary Power (Apr. 15, 1721), in 1
CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 249, at 184, 192.
253

JOHN TRENCHARD, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING THAT A STANDING ARMY IS INCONSISTENT
WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ENGLISH MONARCHY (London, n. pub. 1697).
254

The Justice and Necessity of Punishing Great Crimes, Though Committed Against no
Subsisting Law of the State (Jan. 7, 1720), in 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 251, at 66, 66.
255

Id.

256

Id.

257

The Lawfulness of Killing Julius Caesar Considered, and Defended, Against Dr.
Prideaux (Dec. 2, 1721), in 2 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 249, at 165, 169.
258

Id.

259

Id.

260

Id.
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government’s disposal.261 But when the “publick Grievances are so enormous, the
Oppression so great, and the Disaffection so universal” the people must rebel.262 It is
this “Principle of People’s judging for themselves, and resisting lawless Force,”
wrote Trenchard, that “stands our late happy [Glorious] Revolution.”263 People did
not have an unfettered right to “have arms” to accomplish this either. What they did
have was the right to take up arms and restore their rights.
Individual Right Scholars ignore these historical and philosophical facts. They
are so bold to believe that even if the Declaration of Rights allowed Protestants to
“have arms,” it must have overridden any laws restricting firearm ownership,
including the game laws.264 The Declaration of Rights never overrode these laws,
nor was it ever intended to do so. In fact, upon the accession of William and Mary,
the 1692 Game Act affirmed that “all and every Law and Statute now in force for the
better preservation of the Game” shall remain in force.265 The only laws that were
voided were those that were “altered or repealed” by the 1692 Game Act’s
provisions.266
Both the 1671 and 1692 Game Acts put in place a provision by which “one or
more Justice of the Peace” had the authority to search the “Houses[,] Out-houses[,]
or other places belonging” to “suspected persons not qualified” by law to possess
certain hunting instruments.267 Clearly, the 1692 Game Act’s search and seizure
provision overrode its 1671 predecessor. What Individual Right Theorists stress is
that the word “guns” was omitted in the 1692 Game Act—an astute and correct
observation.268 The 1671 Act allowed the Justices of the Peace to take the following
hunting instruments from persons who were suspected of violating property
requirements: “Gunns, Bows, Grayhounds, Setting-dogs, Lurchers or other Dogs to
kill Hares or Conies, Ferrets, Tramels, Lowbells, Hayes or other Netts, Harepipes,
Snares or other Engines for the takeing and killing of Conyes, Hares, Pheasants
Partridges or other Game.”269 Meanwhile, the 1692 Act overrode this by listing only
the following hunting instruments: “Bows Greyhounds Setting Dogs Ferrits Coney
Dogs Hayes Lurchers Netts Tunnels Lowbels Hare-Pipes Snares or any other
Instruments for the destruction of Fish Fowle or other Game.”270
A comparison of the two provisions shows that the word “guns” was omitted
from the 1692 Act. One may argue that “guns” could be grouped in with the 1692
Act’s mention of “other Instruments.” This may be true, but any guns found would
261
Liberty Proved to be the Unalienable Right of all Mankind (Dec. 30, 1721), in 2
CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 249, at 214, 225.
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have had to been shown to be an instrument for hunting game. In other words, upon
the justice’s search, there could be no question that (1) the firearm was for hunting
game; and (2) that the individual whose premises were searched did not meet the
property qualifications to possess it, for the search and seizure provision was one of
presumed guilt.271 Persons suspected of violating the Game Act were presumed to be
unable to meet the property qualifications.272 To be qualified, one had to: (1) have
freeholds worth at least 100l. a year; (2) have leaseholds (for ninety-nine years or
longer) or copyholds worth at least 150l. a year; (3) be a son and heir apparent of
esquires or other persons of higher degree; or (4) hold franchises of park, chase or
free warren.273
These qualifications help explain why the word “guns” was removed from the
search and seizure provision. It expressly conflicted with the Militia Act’s
requirement that all persons with a yearly revenue of 50l. were required to provide a
“Foot Souldier and Armes” for the defense of the realm.274 This is likely what Lord
Macclesfield was objecting to in the 1706 Game Act’s debates when he stated that it
was a “great inconvenience” to maintain “guns” in the Game Act.275 Joyce Lee
Malcolm implies that the “great inconvenience” was in reference to the Game Act’s
interference with the alleged right for every individual to own arms for self-defense
that the Declaration of Rights echoed.276 This is not the case nor does the record
support it, for the 1692 Game Act did not repeal Henry VIII’s statute on firearms.
Henry VIII’s statute regulating arms had been enacted to prevent “shamefull
murthers roberies felonyes ryots and routs” and limited what arms one could own.277
The act required individuals have “lands, teñts rents fees annuyties or Office, to the
yeerly value of one hundred Pounds.”278 Otherwise, it was unlawful for them to own,
possess, or use guns. Those who did qualify had to ensure that the gun was “not of
the lengthe of one whole Yarde or hagbut or demyhake beinge not of the lenghe of
thre quarters of a Yarde, Tenne pounds sterlinge.”279 Meanwhile, “Crosbowes little
shorte handguns and little hagbutts” were illegal for anyone to own, regardless of his
condition or quality.280
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The statute also regulated the manner in which one could use firearms. Those
who were qualified could shoot lawful firearms only “within any Cittie Boroughe or
Market Towne or within one quarter of a myle of any Cittie, Boroughe or Market
Towne” at “Butt of Banck of earth in place convenient, or for the defence of his pson
or house.”281 It is here where a statute made it lawful for an individual to use
firearms for self-defense. It was not an affirmed right, but an allowance that could
be regulated by law. More importantly, it was an allowance that extended only to
individuals that earned a yearly value of 100₤.282 All other individuals were
disqualified unless they resided “in anye house standinge and being sett distance
twoo furlongs from any Cittie Borough or Towne.”283 Only then may the individual
have lawful firearms to “ayde and assist to the defence of this Realme.”284
As late as 1755, Richard Burn285 cites Henry VIII’s statute as still being in force
and as the reason “guns” was removed from the 1692 Game Act. He wrote that “it
was not at all necessary to insert a gun in this act, since the carrying of a gun is
prohibited under double the penalty by the statute of [Henry VIII].”286 Meaning the
1671 Game Act’s inclusion of “guns” was repetitive. Henry VIII’s statute already
regulated the illegal carrying, ownership, and use of firearms.287 This conflict of
laws helps put into context Lord Macclesfield’s objection that the maintaining of
“guns” in the Game Act “might be attended with great inconvenience,” but this is not
the only reason.288
As has already been addressed, the 1671 Game Act’s qualifications for hunting
instruments conflicted with the Militia Act. While persons with a yearly revenue of
50l. were required to provide certain arms, it was illegal for these same persons to
possess guns or bows for hunting if they did not make a yearly revenue of 100l.289
The 1692 Game Act did not fix this. It merely altered the search and seizure
provision, and it did not address whether it was legal to own guns for hunting.290
What Individual Right Scholars ignore is that while Section Two’s search and
seizure of illegal hunting instruments may have been revised by omitting “guns,”
Section Three remained in force. It still stipulated that any person not meeting the
281
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hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications were “not allowed to have or keepe for
themselves or any other person or persons any Guns, Bowes, Grey hounds, [or]
Setting-dogs” to hunt protected game.291 Thus, while it may have been an
individual’s duty to provide arms for the militia, at the same time it could also be
illegal for the same individual—who did not meet the 1671 Game Act’s
qualifications—to own firearms for hunting game.
The 1706 Game Act altered this conflict of law. It revised Section Three of the
1671 Game Act.292 No longer were “guns” or “bows” listed as illegal hunting
instruments for unqualified persons.293 Now, it was unlawful only to “keep or use
any Greyhouds Setting Dogs Hayes Lurchers Tunnells or any other Engine to kill
and destroy Game.”294 This fixed the “great inconvenience” maintaining “guns” in
the Section Three of the 1671 Game Act attended. Furthermore, it is in this legal
context that Rex v. Gardiner295 and Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman296 were decided.
Individual Right Scholars incorporate the decisions of these cases in a light that
supports their pre-determined conclusion.297 Unfortunately, in doing this, they do not
understand the legality of “guns” in early eighteenth-century England. The scholars
claim that the court’s failure to mention the militia implies that there was a right to
have guns for reasons besides defense of the realm and against tyrannical
government. Nothing is farther from the truth. As will be shown, the court
accurately applied the statutes of the realm in both cases. The decisions had nothing
to do with a right to own arms for self-defense. They had to do with the proper
adjudication of the game laws.
In Rex v. Gardiner, the defense “moved to quash a conviction, for unlawfully
having and keeping a gun” in violation of the game laws.298 It was rightfully argued,
in accordance with the 1706 Game Act, the defendant’s possession of a gun did not
prove that it was being used for the illegal destruction of game,299 for “guns” were no
longer expressly mentioned in the game laws.300 Therefore, the prosecution had to
prove that the gun was used for the illegal destruction of game. Mere possession was
no longer a strict liability offense that could be prosecuted.301 This legal principle
was articulated by defense counsel when it was argued:
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For . . . if the statute is to be construed so largely, as to extend to the
bare having of any instrument, that may possibly be used in destroying
game, it will be attended with very great inconvenience; there being
scarce any, tho’ ever so useful, but what may be applied to that purpose.
And tho’ a gun may be used in destroying game, and when it is so, doth
then fall within the words of the act.302
Individual Right Scholars rely too much on the defense’s argument that a “gun”
did not qualify as an “engine.” The defense stated that a “gun is an engine, not for
the killing of game, but for the defence of a man’s house.”303 The defense was not
stating that having a gun for the defense of the home was a right. Rather, it was
making the point that “guns” were “frequently necessary to be kept and used for
other purposes,”304 including the “killing of noxious vermin” and self-defense of the
home by persons “qualified to have such arms.”305
Having arms as an allowance was even articulated in the Individual Right
Scholars’ second example—Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman. In that case, the court
stated that “a Gun may be kept for the Defence of a Man’s House, and for divers
other lawful Purposes.”306 At no time did it stipulate that having arms was a right.
The court was merely making the same point that was made in Rex v. Gardiner when
it stated:
As Greyhounds, Setting dogs, Hayes, Lurchers and Tunnels are
expressly mentioned in that Statute, it is never necessary to alledge, that
any of these have been used for killing or destroying the Game; and the
rather, as they can scarcely be kept for any other Purpose than to kill or
destroy the Game.307
In other words, “guns” served purposes other than hunting. This was not the case
with the instruments listed in the 1706 Game Act.308 It was rare for anyone to keep
“greyhounds, setting dogs, hayes, lurchers and tunnels” but to kill game.
In sum, the “individual right” contention about the phrase “arms for their
Defence” and the game laws are unfounded. First, Individual Right Scholars assume
that the Convention’s adoption of “arms for their Defence” affirmed an individual
right for armed self-defense. As the historical record shows, the phrase “arms for
their Defence” has always been associated with using arms in the limited
circumstances of the defense of the realm or to take up arms to overthrow tyrannical
government309—neither of which comport with the “individual right” theory.
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Second, no evidence exists that shows that the Convention intended on
modifying the game laws to comply with an alleged right to “have arms” for
personal self-defense. The removal of “guns” and “bows” from subsequent game
laws was done to remove any confusion with the 1662 Militia Act’s requirement to
provide arms and because the penalties for the illegal possession of arms were
already covered under Henry VIII’s statute.310 Not to mention, the “individual right”
theory that “future legislation would eliminate the discrepancy” between current gun
laws and the “have arms” provision311 does not explain why “arms” qualifications
remained. Both the hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications to possess arms
and the confiscation of the arms of unqualified persons not only remained in force,
they were affirmed by William and Mary of Orange.312 Needless to say, the
“individual right” theory of a right to armed self-defense lacks sufficient legal and
historical support.
V. THE DISARMING OF PAPISTS AND THE ALLOWANCE OF ARMS FOR SELFDEFENSE
Starting in the late thirteenth century, the hue and cry required individuals to
maintain arms, weapons, and armor for the defense of their community and the
realm. When violent crimes were committed—i.e., robbery, burglary, and murder—
people were called from their houses to find and arrest perpetrators according to the
law.313 Michael Dalton’s 1697 edition of Country Justice provides the following
helpful example:
If Thieves shall come to a Man’s House, to rob or murther him, he
may lawfully assemble company to defend his House by force; and if he
or any of his company shall kill any of them in defence of Himself, his
Family, his Goods or House, This is no felony, neither shall forfeit any
thing therefore.314
Dalton accurately shows us that self-defense was lawful through the hue and cry.
In fact, self-defense has always been lawful because it is one of the primary rules of
nature.315 However, an individual gives up some of these rights once he enters
society.316 Although individuals can never relinquish their right to repel force by
310
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force, they do relinquish the society-allowed means by which to accomplish that
end.317 This was true even with the hue and cry, for in 1285, Edward I stipulated
what were lawful arms through hierarchal and socio-economic conditions.318
The 1619 edition of Dalton’s Country Justice supports this. In it, Dalton shows
that hierarchal and socio-economic gun restrictions were enforceable by law.
Immediately after his analysis of the hue and cry laws, he wrote, “Every man
knowing of any that keepeth, or useth any gun, . . . contrary to the stat[ute] may
arrest them, [and] bring them to the next [justice of the peace].”319 Restrictions on
gun ownership and use remained in subsequent editions of Dalton’s work, including
the 1746 edition.320 Malcolm believes that the 1697 edition of Dalton’s Country
Justice—which was released after the Glorious Revolution—inaccurately interpreted
the gun laws. She writes that the 1697 edition “ought to have clarified changes in the
law resulting from the Glorious Revolution, [and] bears all the marks of a rushed and
patchy update.”321 Dalton’s work is deemed inaccurate because the “chapter on guns
listed the acts of Henry VIII and Edward VI even though the latter had been repealed
two years before.”322
Although Malcolm’s note on the statute of Edward VI is correct, her overall
analysis of Dalton’s legal treatise is unsupported. Her theory does not explain why
every edition after 1697 retained the hierarchal and socio-economic conditions on
gun use and ownership—including using arms for self-defense in the home. The fact
of the matter is that the statute of Henry VIII remained in force. It had express
limitations on who could own, use, and operate guns. As the 1746 edition of
Dalton’s Country Justice affirms, although the statute made it lawful to “shoot in any
Gun” in “Defence of his Person, or House,” it did not remove the qualifications to
own a gun.323 Moreover, this self-defense allowance was an exception to the legal
317
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requirement that guns were to be shot only at a “butt or banke of Earth or in tyme of
Warre.”324 At no time had any law allowed every person to own and operate
firearms for self-defense. One had to qualify for a gun in order to lawfully use it.
It may seem odd to contemporary Americans that only qualified persons were
allowed to own and use guns for self-defense or for any purpose, but this was not the
case to persons living in seventeenth-century England. They were familiar with
these types of gun laws. For instance, in 1690 the inhabitants of Westminster and St.
James requested the King to enforce the militia laws as written.325 The inhabitants
were mustered with each being levied “2s. 6d.”326 The money, however, was not
going towards providing arms for the militia as the inhabitants were told. Instead,
the money was pocketed for “private use, to the great oppression of your Majesty’s
poor subjects.”327 The inhabitants knew that the militia laws stated that no person
“was to ‘find a foot arms,’ who has not a yearly revenue of 50l. of real or 600l. in
personal estate.”328 More importantly, and for our purposes, they knew they were
“not qualified by law to bear arms.”329 The inhabitants merely wanted to comply
with the law by finding “men and arms proportionable of their estates.”330
This example shows that the people were well aware of the gun laws and the
ramifications of non-compliance, as well as the fact that only qualified persons may
possess guns—even after the adoption of the Declaration of Rights. The people’s
knowledge of the laws did not mean that everyone agreed with the laws or how they
were enforced. Nevertheless, what is certain is that the people knew that the laws
were in place. For example, in 1682 Henry Booth hoped the search and seizure
provision would not be used against “Protestant Dissenters but only against
Papists.”331 He was of the “opinion . . . that no man should be denied to keep a gun
in his house, provided he did not destroy the game, for a man’s house is his castle
and for the defence.” He further stated that he “thought it reasonable he should keep
a gun” even “though the laws enjoin that none under a certain qualification should
have that privilege.”332
Booth recognized the fact that only people of a “certain qualification” had the
“privilege” of having arms. There is no doubt Booth disagreed with these laws, but
it does not override the fact they were in existence. Moreover, the Declaration of
Rights’ “have arms” provision did not take precedence over these laws, for if the
“have arms” provision had overrode the gun laws, the 1690 inhabitants’ petition
324
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would not have referenced that they were “not qualified by law to bear arms.”333
Therefore, even after the Declaration of Rights, the historical evidence makes it clear
that it was within parliamentary power to limit who could use what arms and for
what purposes—including in situations of self-defense.334
To support their arguments, Individual Right Scholars often point to Parliament’s
March 1689 decision to allow qualified papists to maintain “weapons” for selfdefense.335 In December 1688, Parliament issued the following order:
In the mean time we will endeavor to preserve, as much as in us lies,
the peace and security of these great and populace cities of London and
Westminster, and the parts adjacent, by taking care to disarm all Papists,
and secure all Jesuits and Romish priests, who are in or about the same.336
To maintain this disarmament and secure the peace and security of the kingdom
Parliament passed the Disarming Act, An Act for the better securing the Government
by disarming Papists and reputed Papists.337 This Act included a provision allowing
qualified papists to maintain “such necessary Weapons as shall be allowed to him by
Order of the Justices of the Peace at their Generall Quarter Sessions for the Defence
of his House or person.”338 The Act’s use of “weapons” in lieu of “arms” or “guns”
has two legal interpretations.
The first interpretation is that the use of the word “weapons” was not meant to
include “guns.” For the Disarming Act made it expressly illegal to “have or keepe in
his House or elsewhere . . . any Arms Weapons Gunpowder or Ammunition.”339 The
self-defense exception to this rule, however, mentions only “weapons.” This was
probably intentional because in subsequent sentences and paragraphs of the Act
“Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, and Ammunition” always are mentioned together.340
Thus, there is a valid argument that the Act never intended to allow papists to have
“guns” because it would have fallen under the term “arms.”
The second interpretation includes “guns” as “weapons.” When the bill was
proposed, John Maynard moved that all papists “bring all their fire-arms in, unless
for the necessary defence of their Houses, to officers appointed.”341 Maynard’s
proposal was for allowing qualified papists to maintain “fire-arms” if they could
prove that the firearms were “necessary.”342 Despite differences in the interpretation
of “weapons,” the Disarming Act raised the dilemma of how to convict persons of
333
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being a papist. Parliament was concerned that “not one man will go out of Town,
nor deliver their Arms[] Unless actually convicted” of being a papist.343 Parliament
settled this matter by requiring suspected persons to take Oaths of Allegiance.344
Those who did not take the oath were to be “subject to all and every the Penalties
Forfeitures and Disabilities hereafter in this Act mentioned.”345
Malcolm believes the Act shows there was “general agreement that for the time
being Catholics should be deprived of all arms except those needed for personal
defence.”346 She supports this with Mr. Wogan’s concern during the debates of the
bill when he stated, “If you find not a way to convict them, you cannot disarm
them.”347 She claims Wogan’s statement “clearly meant the new right to have arms
[was] to include all Protestants, whatever their condition.”348 The truth is that Wogan
was concerned only with finding an enforcement mechanism, for immediately
following the words cited by Malcolm, Wogan stated, “I would have a Clause for
[identifying papists] in the Bill.”349 Malcolm goes on to conclude from the language
of the Disarming Act that Parliament “assumed that everyone had a right to own
firearms unless he could be conclusively convicted of Catholicism” and that
“Catholics were considered to have a right to own arms for their personal defence
and the defence of their households.”350
These are several historical assumptions that do not comport with the English
laws governing arms or self-defense. Mr. Maynard delivered a motion to allow
Catholics to maintain arms “unless for the necessary defence of their Houses.”351
These allowances not only required an order of the justice of the peace, but also
required the individual to meet the hierarchal and socio-economic qualifications to
possess these “weapons.”352 Furthermore, the use of the word “weapons” does not
necessarily speak to “guns.” What Parliament meant to constitute as “weapons” is
unknown. All that is certain is that “weapons” were intended to be different from
“arms.”
If anything, the Disarming Act and its debates prove that the having of “arms” or
“weapons” for self-defense was an allowance—not a right. Parliament could never
abolish individual self-defense, but it could regulate how individuals were equipped
for self-defense. Customary practice by the laws of England proves this to be true.353
Even the holdings of Rex v. Gardiner and Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman support
this understanding. The defense counsel argued in Rex v. Gardiner that a “gun is an
343
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engine, not for killing the game, but for the defence of a man’s house.”354 Nothing
was said about the “right” to have a gun. The defense was merely making an
argument that the use of a gun by qualified persons was a lawful purpose by the
statutes of the realm. Meanwhile, Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman affirmed this,
stating, “[A] gun may be kept for the defence of a man’s house.”355 Legal emphasis
must be placed on the use of the word “may.”
Furthermore, the Individual Right Scholars’ understanding of the “have arms”
provision and an alleged right to armed self-defense is ludicrous given that in 1693 a
parliamentary motion was made that allowed “every Protestant to keep a musket in
his House for his defence.”356 The motion was made during the debates of a bill for
the preservation of game.357 After the bill was read three times, Mr. Norris made the
motion, and members Bowyer, Howe, Clarke, and Wharton expressed their support
for it.358 They “thought it a good clause and for the security of the government that
all Protestants should be armed sufficiently to defend themselves.”359 It is this
support for the bill that proves a general right to “have arms” for personal defense
did not exist. Not one member of the House even mentioned the “have arms”
provision in the Declaration of Rights or that “having arms” was a pre-existing right.
John Lowther’s response sums up the overwhelming majority of the Parliament’s
stance on the subject. He stated that the motion was “not proper for this bill” and
was appalled that Norris “would add a clause to it that savours of the politics to arm
the mob, which,” he thought, was “not very safe for any government.”360 Lowther’s
opinion also articulated the concerns that the House of Lords must have had when it
revised the House of Commons’ version of the “have arms” provision. To state that
every Protestant “should” have arms would have created an armed mob. It was
better that the power to regulate “arms” stayed true to customary practice and
remained with the government. This explains why the final version of the
Declaration of Rights guaranteed that only Protestants “may have arms for their
defence suitable to their condition and as allowed by law.”
VI. THE MILITIA ACT OF 1757
In 1757, with pressure from the George II and the people, Parliament passed a
new militia bill.361 The legislative and statutory construction of the bill provides
great insight in understanding the socio-economic and hierarchal structure of using
and possessing arms. The bill first came to fruition because of the government’s
354
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frequent employment of Hessian soldiers. Although the use of Hessian auxiliaries
was meant to provide only temporary security, the length of the Seven Years War
caused their employment to be continual, causing great dissent throughout England.
The people and many members of Parliament hoped to resolve this problem with a
new militia bill—a bill that would put the militia on an equal footing with the best
armies of Europe.
The 1758 bill was first proposed in 1756 and reached the House of Lords on May
24th.362 Needless to say, it was not well received. The overwhelming majority
agreed that a “well regulated and well disciplined militia” was “the only proper
military force of a free country.”363 However, the majority disagreed as to whether
this could actually be achieved, and it disagreed even further over providing the
people with arms. For instance, the Earl of Stanhope knew the Swiss had achieved
much success in providing its people with arms and hoped that England would do the
same.364 Stanhope feared that if the men in England’s army were the only class that
“knew any thing of arms, or military discipline” the country would be forever forced
to defend itself by “keeping up a standing army of at least 100,000 men.”365
The Earl of Granville opened the debate by arguing that the bill was too
conservative in arming the militia. He felt that what is “properly called the militia of
any country” consists of “every freeman in that country who is able to carry arms.”366
Additionally, he viewed the 1662 Militia Act’s requirement that individuals have at
least “50l. a year land estate” as ridiculous.367 Despite his belief that every man
should be armed, Granville thought the bill would ultimately fail. For the bill to
work, Granville knew the government would have to compel every man to make it
their “immediate and apparent interest to breed himself to arms.”368 Parliament
would have to require “men to employ a considerable part of their time . . . and even
some expence, to learn an art which they think they may never once in their whole
life have occasion to make use of.”369
The Duke of Bedford concurred saying, “[I]f it were possible, [that] every
freeman in the kingdom ought to be bred to arms, and taught military discipline,”
then he was for it.370 Bedford saw the “natural spirit and courage of . . . men”
deteriorate because they had been discouraged from the “use of arms, and every sort

362

15 COBBETT, supra note 150, at 706.
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Id. The Earl of Stanhope stated, “[A] well regulated and well disciplined militia, or
some other sort of military force for our defence is what, I am sure, no man will dispute.” Id.
at 708. The Earl of Granville, who opposed the bill, stated, “[A] well regulated and well
disciplined militia is so necessary for the glory as well as safety of every nation, that I wish
with all my heart we had it.” Id. at 714.
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of military exercise.”371 Bedford argued that things had deteriorated to such an
extreme that “many of the inferior rank of people amongst us, are now afraid of
handling a gun or a sword, and are terrified at the very name of a soldier.”372
Therefore, Bedford viewed the establishment of a new militia as being paramount.
To him, the militia was “the best guard we can have for our liberties, and the best
military force we can provide for our defence.”373
The bill, however, failed. It was defeated by a vote of fifty-nine to twentythree.374 This defeat can be attributed primarily to Lord Harwicke who distributed a
pamphlet containing his sentiments against the bill to the House of Lords.375 The
pamphlet provided seven objections, the fifth and seventh of which objected to
placing arms in the hands of the common people.376 Specifically, the pamphlet’s
fifth objection regarded the Parliament’s failure to include a search and seizure of
arms provision in the bill.377 Harwicke wrote:
In the Militia Act of king Charles 2, sect. 14, a power is given to the
lord lieutenant and deputy lieutenants to “search for and seize the arms of
persons, whom they shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom.”
This power is totally repealed by this Bill, and no such new power [is]
given.378
This fifth objection is significant for two reasons. First, it shows that the
government had continued to search and seize arms well into the eighteenth century.
Search and seizure of arms had always been an important tool used to keep arms out
of hands of persons not qualified by law to possess them.379 Second, no one even
mentioned or argued that the maintaining of such a provision was in violation of the
Declaration of Rights’ allowance to “have arms.” In fact, Harwicke’s seventh
objection to the militia bill shows that there was great concern in providing arms to
the common people.380 It stated:
The last thing, which I shall mention, by way of particular objection, is
the loose and unsafe custody, wherein the arms of this militia are directed
to be deposited. Can any thing be more dangerous to the peace of the
kingdom, than for so great a quantity of arms to be distributed about the
country, in the houses of churchwardens, seldom stronger or more
371
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defensible than cottages? In cases of rebellions and insurrections, nay of
riots, instead of being arms for your defence, they will be arms in the
hands of the disturbers of the public peace.381
This seventh objection is significant for multiple reasons. First, and most
importantly, Hardwicke described the militia arms as “being arms for your defence.”
By “your” he meant Parliament, men of the aristocracy, landed gentry, and the
government, not the general people. This terminology echoes the limited right that
the “have arms” provision was drafted to protect. Second, Hardwicke was objecting
to making arms easily available to the common people. Arms in the hands of men
who were “educated and trained” to use them, stated Hardwicke, “gives a habit, and
a love of that kind of life.”382 Meanwhile, arms in the hands of the “common people”
produce “a love of idleness, of sports, and at last of plunder.”383
Harwicke had nothing against putting arms into men of property. Rather, he
“heartily wish[ed] that all the men of property in the nation were bred to arms and
taught military discipline.”384 He was afraid, however, to provide arms “to the very
lowermost rank of our people,”385 which included “journeymen, day-labourers, and
Meanwhile, “men of property are our only freemen,” stated
servants.”386
Harwicke.387
Lord Talbot partially agreed. He felt that the “rich and great” needed to be part
of the militia,388 but he also thought that there could be a compromise.389 As long as
“men of property were bred to arms and taught military discipline” how could there
be “any danger from a seditious insurrection among those of no property, even
supposing they should possess themselves of the arms provided for the militia”?390
The dilemma was how to get the upper classes to participate. The bill did not have
any mechanism that forced “men of property” to serve.391 Well-to-do individuals
could pay a fine to meet their militia obligation, which, therefore, made lower-class
381
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Id. Hardwicke’s sentiments echo those of Thomas Gordon in Cato’s Letters. Gordon
wrote:
In Attacks upon a free State, every Man will fight to defend it, because every Man has
something to defend in it. He is in love with his Condition, his Ease, and Property,
and will venture his Life rather than lose them, because with them he loses all the
Blessings of Life.
Military Virtue produced and supported by Civil Liberty only (Feb. 10, 1721), in 2 CATO’S
LETTERS, supra note 249, at 277, 278.
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men serve as substitutes—a legal loophole that scared Lord Sandys.392 Sandys
reminded his fellow Lords that “no free state ever at first trusted the arms of the
commonwealth in the hands of the poor and indigent; and every one of those we read
of in history, lost their liberties soon after they began to do so.”393
Sandys also made sure to address the concerns of the Earl of Granville, and many
other Lords, regarding making this new militia an efficient fighting force. He knew
that military discipline and training took years to develop, and, therefore, he
questioned how the militia could depend on individuals who were not familiar with
the use of arms unless they were compelled to train every day.394 Not to mention, the
proposed militia law did not oblige individuals to have their own arms. Instead, all
militia arms were to be provided at the expense of the public with general taxation.395
This was a drastic change from the old militia laws that required individuals,
depending on their socio-economic and hierarchal status, to pay for their own arms.
These laws required men of property of 50l. and upward to provide their own
arms.396 Many of these men were required to provide more arms depending on the
number of militiamen they were charged.397 Because this new militia bill placed all
arms in the hands of the Lieutenants, Sandys referred to it as “a Bill for establishing
a popular militia by disarming the people,” and he questioned:
How a man is to learn the exercise of the fire-lock, who is never to
handle a fire-lock but for four or five hours of a Sunday, or how a man is
to learn to form in battalion, that is never to see a battalion, or so much as
a whole company formed, but once a year.398
Therefore, Sandys not only viewed the bill as placing the nation’s security into
the “hands of the poor and indigent,” but he also felt that it disarmed “men of
property” who traditionally were qualified to possess arms.399 In other words,
Sandys feared that this kind of disarming hindered the effectiveness and integrity of
the militia, for how were the men to have a “warlike spirit” if they were not
“possessed of arms, and often handling and making use of them”?400 Sandys stated,
“The art of war is now carried to such a height, that even that part of it which
belongs to the common soldier, is not to be learned without frequent and long
practice.”401
Ultimately, the bill did not pass for a multitude of reasons: it did not have a
search and seizure of arms provision; it lacked an effective regiment to train men in
392
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military maneuvers and discipline; and—what scared the House of Lords the most—
it put the nation’s security in the hands of the poor.402 The Earl of Temple summed
up this last concern best when he stated, “A man [of property] that will not fight for
his liberty, I am sure, does not deserve it, and a man who is no way qualified, cannot
fight for it if he would.”403 Simply stated, the poor could not fight for liberties that
they did not possess. It was commonly believed that only men of property knew
what true liberty was, and it was through property that all liberty was derived.404
However, in less than a year, all of these objections and concerns would not
matter. On December 2, 1756, the King personally requested that Parliament push
through the militia bill.405 Consequently, the failed militia bill of 1756 would
virtually become the basis of 1757 Militia Act. This, however, did not occur without
some changes. For instance, the militia force of sixty-thousand persons in the 1756
bill was reduced to thirty-thousand.406 This change further required that the militia
force come from only the larger towns in an effort to concentrate large bodies of men
quickly.407 Moreover, these acts made it easier to drill the militia, and it positioned
armories in places where they could be watched. Therefore, the nation’s arms no
longer would be scattered among the parishes,408 nor would there be a danger of arms
falling into the wrong hands. Moreover, to further protect against this last point, the
1757 Act included a provision allowing Lieutenants to remove the arms to a safe
place at any time.409 Not surprisingly, the original proposition of how arms were to
be supplied, provided, and secured in the 1756 bill remained unaltered.410
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See An Enquiry into the Nature and Extent of Liberty; with its Loveliness and
Advantages, and the vile Effects of Slavery (Jan. 20, 1721), in 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note
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15 COBBETT, supra note 150, at 772. The King wrote to Parliament:
An adequate and firm defence at home must have the chief place in my thoughts;
and, in this great view, I have nothing so much at heart, as that no ground of
dissatisfaction may remain in my people.
To this end a national militia, planned and regulated with equal regard to the just
rights of my crown and people, may, in time, become one good resource, in case of
general danger; and I recommend the framing of such a militia to the care and
diligence of my parliament.
The unnatural union of councils abroad, the calamities which, in consequence of
this unhappy conjunction, may, by irruptions of foreign armies into the empire, shake
its constitutions, overturn its system, and threaten oppression to the Protestant interest
there, are events which much sensibly affect the minds of this nation, and have fixed
the eyes of Europe on this new and dangerous crisis.
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As previously addressed, the “Arms, Clothes and Accoutrements” of the militia
were provided by general taxation. They were required by law to be kept “under
Lock and Key” in a place where they would be secure.411 Not to mention, they were
to be distributed only during musters and times of training.412 Upon the completion
of such “exercises,” the law required “every Militia Man [to] clean[] and return[] his
Arms, Clothes and Accoutrements, to his Captain, or to such Person as shall be
appointed as aforesaid to receive the same.”413 These provisions led Lord Sandys to
be so critical of the 1756 bill,414 for the bill essentially disarmed the old militia.
Since 1662, “men of property” were required to provide their own arms “suitable to
their condition.”415 This 1662 provision allowed qualified men to possess and
exercise the use of arms at any time. No longer was this the case.
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords were in consensus on this
matter. In fact, it was the House of Commons that submitted the new arming
restrictions in the bill. Apart from Lord Sandys’ reservations, no one was even
concerned with placing sole control of the arms in the hands of government. It was
Parliament’s right to pass laws that determined who was allowed to “have arms” and
for what purposes.416 Furthermore, the 1757 Militia Act did not infringe upon the
Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision. Like the previous militia laws, it
established property qualifications based upon military rank.417 Where it differed,
however, was that individuals were no longer taxed with providing arms. They were
now taxed monetarily, and the government procured and provided the arms.418
Additionally, the 1757 Militia Act allowed individuals to serve in the militia.
Although the 1757 Act did not allow all persons to individually “have arms” per se,
it more closely resembled James Harrington’s militia ideology.419 It gave a larger
contingent of the population an active participation in the defense of its liberties and
government.
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Harrington believed that a militia comprised of English yeoman citizens would provide
better protection than any of the professional armies of Europe. EDMUND S. MORGAN,
INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 15657 (1988). Harrington slightly altered the Roman militia system, giving the ability to bear
arms to all citizens.
JAMES HARRINGTON, OCEANA (1656), reprinted in IDEAL
COMMONWEALTHS 183, 361 (Henry Morley ed., Kennikat Press 1968) (1901). The inclusion
of all citizens made the “common soldier herein a better man than the general of any
monarchial army.” Id. at 361. The result was that members of the militia against “that reward
which is so much higher as heaven is above the earth”—the “common right” that “he who
stands in the vindication of, has used that sword of justice for which he receives the purple of
magistracy.” Id.
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Even Lord Sandys’ reservations do not conflict with this limited understanding of
the allowance to “have arms.” If anything, Sandys supports it. When he referenced
the 1756 bill as “establishing a popular militia by disarming the people,”420 Sandys
meant only qualified men of property—a point he clarified when he expressed
concern over placing arms in the “hands of the poor and indigent.”421 Moreover,
Sandys’ use of “disarming” comports with our understanding of the “disarming”
described in the “have arms” provision. Notice that his use of the term does not
describe an individual physical disarming, but a larger concept. Just as James II
placed Catholics in a position to control the militia arms, thereby “disarming”
Protestants, a similar “disarming” was also occurring: the “disarming” of the old
militia system in which qualified individuals possessed the arms. These two
disarmings, however, differ from each other in their legality. Leading up to the
Glorious Revolution, it was against the law for Catholics to be employed in military
commissions or possess arms in service of the militia.422 Thus, this “disarming” by
Catholic Lieutenants was against the law, as written. Meanwhile, the “disarming” in
the 1757 Militia Act was legal. Parliament authorized this disarming when it
approved changing the qualifications and conditions that Protestants “may have arms
for their defence.”423 In other words, “disarming” was not always a reference to the
individual act itself, but to a larger principle.424
Most importantly, the legislative history of the 1757 Militia Act debunks the
“individual right” theory on the use and ownerships of arms by the middle of the
eighteenth century. It can be seen from the debates that not only did both Houses of
Parliament want to place limitations on the access to firearms, but that there was also
a general consensus that the people were not familiar with the use of firearms,
period.425 The Earl of Stanhope expressed his fear when he stated that only the army
“knew any thing of arms, or military discipline.”426 Meanwhile, the Duke of Bedford
420
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The same is true with the phrase “arms for their defence.” As Lord Hardwicke’s
objection makes clear, this terminology was not speaking to individual self-defense but, rather,
to the larger principle of self-preservation. It is a principle that applies to society as whole to
protect the government that provides individuals their civil liberties. John Trenchard made
this clear in Cato’s Letter No. 12 when he wrote:
The great Principal of Self-Preservation, which is the first and fundamental Law of
Nature, calls for this Procedure [of trial and committal of treasonous persons]: The
Security of Commonwealths depends upon it; the very Being of Government makes it
necessary; and whatever is necessary to the Publick Safety, is just.
Of Treason: All Treasons not to be found in Statutes.—The Right of the Legislature to declare
Treasons (Jan. 14, 1720), in 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 251, at 74, 75. Harwicke
articulated this same principle when he addressed his concern about the security of arms being
placed in the countryside. He stated, “[I]nstead of being arms for your defence, they will be
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reiterated the fact that the people had been discouraged from the “use of arms, and
every sort of military exercise.”427 To the extent that “many of the inferior rank of
people amongst us, are now afraid of handling a gun or a sword, and are terrified at
the very name of a soldier.”428
Not one member in the House of Lords disagreed with either of these points. No
one stated that the people were generally allowed to have “arms for their defence,”
thus making them somewhat proficient in arms use. It was quite the contrary. The
general populous was not in possession of firearms as Individual Right Scholars
contend. The truth of the matter is that there was a general fear of placing arms—of
any kind—in the hands of the poor and indigent.
VII. GRANVILLE SHARP IN UNDERSTANDING THE ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS”
Even Granville Sharp—whom “individual right” supporters429 and the Supreme
Court majority430 cite as providing evidence of a fundamental right to own guns—
supports the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.” Sharp expressly defined
the Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision as follows:
By the constitution of this kingdom, as well as by many express laws
still in force, apprentices, wards, and indeed laymen of all ranks and
conditions, from fifteen to sixty years of age, are required to have arms,
and be duly exercised in the use of them, for the national defence.431
Sharp’s interpretation undoubtedly limits “having arms” to defense of the realm
as a means to prevent unlawful standing armies, and as a philosophical justification
to usurp tyrannical government. Neither Individual Right Scholars nor the Supreme
Court cite this portion of Sharp’s tract. Instead, both focus on an earlier portion
which reads:
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See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 132-33. Malcolm writes:
In a polemical tract written in defence of the armed citizen and the militia,
Granville Sharp insisted that the phrase in the Bill of Rights “suitable to their
conditions and as allowed by law” referred only to the act of Henry VIII “restraining
use of some particular sort of arms, meaning only such arms as were liable to be
concealed, or otherwise favour the designs of murderers,” but proper arms for defence
“are so far from being forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorized, and
the exercise thereof expressly recommended by it.” He claimed that “the laws of
England always required the people to be armed, and not only to be armed, but to be
expert in arms.” No Englishman, he argued, “can be truly loyal” who opposes these
essential principles of English law whereby the people are required to have “arms of
defence and peace” for mutual as well as private defence.
Sharp’s passionate defence of the militia raises the question of whether the right of
Englishmen to have arms as a political, as opposed to an individual, safeguard was
inextricably bound to the institution of the militia.
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This latter expression, “as allowed by law,” respects the limitations in
the above-mentioned act of 33 Hen. VIII c. 6, which restrain the use of
some particular sorts of arms, meaning only such arms as were liable to
be concealed, or otherwise favour the designs of murderers, as “crossbows, little short hand-guns, and little hagbuts,” and all guns UNDER
CERTAIN LENGTHS, specified in the act; but proper arms for defence
(provided they are not shorter than the act directs) are so far from being
forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorised, and “the
exercise thereof” expressly recommended by it, as I have already shewn.
And indeed the laws of England always required the people to be armed,
and not only to be armed, but to be expert in arms; which last was
particularly recommended by the learned chancellor Fortescue.432
From this quotation, Individual Right Scholars strongly infer that an “individual
right” to “have arms” for self-defense existed.433 The first error in this interpretation
is their misquotation of Sharp. These scholars contend that “suitable to their
conditions as allowed by law” was in reference to only Henry VIII’s gun statute. As
the quote shows, Sharp stated “as allowed by law” only in reference to the statute.
The differentiation between the two interpretations is significant for interpretative
purposes, for the Individual Right Scholars’ misquotation of Sharp implies that only
Henry VIII’s Act was a proper legal limitation on the “have arms” provision. This is
not true. As Sharp correctly states, the “as allowed by law” condition respected the
government’s ability to restrict the types of weapons that a person may use and who
may have them.
Individual Right Scholars are quick to forget that Henry VIII’s statute required
individuals to have lands of 100₤ to possess lawful weapons.434 Furthermore, the
statute stipulated:
[N]oe psn or psns, other then suche as have lands tents rents fees
annuityes or Offices, to the yearley value of one hundred Pounds . . . shall
carrie, or have in his or their Journey, goinge or ridinge in the Kings highe
waye, or elsewhere, any Crosbowe bent or Gun charged or furnished
withe Powder, fir or touche for the same, Except it bee in the tyme and
Service of warre.435
At no time did Sharp write that Henry VIII’s statute was the only allowable
restriction on firearm ownership; he was merely clarifying that it “respects the
limitations.”436
The second error that Individual Right Scholars make is that their implication of
the phrase “proper arms for defence . . . are so far from being forbidden by this
statute, that they are clearly authorised, and ‘the exercise thereof’ expressly
recommended by it.”437 This quote is used as a contextual jumping point to another
432
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section of Sharp’s political tract.438 To jump from one section of a political work to
another—without informing the reader of this improper context—is misleading and
perilous in interpreting the law, for Sharp’s mentioning of “proper arms” not “being
forbidden” is again referencing Henry VIII’s gun statute. First, it required
individuals to have annual revenue of 100₤.439 Second, the Act specified that guns
shall be “the lenghe of one whole Yarde, or any Haquebut, or Demie hake of the
length of three quarters a yard”440—a standard that the 1662 Militia Act conformed to
when it required musket barrels “not to be under three Foot in length.”441 Third,
these lawful guns were to “better ayde and assist to the defence of this Realme.”442
Lastly, qualified persons were allowed to shoot lawful guns only “at anye butt of
banke of Earth onlye in place convenient” or in defense of their person or house.443
It is this last allowance—that a qualified person may use lawful guns for personal
self-defense—that gives minor credibility to the “individual right” argument, but not
much. This is because even though the statute made armed self-defense lawful, it
still extended to only qualified persons based on hierarchal and socio-economic
status.444 Individual Right Theorists and the Supreme Court majority in Heller
ignored these facts. Both rely too heavily on the following Sharp quote: “No
Englishman, therefore, can be truly LOYAL, who opposes these essential principles
of the English LAW, whereby the people are required to have ‘arms of defence and
peace,’ for mutual as well as private defence.”445
The quote is often cited to support the “individual right” model and brings us to
the third error in the individual right interpretation of Sharp. Notice the quotation’s
use of “therefore.” It denotes that the sentence is concluding the preceding
paragraph. Individual Right Scholars intentionally omit this paragraph because it
undermines their entire argument. That paragraph reads:
If it be alleged that there can be no occasion, in these modern times, to
arm and train the inhabitants of England, because there is an ample
military force, or standing army, to preserve the peace; yet let it be
remembered, that, the greater and more powerful the standing army is, so
much more necessary is it that there should be a proper balance to that
power, to prevent any ill effects from it: though there is one bad effect,
which the balance (howsoever perfect and excellent) cannot prevent; and
that is the enormous and ruinous expence of maintaining a large number
of men, without any civil employment for their support; an expence, which
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neither the land nor trade of this realm can possibly bear longer, without
public failure!446
Therefore, Sharp states that the people were required to have arms as a means to
check a standing army. This is reiterated immediately following the phrase “for
mutual as well as private defence.” Sharp wrote that the people were required to
“have arms” because “a standing army of regular soldiers is entirely repugnant to
the constitution of England, and the genius of its inhabitants.”447 Individual Right
Scholars assume too much from Sharp’s statement that “the people are required to
have ‘arms of defence and peace’, for mutual as well as private defence.”448 Because
Sharp states that this was “required” proves that he was referring to the laws
respecting the militia, hue and cry, and assize of arms. A right is never a
requirement. It is a guarantee.
The last error of Individual Right Scholars’ interpretation is their failure to
reference, cite, or even examine Sharp’s interpretation of the “have arms” provision.
It explicitly conditions having arms on militia service “for the national defence.”449
Most importantly, it refutes Malcolm’s interpretation of the statement: “proper arms
for defence (provided they are not shorter than the act directs) are so far from being
forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorized, and ‘the exercise thereof
expressly recommended by it.’”450 For it is here—when Sharp defines the “have
arms” provision—that he immediately cites pages nine through twenty-four of his
tract.451 It is within these same pages to which the Court’s majority cites in Heller to
assert that Sharp promoted an “individual right” to armed self-defense.452 This
interpretation, however, is inaccurate.
VIII. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES AND THE ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS”
Individual Right Scholars often cite William Blackstone’s Commentaries to
support their stance that the “have arms” provision and the Second Amendment
support an “individual right” to armed self-defense. In these instances, Blackstone is
always taken out of context. Blackstone perfectly articulates the limited right that
the “have arms” provision was drafted to protect when he wrote:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also
declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2. and is indeed a public
allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and
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self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.453
Never has a commentator so eloquently stated the protective scope of the “have
arms” provision. Malcolm and Individual Right Theorists draw support for their
argument from Blackstone’s phrase “the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation.”454 From this phrase, Individual Right Scholars believe that Blackstone
is talking about armed individual self-defense. Unfortunately, this interpretation
does not comport with the definition of what is an “auxiliary right.” The “have
arms” provision was the “fifth and last auxiliary right”—meaning there were four
other preceding rights.455 Just what was an “auxiliary right”? Blackstone states that
it was a means to ensure that rights “ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of
the laws, [would remain in force] if the constitution had provided no other method to
secure their actual enjoyment.”456 In other words, auxiliary rights “serve principally
as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great primary rights, of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”457
What Blackstone made clear was that when government intruded on people’s
natural and civil rights that the people had recourse by turning to the “auxiliary
rights” to retain them.458 The first three auxiliary rights stemmed from the political
structure of England. The first was Parliament; the second was the King; and the
third was the courts of justice.459 All three entities possessed a duty to maintain
natural and civil individual rights.460 It was when all three government entities failed
and there was an “uncommon injury” to the people or when an “infringement of the
rights” of personal security, personal liberty, and private property occurred—“which
the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach”—that there “still remain[ed] a
fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual.”461
This fourth auxiliary right allowed every person to petition Parliament or the
King for the “redress of grievances”—a right that Blackstone cites as being protected
by the Declaration of Rights.462 It was only once these four auxiliary rights were
exhausted that the people may resort to the “have arms” provision—it too being an
auxiliary right that was “declared by the same statute.” 463 Thus, what Blackstone
was stating is that the Declaration’s guarantees—the right to petition and the
allowance to “have arms”—were intended to be legal devices that ensured the
protection of individuals’ natural and civil rights.
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Individual Right Theorists extend this interpretation to armed individual selfdefense because they misinterpret the phrase “the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation.” They seem to ignore that Blackstone even states that the “have arms”
provision is a “public allowance”—not a right. Furthermore, he confirms that this
“allowance” is “under due restrictions,” which supports the fact that Parliament can
regulate it “suitable to their condition and degree.”464 In no way does Blackstone
state that the “have arms” provision was drafted to give individuals an armed right to
self-defense.465 He merely articulates the principle that the “have arms” provision
comes from the “natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”466 In other words,
“when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression” the people have a right to take up “arms for their defence” to
overthrow tyrannical government.467 The allowance to “have arms” justified lawful
rebellion.468
If there was an eighteenth-century right—either through the English Constitution
or common law—to possess arms for self-defense, then it certainly would have been
included in Blackstone’s section on the absolute rights of individuals. The first
absolute right that the “fifth auxiliary right” could be exercised to protect was
“personal security.” This first absolute right echoes the principle of self-defense by
protecting “[a] man’s limbs,” and enabling “man to protect himself from external
injuries in a state of nature.”469 It is a right that “cannot be wantonly destroyed or
disabled without a manifest breach of civil liberty.”470 However, there is no mention
464
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Id. Blackstone was not the first to articulate this argument. In 1649, James Howell
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of arms or the use of any kind of instruments to defend this absolute right. Nowhere
in his Commentaries does Blackstone state that society is bound to allow individuals
to “have arms” to defend their person. It had always been a “public allowance” by
statute. 471
There is not even one reference to the Declaration of Rights throughout
Blackstone’s examination of “personal security.” Although it may seem valid to
argue that Blackstone may have just forgotten to cite the Declaration of Rights, this
argument becomes perilous upon reaching his analysis of the second absolute right—
“personal liberty.” Writing on wrongful detention, Blackstone states that “31 Car. II
c.2 commonly called the habeas corpus act . . . be evaded by demanding
unreasonable bail, or sureities for the prisoner’s appearance, it is declared by 1 W. &
M. st. 2 c. 2[, the Declaration of Rights,] that excessive bail ought not to be
required.”472 Thus, Blackstone was clearly cognizant of the Declaration of Rights
and its direct application to the three absolute rights of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property. He knew, however, that the “have arms” provision did
not apply directly to any of the three, including “personal security” or self-defense.
As Blackstone correctly cites, the have arms provision becomes applicable only upon
the exhaustion of the preceding four auxiliary rights.473
Moreover, not even Blackstone’s section on self-defense mentions anything
resembling a right to “have arms” or instruments to defend one’s person. It is true
that Blackstone states that “it is lawful for [man] to repel force by force” in “defence
of one’s self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant.”474 However, he does not
cite the Declaration of Rights here, nor does he even imply that people have a right
to a modern means to defend themselves. He merely states that it is lawful to “repel
force by force.” What “force” an individual possesses is not a right. A man can use
only whatever “force” society makes available to him.
Most importantly, Blackstone makes it clear that self-defense is not something
for which one should prepare. Only in “sudden and violent cases[,] when certain and
immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the
law” could an individual “legally exercise this right of preventative defence.”475 In
all other circumstances, the “right of natural defence does not imply a right of
attacking.”476 Instead, the right only required that men have “recourse to the proper
tribunals of justice.”477 Therefore, Blackstone provides a legal analysis that is a far
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cry from an alleged right for individuals to prepare in the defense of their homes by
having arms.478
IX. ST. GEORGE TUCKER ON BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES AND THE
ALLOWANCE TO “HAVE ARMS”
St. George Tucker’s edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries is of special
significance in understanding the “have arms” provision. This is because the Heller
majority determined that Tucker’s analysis “made [it] clear in the notes to the
description of the arms right, [that] Americans understood the ‘right of selfpreservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention
of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent injury.’”479 This note that the
Heller majority paraphrases is not a description of the “have arms” provision,
though, and, instead, is actually a note to Blackstone’s Commentaries stating the
following:
So that this review of our situation may fully justify the observation of
a learned French author [Montesquieu], who indeed generally both
thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom; and who hath not
scrupled to profess, even in the very bosom of his native country, that the
English is the only nation in the world, where political and civil liberty is
the direct end of it’s constitution.480
Not to mention, the majority even takes the language in the footnote out of
context. The pertinent part of that footnote reads:
Rights, then, I apprehend, admit of a fourfold division: 1st, natural
rights; 2dly, social rights; 3dly, civil rights; 4thly, political rights. 1.
Natural rights, are such as appertain to every man, as a moral agent,
independent of any social institutions, or laws, whatsoever: to which all
men, without distinction, so long as they remain in the state of nature, are
absolutely entitled. The whole of which are comprehended under the right
of self-preservation, and of doing whatsoever may be necessary to that
end.
It is this right of self-preservation which gives to any person in the
state of nature the right to punish any other for any evil he has done; and
to be himself both the judge and executioner of the law of nature.
But this natural right doth not amount, even in the state of nature, to a
state of license, or uncontrolled liberty; for the state of nature hath the law
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that
law, teaches all mankind that will consult it, that being all equal, and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions. And, therefore, when his own preservation comes not in
478
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competition, he ought, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind,
and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of liberty, health, limbs,
or goods of another.
When a man quits the state of nature, and enters into a state of society,
he resigns into the hands of society the right of punishing an offender, for
an injury already done him, the society by the terms of the social compact,
having engaged to punish every such offender for him. But he retains the
right of repelling force by force; because that may be absolutely necessary
for self-preservation, and the intervention of the society in his behalf, may
be too late to prevent an injury. Upon the same principle, he may be
supposed to retain every other natural right, which the society cannot aid
him in preserving or enforcing.481
What Tucker’s footnote stated is what Blackstone articulated on the legality of
self-defense: the philosophical principle that when an individual leaves a state of
nature and enters society, that person gives up certain rights. What no individual
gives up, though, is the right to repel force by force, for no matter how many
safeguards society may offer, there will always be instances when an individual
cannot wait for society’s protection and must use force—lethal if necessary—to repel
an attacker. Of course, there is no mention of a right to arms or other instruments to
accomplish this end. There exists no such right.
Even Tucker, writing in 1803 after the adoption of the Second Amendment,
viewed the “have arms” provision as an allowance. This is evidenced by the
footnote he places next to Blackstone’s writing of the “fifth auxiliary right.” The
footnote comes after Blackstone wrote, “The fifth and last auxiliary right of the
subject, that I shall present mention, is that of having arms for their defence.”482 The
footnote reads: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
Amendments to C.U.S. Art. 4, and this is without any qualification as to their
condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.”483
Notice that Tucker cites the Second Amendment as being similar to the English
allowance to “have arms.” The major difference between the two being that the
Second Amendment did not place restrictions on the condition or degree of the arms.
This is evidenced by the statutory requirements in the militia laws throughout the
United States—both preceding and after the adoption of the Constitution—that
persons of all classes were required to keep and bear arms.484 This included even
poor persons and indentured servants. Of course, poor persons and indentured
servants usually were exempt from the requirement to provide arms. They were just
never exempt from keeping arms that were personally assigned by the government
nor relieved from serving during times of emergency.485 In other words, the English
hierarchal structure was not as prevalent in the American militia laws as it was in
England.
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This understanding of Tucker’s analysis of the relation to the “have arms”
provision and the Second Amendment is supported in his View of the Constitution of
the United States, for Tucker first brings up the Second Amendment in describing
Congressional power to provide for “organizing, arming and disciplining the
militia.”486 In it, Tucker reiterates the fact that the Virginia Constitutional
Convention was deeply concerned about giving Congress power over the State’s
militias. The Convention firmly believed “that a well regulated militia, composed of
the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a
free state.”487 Therefore, the Convention proposed “‘that each state respectively
should have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own
militia, whenever congress should neglect to provide for the same.’”488 Tucker
believed that “all room for doubt, or uneasiness upon the subject, seems to be
completely removed” with the inclusion of the Second Amendment.489 Its
incorporation added “that the power of arming the militia, not being prohibited to the
states, respectively, by the constitution, is, consequently, reserved to them,
concurrently with the federal government.”490
This section of Tucker’s View of the Constitution of the United States clearly
denotes that the Second Amendment was a synonymous limited right with the
Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision. This is a fact that does not support
Malcolm or the “individual right” model that the Supreme Court majority adopted in
Heller.491 Furthermore, Tucker goes on to discuss the importance of a wellorganized and disciplined militia. The Framers thought it was essential that there be
uniformity in this regard because of the problems that the country faced during the
American Revolution. Tucker described the militia during that war as one of
“uncertainty and variety.”492 By giving the federal government the power to organize
and discipline, the exact opposite would present itself. Now the country would
present a militia that is “most safe, as well as [a] most natural defense of a free
state.”493
These facts put both the English “have arms” provision and the Second
Amendment in their true contexts. Given that Tucker cites the Second Amendment
as being similar to the “have arms” provision in his edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, coupled with his analysis on the connection between the militia
powers and the Second Amendment, it is clear that neither the English “have arms”
provision nor the Second Amendment had anything to do with armed self-defense.494
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The Heller majority ignored Tucker’s comments and, instead, preferred to focus on
his description of the Second Amendment as the “true palladium of liberty.”495
Granted, the purpose of the Second Amendment and the “have arms” provision is
just this, because the ability of the people to stand up against oppressive standing
armies, foreign and domestic, ensured that everybody had a hand in defending their
liberty. This point is stressed when Tucker writes, “Wherever standing armies are
kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color or
pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, on the brink of
destruction.”496 Tucker stresses the philosophical underpinnings of the English “have
arms” provision—that the people must have the ability to partake in defending their
liberties. If the people were left out of this process, it was feared that they would
have no redress. People had to fight to ensure the protection of their own liberties.
Counting on others to protect them, or in the case of the Second Amendment, if they
were ever restricted from the process, the people could essentially lose these
liberties.
This is why Tucker refers to hunting laws that confiscated English citizens’ arms
for non-compliance.497 It was suspected that the English government had used the
gaming laws as a means to prevent the people from attempting to overthrow
tyrannical government.498 While English gaming laws prior to the Glorious
Revolution might have stated that their purpose was to preserve game and property
rights, they also supported the English government’s objective to prevent popular
uprisings form the lower classes.499
Game laws, however, did not conflict with the English Bill of Rights, for the
“have arms” provision protected only an allowance and did so under limited
circumstances.500 At no time did the game laws outright prevent an individual from
bearing “arms for their Defence.” These laws merely limited who could use and own
certain arms outside of countering an illegal standing army and defending the realm
from invasion.501 Tucker believes that this is what the Framers were trying to
prevent by drafting the Second Amendment.502 The strong language “shall not be
infringed” was included to obstruct the passing of laws that prevented classes of
people from being able to bear arms—including the authority to overthrow tyrannical
government.
X. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON “HAVE ARMS”
Not only have Individual Right Scholars misinterpreted St. George Tucker’s
analysis of the English allowance to “have arms,” but they also misunderstand the
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Founding Fathers’ interpretation. Individual Right Scholars reach conclusions
without substantiating historical evidence and—in most cases—take quotes out of
context. The strength of the “individual right” argument rests in a slew of 1769
newspaper editorials found by Stephen P. Halbrook. These editorials give some
insight into the colonists’ opinions regarding Massachusetts Governor Francis
Bernard’s decision to veto the acts and resolves of an illegally assembled Boston
Town Council. On April 13th, the New York Journal published the following:
Instances of the Licentious and outrageous Behavior of the Military
Conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are of
such a Nature, and have been carried to so great Lengths, as must serve
fully to evince that a late Vote of this Town, calling upon the Inhabitants
to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence, was a Measure as
prudent as it was legal: such Violences are always to be apprehended
from Military Troops, when quartered in the Body of a populous City; but
more especially so, when they are led to believe that they are become
necessary to awe a Spirit of Rebellion, injuriously said to be existing
therein. It is a natural Right which the People have reserved to
themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep Arms for their own
Defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the
Sanctions of Society and Law are found insufficient to restrain the
Violence of Oppression.—We are however, pleased to find that the
Inhabitants of this Town, under every Insult and outrage, received from
the Soldiery, are looking up to the Laws of the Land for Redress; and if
any Influence should be powerful enough to deprive the Meanest Subject
of this Security; the People will not be answerable for the unhappy
Consequences that may flow therefrom.503
It was this editorial that the Ninth Circuit used in Nordyke as supporting evidence
to incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.504 The Nordyke court did not elaborate on how this editorial
supports its stance, but it can be assumed that the court interpreted the “calling upon
the inhabitants to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence”—as prudent and
legal—to equate to armed individual self-defense. The problem with such an
interpretation is that it is not placed in historical context. What was the substance of
the law that called for the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms? What was
the context and reason for passing the law? Why was the law vetoed by Governor
Bernard? Why is “Spirit of Rebellion” mentioned? Does not the editorial’s
interpretation of Blackstone equate with the limited “auxiliary right” that the “have
arms” provision protects?
The Nordyke court failed to ask or analyze any of these important contextual
questions, for if it had, it would have come to understand that the law in question
was a militia law. More importantly, it was a law that was enacted by Boston’s
radical leaders—not the Convention of Towns—because they believed that British
troops were coming to strip them of their rights; thus, they felt compelled to enforce
Blackstone’s “fifth and last auxiliary right.”
503
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In order to place the editorial in its proper context, one must go back to the
Spring of 1768. In March, mobs of Bostonians called for the end of the Townshend
Duties and were celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act.505 Lieutenant Governor
Thomas Hutchinson described these mobs as gangs of thugs “armed with
The mobs were defying the American Board of Customs
bludgeons.”506
Commissioners by continuing to illegally smuggle goods openly through the
streets.507 By June, things had gotten worse. John Hancock’s sloop, Liberty, had
been seized, which caused “riots in the streets, physical assaults on the customs
officers, the burning of patrol boats, Town Meeting resolutions of the wildest kind,
and the harassment of the customs commissioners.”508 This all escalated to a point
where many of the crown’s officials were forced to seek shelter at the Castle
William.509
These events forced Governor Bernard to request several regiments to aid him in
keeping the peace.510 The request invoked unpopular reaction, which caused British
officials to be secretive in requesting more.511 By July, Bernard had “some Concern
for the Safety of the Castle [William] since the Commissioners retired” there.512
Bernard did not have intelligence that it would be attacked, but he knew of the
garrison’s weakness and “the Ease with which it might be surprised.”513 There was,
however, a larger concern. On July 9th, he wrote to Lord Hillsborough:
This very Morning the Select Men of the Town ordered the Magazine
of Arms belonging to the Town to be brought out to be cleaned, when
they were exposed for some Hours at the Town-House. They were
expostulated with for this imprudent act; they excused themselves by
saying, that those Arms were ordered to be cleaned two Months ago.514
It was this rebellious behavior that led Bernard to ask for Thomas Gage’s help.
By July 20th, Bernard finally received some encouraging news. He learned that
Gage received orders to “collect [and keep] in readiness” his army.515 The troops,
505
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however, did not have orders to deploy. There were constitutional concerns at play.
Bernard wrote that neither the “popular [Massachusetts] Constitution nor the present
intimidation” would allow troops to be sent to “quell Riots [and] Tumults but at the
desire of the Civil Power”—a constitutional limitation with which Bernard generally
agreed.516 He personally felt that “no Troops can be of any Service in quelling a Riot
or a Tumult, that are not previously quartered near that Place.”517
Bernard saw his current situation a bit differently. “Troops are not wanted here
to quell a Riot or a Tumult, but to rescue the Government out of the hands of a
trained mob, [and] to restore the Activity of the Civil Power, which is now entirely
obstructed,” wrote Bernard.518 In August, Lord Barrington agreed by offering
whatever support he could. Barrington felt it was “now evident to all the world that
the Civil Magistrate in the Massachusetts should be assisted by troops, in
maintaining Peace [and] supporting [the] Law.”519
The Boston Sons of Liberty were acutely aware of what was afoot. Especially
when, on July 27th and 29th, Bernard requested the Boston Town Council’s approval
for troops. Both requests were unanimously rejected.520 The Council even issued a
reply to Bernard, warning that he would be held “‘in the highest degree unfriendly to
the Peace and good Order of this Government.’”521 This response led Bernard to
believe that he could “‘no longer . . . depend upon the Council for the Support of the
small Remains of royal [and] parliamentary Power now left.’”522
In August, Samuel Adams’ correspondence shows that the radical element
believed that military intervention was all but certain. He even wrote an editorial
under the name “Determinatus,” with the following contents:
I am no friend to “Riots, Tumults and unlawful Assemblies,” I take
upon me to say, any more than his Excellency is: But when the People are
oppress’d, when their Rights are infring’d, when their property is invaded,
when taskmasters are set over [to] them, when unconstitutional acts are
executed by a naval force before their eyes, and they are daily threatened
with military troops, when their legislative is dissolve’d! . . . In such
Circumstances, while they have the spirit of freedom, they will boldly
assert their freedom; and they are to be justify’d in so doing.523
This editorial shows that Adams believed that rebellion not only was evident, but
that the people would be “justify’d” in “assert[ing] their freedom” to do so. James
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Otis wrote similar sentiments, proclaiming that if the colonists’ grievances were not
redressed and they “were called on to defend [their] liberties and Privileges, he
By
hoped and believed [they] should one and all resist even unto Blood.”524
September 8th, the Bostonians received affirmation of the Fourteenth and Twentyninth Regiments coming from Halifax.525 A week later they were informed that two
more regiments would be arriving from Ireland.526 The news caused Samuel Adams
and James Otis to curse the governor. They even pledged to defend themselves “‘at
the utmost peril of their lives and fortunes.’”527
It was under this tumultuous atmosphere that the Boston Town Council requested
the Convention of Towns.528 This is where Individual Right Scholars first fail in
their contextual understanding of the events that took place. A Boston Town
Meeting consisting of Thomas Cushing, Samuel Adams, Richard Dana, John Rowe,
John Hancock, Benjamin Kent, and Joseph Warren proposed a law that required
inhabitants to provide themselves with arms.529 It was not a resolution by the
Convention of Towns. Drafted on September 12th, the proposed law read:
Whereas, By an Act of Parliament, of this first of King William and
Queen Mary, it is declared, That the subjects being Protestants, may have
arms for their Defence: It is the Opinion of this Town, That the said
Declaration is founded in Nature, Reason and sound Policy, and is well
adapted for the necessary Defence of the Community:
And Forasmuch, As by a good and wholesome Law of this Province,
every listed Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers, who by Law
are otherwise to be provided) shall be always provided with a well fix’d
Firelock, Musket, Accoutrements and Ammunition, as is in said Law
particularly mentioned, to the Satisfaction of the Commission Officers of
the Company: And as there is at time a prevailing Apprehension, in the
minds of many, of an approaching War with France: In order that the
inhabitants of this town be prepared in Case of sudden Danger: VOTED,
That those of the said Inhabitants, who may at present be unprovided, be
and hereby are Required duely to observe the said Law at this Time.530
The language of the proposal definitively speaks to the limited nature of the
allowance to “have arms.” This is first evidenced by the requirement that individuals
equip themselves with a “Firelock, Musket, Accoutrements and Ammunition.” Only
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Militia laws frequently required these items,531 a fact that is made clear with the
language “by a good and wholesome Law of this Province.” This phrase was a
direct reference to the 1693 Militia Act and the subsequent militia laws that were still
in force.532 In fact, the language of the 1693 Act corresponds with the Boston Town
Meeting’s proposal. Section 5 of the Act states:
That every listed Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers)
shall be always provided with a well fix’d Firelock, Musket, of Musket or
Bastard Musket bore, the Barrel not less than three Foot and a half long;
or other good Fire Arms to the Satisfaction of the Commission Officers of
the Company; a Snapsack, a Collar with twelve Bandaliers, or CartouchBox; one Pound of good Powder, twenty Bullets fit for his Gun; and
twelve Flints.533
The only major difference between the Boston proposal and the 1693 Act is that
instead of listing each of the required accoutrements, the Boston proposal broadly
defined them as “accoutrements.”534 Other than this, the first sentence of the
proposal and the 1693 Act read almost verbatim. This proves that it was the Town
Meeting’s clear intention to revive the militia laws as a means to repel an alleged
threat from France, for it was through the militia that the inhabitants “may have
Arms for their Defence.”535
It is not surprising that Governor Bernard did not allow such a proposal to go
forward. He was recently informed that there was a plot to “raise the Country and
oppose the Troops.”536 Moreover, at the September town meeting, the same militia
arms that the Boston Council had claimed were “brought out to be cleaned” in
July,537 were rumored to be “laid upon the floor of the Town Hall to remind the
people of the use of them.”538 Bernard was not ignorant. He knew that the Town
Meeting’s debates on “Arming the Town and Country against their Enemies” was a
cover for the radicals’ true intentions—armed rebellion and preventing the Ireland
regiments from landing.539 Bernard wrote, “The probability of a French War . . . was
531
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[merely a] pretence for arming the Town” and “a cover for the frequent use of the
word Enemy.”540
He had even heard the Town Meeting claim that it “had a right to oppose
with Arms military Force which was sent to oblige them to submit to
unconstitutional Laws.”541 Bernard then heard another man argue that “when a
people’s Liberties [are] threatened they [are] in a state of War, and [have] a right to
defend themselves.”542 Both of these quotes adequately articulate the Founding
generation’s understanding of the limited right that the “have arms” provision
protected. What should be stressed is that the grievance that compelled the Town
Meeting to attempt to invoke the militia laws was the sending of a standing army.543
This is significant because it was generally feared that illegal standing armies
usurped individuals’ liberties.544
Therefore, the Town Meeting’s proposal to reinstate the militia laws was an
attempt to prepare to exercise the “fifth and last auxiliary right.” Unfortunately for
the select radical Boston men involved, they were the only representatives in
Massachusetts that felt that such a measure was necessary. When calling the
Convention of Towns, the Boston Town Meeting enclosed its resolves to its
surrounding brethren.545 It was hoped that the surrounding towns would agree with
its measures and, thereby, collectively petition Bernard and Parliament for a redress
of grievances.546 This did not occur, however, especially in regards to reinstating the
1693 Militia Act.
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The Convention of Towns met on September 22nd.547 It is unclear exactly what
transpired at this meeting, but, according to Bernard, extremists like Adams were
“presently silenced.”548 The Convention took more of a moderate stance compared
to the Bostonians. The Convention presented a “humble and dutiful petition . . . for
the redress of their grievances.”549 Thus, unlike the Town Meeting, they sought “the
legal, regular, and prudential methods of obtaining the redress.”550 It is almost as if
the Convention was apologizing for the Town Meeting’s resolves, for the
Convention stated that “no irregular steps should be taken by the people, but that all
constitutional and prudential methods should closely be attended.”551
In speaking on the illegality of standing armies, the Convention viewed these
armies as “dangerous to [the people’s] civil liberty” and stressed that standing armies
were entities that could “ruin the liberties of America.”552 The constitutional means
to protect against riots and tumults should be handled by “the civil magistrate” and
aided by the “Posse Comitatus, when legally called in aid of the civil power.”553 The
Convention made no mention of arms, providing arms, or the reinstatement of the
militia laws.
While the Convention did not outright proclaim that the Town Meeting’s militia
proposal was constitutionally unsupported, the Town of Hatfield did.554 The town
knew the real reason why the Boston Town Council requested a convention—“an
apprehension of their being [a standing army] quartered.”555 The Town of Hatfield
did not see the maintenance of a standing army as unconstitutional in this instance.
Had not the entire colony been told that the purpose of arming Boston’s inhabitants
was to defend against a French War? Thus, Hatfield’s leaders thought it was
plausible that an army be sent there “for your defence in case of a French war.”556
These statements were merely witty retorts to the faulty logic of Boston’s radicals.
The Town of Hatfield knew the real reason why the troops were being sent to
Boston—to check on the latter’s unruly behavior. Therefore, Hatfield told Boston’s
radicals to use their “loyalty and quiet behaviour” to “convince his majesty and the
world, [a standing army is no] longer necessary for that purpose, that thereupon they
will be withdrawn, and your town and the province saved any further trouble and
expence from that quarter.”557
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It is interesting that no mention of the revival of the 1693 Militia Act was made
until nearly six months after the troops were sent to Boston. After his failure to gain
the support of Massachusetts’ leaders at the Convention in January 1769, Samuel
Adams and other radical leaders remained silent on the failed measure. Things had
even calmed to the point that Commodore Samuel Hood did not see the “least
Probability of the People’s taking Arms.”558 “Indeed some few of the Convention
took Pains to bring the Ignorant and lower Class into that Mind, and possibly might
have succeed[ed] had not the Troops arrived as they did,” wrote Hood, “but those
few are now alarmed.”559 This changed when Governor Bernard created a “cabinet
council” to take depositions that, later, would be used as evidence in court trials for
treason.560
Bernard had become aware of all the “hidden purposes” behind the radical
leaders of Boston. It began on January 23, 1769 when Richard Silvester made a
formal deposition before Thomas Hutchinson. In it, Silvester swore that he had
heard Adams howl, “‘Let us take up arms immediately and be free, and seize all the
King’s officers’” and “we will destroy every soldier that dare put his foot on
shore.”561 The most inflammatory statement came from Dr. Benjamin Church.
Silvester heard Church openly state that not only would Boston resist the King’s
troops, but that there were plans to seize Hutchinson, Bernard, and their papers and
“‘send them home in irons.’”562
In addition to the ongoing investigation by the “cabinet council,” Boston’s
radical leaders were also unhappy with the content of King George III’s speech to
Parliament on November 8, 1768. What particularly upset them was the King’s
description of Boston’s inhabitants as being “in a state of disobedience to all law and
government: and [having] proceeded to measures subversive of the constitution, and
attended with circumstances that might manifest a disposition to throw off their
dependence on Great Britain.”563
It was in this context that Samuel Adams defended the Town Meeting’s proposal
to reinstate the provisions 1693 Militia Act. In an anonymous editorial signed
“Shippen,” Adams responded to Bernard’s investigation on treason and to the
contents of the King’s speech. He was appalled that the Ministry believed that “the
558
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proceedings of [Boston], were not only to the highest degree seditious, but nothing
short of treason itself.”564 Adams felt “the charge[s] appeared to be laid too high,”
because neither Bernard, the King, nor Parliament “justly stated or proved, one
single act of that town, as a public body, to be, I will not say treasonable or seditious,
but even at all illegal.”565 Regarding the legality of reviving the 1693 Militia Act,
Adams argued:
For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry to prove that British
subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly
recognized by the Bill of Rights, and, who live in a province where the
law requires them to be equip’d with arms, . . . are guilty of an illegal act,
in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law directs.566
Individual Right Scholars have relied on this quote to infer that the “have arms”
provision protected a right to possess firearms outside of a militia or military
context.567 This is a large assumption given that Adams expressly refers to the “have
arms” provision as a “privilege”—not a “right.” Moreover, such an interpretation is
unsupported because Individual Right Scholars forget to take notice of Adams’
statement that “the law requires them to be equip’d with arms”—an explicit
reference to Section 5 of the 1693 Militia Act.568 The fact of the matter is that the
two are linked. It was a privilege for an individual to possess arms to defend the
state and their liberties. Most importantly, it was a privilege that was regulated
through the militia laws, as the Town Meeting’s resolve makes clear.569 This is why
Adams adamantly defended the resolve as follows:
But if some are bold and base enough, where the interest of a whole
country is at stake, to penetrate into the secrets of the human breast, to
search for crimes, and to impute the worst of motives to actions strictly
legal, whatever may be thought of their expediency, it is easy to
recriminate in the same way; and one man has as good reason to affirm,
that a few, in calling for a military force under pretence of supporting civil
authority, secretly intended to introduce a general massacre, as another
has to assert, that a number of loyal subjects, by calling upon one another
to be provided with arms, according to law, intended to bring on an
insurrection.570
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Adams’ mention of the “interest of the whole country” was a direct reference to
the Town Meeting’s fabricated purpose behind the militia resolve—a perpetual fear
of a war with France.571 With the Seven Years War ending just six years prior,
Adams balked at the resolve as being treasonous or rebellious. If the reinstatement
of the militia laws had a “secret” intent, Adams felt that it was just as fair to argue
that the same could be said on the stationing of troops in Boston. To him, it was just
as plausible that the British troops “secretly intended to introduce general massacre”
if Bernard persisted on investigating the Town Meeting’s militia resolve as
treasonous. This was not Adams’ first query into the insidious designs of the British
troops. He had written a combination of editorials claiming that the army’s presence
was in violation of the English Bill of Rights.572
In these editorials, Adams makes multiple references to the people’s duty to be
aware of their constitutional rights. “It behoves the publick then to be aware of the
danger, and like sober men to avail themselves of the remedy of the law, while it is in
their power.”573 This included restraining military power, especially when it was
being used as a substitute for the civil authority.574 Adams used the power of the
press to push for the peaceful removal of the British troops by arguing that their
presence was unconstitutional on multiple levels.
By February 1769, he changed his approach in light of the forfeiture of the
Massachusetts charter and the reorganization of government that was being
discussed in England.575 In another anonymous Boston Gazette editorial, Adams
responded to the numerous heated exchanges between the selectmen of Boston and
Governor Bernard.576 The governor’s position was that he was forced to solicit the

571

See id.

572

For instance, in an article entitled Principiis Obsta, Adams argued that the maintaining
of a standing army generally led to the adoption of “military maxims” that would “soon
eradicate every idea of civil government.” SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE, UNSIGNED (BOSTON
GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at
251, 252. It was universally believed that soldiers “look upon themselves as a body of men
different from the rest of the people” and would “make laws for themselves, and enforce them
by the power of the sword!” Id. at 252-53. To Adams, it was better that the power be in the
hands of the people. He had no quarrels with the “prerogative [being] a power vested in the
crown by the constitution, for the safety of the people.” SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE SIGNED
“VINDEX” (BOSTON GAZETTE, Dec. 26, 1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL
ADAMS, supra note 523, at 272, 275. This, however, was a power “which is never to be
exerted, but when the safety of the people requires it.” Id. Otherwise, standing armies are
“not to defend the nation, but to destroy its liberties.” Id.
573
SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE, UNSIGNED (BOSTON GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1768), reprinted in 1
THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 251, 253.
574

Id. at 252.

575
RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, LIFE
Brown, & Co. 1865).

AND

TIMES

OF

JOSEPH WARREN 95 (Boston, Little,

576

SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE SIGNED “E.A.” (BOSTON GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1769), reprinted
in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 316, 318; see also ANDREW
STEPHEN WALMSLEY, THOMAS HUTCHINSON AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
98 (1999).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

81

432

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:351

troops to preserve law and order.577 Meanwhile, Adams and the selectmen viewed
the troops as a means to strip the colonists of their liberties. They preferred to have
the civil authorities handle the security of the town, with the civil magistrate having
power to adjudicate. Any riots or tumults were to be suppressed by the militia.
“Every one knows that the exercise of the military power is forever dangerous to
civil rights,” wrote Adams.578 It is here that Adams defended the Town’s militia
resolve and reiterated the limited legal understanding of the “have arms” provision as
stated by Blackstone.579
While Individual Right Scholars use Adams’ paraphrase of Blackstone to support
their stance, it provides nothing that refutes the limited interpretation of the “have
arms” provision. What is unique about this editorial is that it was the first time that
Adams admits the true purpose behind reviving the 1693 Militia Act—legal rebellion
or the invocation of the “fifth auxiliary right.”580 The members of the Town Meeting
were not even remotely concerned with a French war. Primarily, they voted to
reinstate the militia laws as a means to prepare against a tyrannical government.581
Of particular interest is the fact that Adams never stated that individuals have a right
to own arms. The constitutional issue at hand was whether the representatives of the
town may invoke the “have arms” provision.582 In other words, the debate was
whether it was legal to pass a law providing arms for the colonists’ defense without

577

WALMSLEY, supra note 576.

578

SAMUEL ADAMS, ARTICLE SIGNED “E.A.” (BOSTON GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1769), reprinted
in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 316, 318. It read:
At the [Glorious] revolution, the British constitution was again restor’d to its
original principles, declared in the bill of rights; which was afterwards pass’d into a
law, and stands as a bulwark to the natural rights of subjects. “To vindicate these
rights, says Mr. Blackstone, when actually violated or attack’d, the subjects of
England are entitled first to the regular administration and free course of justice in the
courts of law—next the right of petitioning the King and parliament for redress of
grievances—and lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
defence.” These he calls “auxiliary and subordinate rights, which serve principally as
barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights of
personal security, personal liberty and private property”: And that of having arms for
their defence he tells us is “a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural
right of resistance and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are
found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”—How little do those persons
attend to the rights of the constitution, if they know anything about them, who find
fault with a late vote of this town, calling upon the inhabitants to provide themselves
with arms for their defence at any time; but more especially, when they had reason to
fear, there would be a necessity of the means of self preservation against the violence
of oppression.
Id. at 317-18.
579

Id.

580

Id.

581

Id.

582

Id.
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the support of the governor.583 Adams certainly thought so, especially because a
standing army was being maintained in Boston.584
The issue did not end there. Adams—being the great disseminator of political
propaganda that he was—forwarded a similar defense of the Town Meeting’s resolve
to the New York Journal.585 He argued that the “late Vote of this Town, calling upon
the Inhabitants to provide themselves with Arms for their Defence, was a Measure as
prudent as it was legal.”586 It was because “Violences are always to be apprehended
from Military Troops” that it is the “natural Right which the People have reserved to
themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep Arms for their own Defence.”587
It was a right “to be made use of when the Sanctions of Society and Law are found
insufficient to restrain the Violence of Oppression.”588
All and all, the brilliance of Samuel Adams as a political propagandist can be
seen on the subject of the Town Meeting’s attempt to reinstate the 1693 Militia Act.
Adams’ argument evolved from a reasonable fear of foreign invasion to the
invocation of the “have arms” provision in situations when government has
oppressed life, liberty, and property, and all other attempts of redress are exhausted.
Several months later, however, Adams changed his argument again. This time he
took the innocent approach and omitted ever proposing a Militia Act.589 It began
when Boston’s radicals seized Bernard’s and Hutchinson’s letters, publishing them
for all the colonies to see.590 Adams no longer needed to be on the defensive and
forced to explain Boston’s decision to reinstate the Militia Act. Instead, he claimed
that ordering the cleaning of arms was incidental to the riots and tumults occurring at
that time.591 Adams wrote that “revolting” was in “no other Thought in the Minds of
any, except in the Governor and a few more.”592 He explained the incident:
583

Id.

584

Id. Lord Barrington thought otherwise. He wrote:
I am convinced the Town Meeting at Boston which assembled the States of the
Province against the King’s Authority, [and] armed the People to resist his forces, was
guilty of high Crimes [and] Misdemeanors, if not of Treason; And that Mr. Otis the
Moderator (as he is improperly called) of that Meeting together with the Selectmen of
Boston who signed the Letters convoking the Convention should be impeach’d.
Letter from Lord Barrington to Governor Bernard (Feb. 12, 1769), in THE BARRINGTONBERNARD CORRESPONDENCE AND ILLUSTRATIVE MATTER 1760-1770, supra note 515, at 183,
184.
585

Boston, March 17, supra note 503.

586

Id.

587

Id.

588

Id.

589

SAMUEL ADAMS, AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD OR A VINDICATION OF THE TOWN OF
BOSTON, FROM MANY FALSE AND MALICIOUS ASPERSIONS (Boston, Edes & Gill 1769),
reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 396-445.
590

BAILYN, supra note 505, at 130-31.

591

SAMUEL ADAMS, AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD OR A VINDICATION OF THE TOWN OF
BOSTON, FROM MANY FALSE AND MALICIOUS ASPERSIONS (Boston, Edes & Gill 1769),
reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 396, 434.
592

Id.
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Whereas the simple Truth of the Matter is, these Arms had for many
Years been deposited in Chests and laid on the Floor of the Town Hall;
but the Hall itself being burnt a few Years ago, the Arms were sav’d from
the Ruins and carried to the Town House: After the Hall was Re-built the
Town ordered their Removal there; and tho’ it happen’d to be done at a
Juncture when the Governor and his Confederates talked much of the
Town’s revolting.593
No mention was made of the Town Meeting’s militia resolve, and for good
reason. Adams wanted to attack Bernard’s perception of the Convention of Towns,
thereby, making Boston the innocent party. Adams no longer defended the legality
of armed rebellion. At this point, the Town Meeting’s resolves were “nothing more
than a friendly circular Letter to the Selectmen of several Towns in the Province.”594
The Convention was not called to arm the people, but to consult “Measures to
promote Peace and good Order.”595 It was a “very innocent Measure,” which “was
most certainly attended with all the happy Effects for which it was propos’d.”596
In sum, the Convention of Towns’ resolve to provide the inhabitants with arms
was an attempt to invoke the 1693 Militia Act.597 While Adams’ original argument
was that it was a means to prevent another French War, the “secret” intent was to
invoke the “have arms” provision’s protection of lawful armed rebellion “when the
Sanctions of Society and Law are found insufficient to restrain the Violence of
Oppression.”598 The resolve had nothing to do with an armed individual’s selfdefense.599 This is evidenced not only by the frequent paraphrasing of Blackstone’s

593

Id.

594

REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON: BOSTON TOWN
RECORDS 1758 TO 1769, at 321 (n.p., Rockwell & Churchill 1886).
595
SAMUEL ADAMS, AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD OR A VINDICATION OF THE TOWN OF
BOSTON, FROM MANY FALSE AND MALICIOUS ASPERSIONS (Boston, Edes & Gill 1769),
reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 396, 426.
596

Id. at 436.

597

5 W. & M., c. 7, § 5 (1693) (Eng.).

598

Boston, March 17, supra note 503.

599

Stephen P. Halbrook and other Individual Right Scholars mischaracterize the history of
the Boston Town Meeting and the Convention of Towns. The earliest history of this event
was written by William Tudor (1779-1830) in his 1823 work THE LIFE OF JAMES OTIS, OF
MASSACHUSETTS. WILLIAM TUDOR, THE LIFE OF JAMES OTIS, OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston,
Wells & Lilly 1823). Tudor, the son of America’s first Judge Advocate Colonel William
Tudor (1715-1819), did not characterize the 1768 Militia Act as a right to armed individual
self-defense. He described the Militia Act as “founded in nature, reason, and sound policy,
and is well adapted for the necessary defence of the community.” Id. at 332-33. Tudor
elaborated on “founded in nature” in a footnote. The footnote states:
It will be perceived, that by the authority they quoted, it was only “protestants,” that
could be justified by “nature, reason and policy,” for having arms. There lurks in this
resolve, as well as in that of the legislature, in the observation, that “an army brought
among them without their consent, was an unlawful assemblage of the worst and most
alarming nature,” a kind of grave humour, which does not disparage the soundness of
reasoning.
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“fifth auxiliary right,” but also by Adams’ change in political stance—including his
retraction of the militia law being put forth at all.600
Another “individual right” argument is that the Second Amendment was drafted
to protect against the incessant disarming that occurred during the American
Revolution.601 If this is the case, then why did not one colonial petition, list of
grievances, declaration, or pamphlet mention the disarming as a violation of their
constitutional or natural right to “have arms”? If the Founders were cognizant of the
“have arms” provision and the “individual right” interpretation of it, why did no
one—including Samuel Adams and other members of the Town Meeting—reference
it during this disarming? One need not look further than Lord Dunmore’s actions in
Virginia, Judge William Henry Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury, and the
Declaration of Independence to understand that the Founders did not view individual
firearm ownership as a right—at any level.
Under cover of night on April 20, 1775, Lord Dunmore ordered a contingent of
Marines to seize and move Williamsburg’s gunpowder stores.602 The seizure drew
an immediate response. The people wanted to know “what motives and for what
particular purpose the powder [was] carried off.”603 The people demanded the
gunpowder “to be immediately returned to the magazine.”604 Dunmore replied that
he acted because “he did not think it secure” and moved the gunpowder only “to
prevent any alarm.”605 He promised to deliver the gunpowder “in half an hour” upon
the threat of any insurrection.606 The truth of the matter was that Dunmore wanted to
disarm and disable the rebel contingent. Lord Dartmouth had given him specific
orders to secure as many military stores as possible.607 Dunmore had no plans of
Id. at 332 n.*. The footnote reiterates that the 1768 Militia Act was an attempt to revive the
1693 Militia Act and invoke the limited nature of the “have arms” provision. See 5 W. & M.,
c. 7, § 5 (1693) (Eng.).
600

See SAMUEL ADAMS, AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD OR A VINDICATION OF THE TOWN OF
BOSTON, FROM MANY FALSE AND MALICIOUS ASPERSIONS (Boston, Edes & Gill 1769),
reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 523, at 396-445.
601

HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 29-114.

602

Dunmore was not the only governor to seize gunpowder and/or arms. Governor Josiah
Martin of North Carolina and Governor Robert Eden of Maryland enacted similar measures.
See CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 94-95.
603
Letter from Municipal Common Hall to Governor Dunmore (Apr. 21, 1775), in 3
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 54, 55 (Robert Scribner ed., 1977).
604

Id.

605

Letter From Governor Dunmore to the Municipal Common Hall An Oral Reply (Apr.
20, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at
55, 55. For Peyton Randolph’s account of the situation see Letter from Peyton Randolph to
Mann Page, Jr., Lewis Willis, and Benjamin Grymes, Jr., Esquires (Apr. 27, 1775), in 3
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 63, 64.
606

Id.

607

JOHN E. SELBY, THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA, 1775-1783, at 19 (2d prtg. 1989).
Dartmouth’s orders on October 19, 1774 called for “‘the most effectual measures for arresting,
detaining, and securing any Gunpowder, or any sort of Arms or Ammunitions which may be
attempted to be imported into the Province under your Government.’” Id.
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returning the gunpowder, especially to an armed mob of men. He did “not think it
prudent to put powder into [the people’s] hands in such a situation.”608
Without powder, the inhabitants could not sufficiently arm themselves—not even
against the potential slave revolt that the colonists feared. The belief that “wicked
and designing persons have instilled the most diabolical notions into the minds of our
slaves” caused the people to request the immediate return of the powder.609 This
purpose behind the colonists’ need for the powder is significant in debunking the
“individual right” myth, for not one locality claimed that the taking of the powder
infringed on its right to armed individual self-defense. Surely, just the threat of a
slave revolt would have validated an individual in preparing arms under the
“individual right” model. Therefore, the hindering of the colonists in effectuating
this—with the taking of the gunpowder stores—would have brought forth a
grievance that the people were denied the right to “have arms for their defence.”
However, no complaint was ever made.610
One may argue that Dunmore did not seize arms per se, and, thus, the colonists
could not claim that they had been disarmed. This is a textually valid argument, but
it fails for two reasons. First, Individual Right Scholars have heralded Dunmore’s
seizure of gunpowder as one of the events that infringed on the colonists’ right to
“have arms for their defence.”611 Second, it does not explain why not one colonist,
newspaper, or complaint corrected Dunmore’s claim that he had the authority to
seize whatever arms or ammunition he deemed necessary.
Dunmore even expressly informed his council of this power when he stated that it
was “under the constitutional right of the crown” that “the custody and disposal of all
public stores of arms and ammunition alone belong.”612 Moreover, he would
reiterate this argument to the Virginian people in a proclamation dated May 3,
1775.613 There, Dunmore stated that he was “the only constitutional judge, in what
manner the munition, provided for the protection of the people of this government,
[are] to be disposed of for that end.”614 He informed the populace that it was under
608
Letter From Governor Dunmore to the Municipal Common Hall An Oral Reply (Apr.
20, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at
55, 55.
609

3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 54, 55.

610

See Letter from Orange County Committee, An Endorsement of Violence and
Reprisal (May 19, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra
note 603, at 112, 112. The Orange County Committee’s complaint stated: “That the
Governour’s removal of the powder lodged in the magazine, and set apart for the defence of
the country, was fraudulent, unnecessary, and extremely provoking to the people of this
colony.” Id.
611

STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 16 (1989) [hereinafter HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS].
612

Governor Dunmore to His Council (May 2, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA:
THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 77.
613

See His Council to Governor Dunmore and his Excellency’s Resultant Proclamation
(May 3, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603,
at 80, 81.
614

Id.
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his authority that the militia and people were armed. “[W]henever the present
ferment shall subside, and it shall become necessary to put arms in the hands of the
militia, for the defence of the people against a foreign enemy or intestine insurgents,”
Dunmore stated, he would exert his best abilities to arm the people “in the service of
the country.”615
No one challenged Dunmore—even after word arrived in late April of Gage’s
attempt to seize the arms, ammunition, and gunpowder at Lexington and Concord.616
The similarities between Dunmore and Gage’s actions were all too clear. A fact the
Virginia House of Burgesses even took notice of when it issued the following
address:
The inhabitants of this country, my Lord, could not be strangers to the
many attempts in the northern colonies to disarm the people, and thereby
deprive them of the only means of defending their lives and property. We
know, from good authority, that the like measures were generally
recommended by the Ministry, and that the export of pow[d]er from Great
Britain had been prohibited. Judge then how very alarming a removal of
the small stock which remained in the public magazine, for the defence of
the country, and the stripping of the guns of their locks, must have been to
any people, who had the smallest regard for their security.617
At no time in its address did the House of Burgesses claim that the widespread
disarming was a violation of the Declaration of Rights. No mention was made of a
constitutional or a natural right to “have arms,” yet Halbrook and Individual Right
Scholars claim that the Founders viewed such seizures as violating the “have arms”
provision.618 Without any direct and circumstantial documentary evidence, it is
erroneous for Individual Right Scholars to assert that such seizures violated an
alleged right to “have arms.” How can such a theory be correct if not one petition—
by any locality—connected either event as infringing on the allowance to “have arms
for their defence”?
Judge Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury is also of particular importance in
debunking the “individual right” assumption of a right to “have arms” because it
compares the events—particularly the grievances—of the Glorious Revolution to the
American Revolution.619 Judge Drayton delivered the Charge on April 2, 1776 in
615

Id.

616

Although one may argue that such silence is inconclusive, it is well known that
Dunmore’s actions were under continuous scrutiny. Newspapers, assembly proceedings,
correspondence, and journal entries followed Dunmore’s every move. See generally 3
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603 (Virginia Assembly
proceedings on Dunmore’s actions and responses to his letters). In fact, even third-party
hearsay was prevalent in newspapers and assembly proceedings.
See CHARLES,
IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 95-96; CHRISTOPHER WARD, 2 THE WAR OF
THE REVOLUTION 845 (John Richard Alden ed., 1952).
617

HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, supra note 611, at 16 (alteration in original).

618

Id.; see also HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’ supra note 567, at 29-124.

619

WILLIAM HENRY DRAYTON, THE CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY (Apr. 23, 1776),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE
MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA 50, 50 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1859).
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order to “expound to [the jury] the constitution of [their] country.”620 Drayton
reminded the jury that the forefathers of the Glorious Revolution vested the
protections of the 1689 Declaration of Rights and that the Revolution established an
affirmative right of the people to usurp the government when their unalienable rights
were ruined.621 He catalogued the “attempts to enslave America” by “king and
parliament” prior to hostilities.622
Drayton then went on to describe many events in which the colonists had been
disarmed. This list of events included the attempt to seize munitions at Lexington
and Concord,623 Dunmore’s actions,624 and the disarming of Boston’s inhabitants.625
Although Drayton did not mention anything about the seizure of arms at Lexington
and Concord or the seizure by Lord Dunmore, it was well known what had occurred.
Moreover, Drayton expressly mentioned the taking of arms in his description of what
happened to Boston’s inhabitants626—showing that he was aware that the disarming
of colonists had taken place.

620

Id. (internal formatting omitted).

621

Id.

622

Id. at 51. The charges included:
By claiming a right to bind the colonies “in all cases whatsoever;”
By laying duties, at their mere will and pleasure, upon all the colonies;
By suspending the legislature of New York;
By rendering the American charters of no validity, having annulled the most
material parts of the charter of Massachusetts Bay;
By divesting multitudes of the colonist of their property, without legal accusation
or trial;
By depriving whole colonies of the bounty of Providence on their own proper
coasts, in order to coerce them by famine;
By restricting the trade and commerce of America;
By sending to, and continuing in America, in time of peace, an armed force,
without and against the consent of the people;
By granting impunity to a soldiery instigated to murder the Americans;
By declaring, that the people of Massachusetts Bay are liable for offences, or
pretended offences, done in that colony, to be sent to, and tried for the same in
England, or in any colony where they cannot have the benefit of a jury of the vicinage;
By establishing in Quebec the Roman Catholic religion, and an arbitrary
government, instead of the Protestant religion and a free government.

Id.
623
See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 81; JAMES H. STARK, THE
LOYALISTS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE OTHER SIDE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51
(Augustus M. Kelley 1972) (1910).
624
See An Introductory Note (Mar. 28, 1775-June 24, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY
VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 603, at 1, 5.
625

See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 81; SELBY, supra note 607, at

19.
626

1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE MOST
EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619, at 50, 52 (“For the little purpose of disarming
the imprisoned inhabitants of Boston, the king’s general, Gage, in the face of the day, violated
the public faith, by himself plighted.”).
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Drayton felt that the abuses by the British government were so destructive that
“[n]ature cried aloud, self-preservation is the great law,”627 which “forced [the
colonies] to take up arms in [their] own defence.”628 This use of terminology—“selfpreservation” and “arms in their own defence”—comports with the proper and
limited understanding of the English allowance to “have arms.” As a judge, Drayton
was familiar with the proper use of this language, and his comparison of the
provisions—of the Declaration of Rights to the events of the American Revolution—
comports with the limited nature of the allowance to “have arms.”
Drayton listed the first eight grievances in the Declaration of Rights verbatim
including the accusation that James II caused “several good subjects, being
Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when Papists were both armed and
employed contrary to law.”629 In comparing the grievances to the events of the
American colonists, Drayton correlated four grievances to the actions of King
George III: the suspending of the laws,630 levying money without consent of
parliament,631 freedom of elections,632 and the raising and keeping of a standing army
without consent.633 He failed to make any connection between the disarming of the
colonists and the English “have arms” provision. Drayton even stated that the
colonies needed “no better authority than that illustrious precedent” of the Glorious
Revolution and would “therefore compare the causes of, and the law upon the two

627

Id.

628

Id. at 51.

629

Id. at 53.

630

Id. In particular:
James the Second suspended the operations of laws—George the Third caused the
charter of the Massachusetts Bay to be in effect annihilated; he suspended the
operation of the law which formed a legislature in New York, vesting it with adequate
powers; and thereby he caused the very ability of making laws in that colony to be
suspended.
Id.
631
Id. (“King James levied money without the consent of the representatives of the people
called upon to pay it—king George has levied money upon America, not only without, but
expressly against the consent of the representatives of the people in America.”).
632
Id. The grievance stated that:
King James violated the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament—King
George, by his representative, Lord William Campbell, acting for him and on his
behalf, broke through a fundamental law of this country, for the certain holding of
General Assemblies; and thereby, as far as in him lay, not only violated but
annihilated the very ability of holding a General Assembly.

Id.
633

Id. As to keeping a standing army without consent:
King James in time of peace kept a standing army in England, without consent of the
representatives of the people among whom that army was kept—king George hath in
time of peace invaded this continent with a large standing army without the consent,
and he hath kept it within this continent, expressly against the consent of the
representatives of the people among whom that army is posted.
Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

89

440

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:351

Moreover, he expressly mentioned the disarming of Boston’s
events.”634
inhabitants.635 Therefore, if Halbrook, Malcolm, and the Individual Right Scholars
are correct in their interpretation of the “have arms” provision, why did Drayton not
connect the disarming of colonists with the 1689 Declaration? Under their
interpretation, any eighteenth-century laymen should have connected the disarming
of colonists and a right to “have arms for their defence.”
The truth of the matter is that the “individual right” interpretation is inaccurate
and incomplete. The “have arms” provision was a limited right and no substantiating
historical correlation exists between it and an alleged right to armed individual selfdefense. Drayton was an eighteenth-century judge, no less, and he would have
understood the legality of the “have arms” provision more than most of the Founding
generation. Not to mention, Drayton’s list of grievances goes side by side with the
Declaration of Independence, which is the most comprehensive list of grievances
against the crown. If the disarming of individuals was against the “have arms”
provision, the drafting committee certainly would have included or at least
mentioned it; the committee, however, did not.
The Declaration of Independence lists twenty-seven grievances against the
British government—twenty-nine were in the original list, but two were deleted by
Congress.636 They include allegations from “the imposing of taxes . . . without
consent” to the employing of the “merciless Indian savages.”637 What makes the
grievances specifically important to understanding the “have arms” provision is their
similarity to the grievances in the 1689 Declaration.638 At least eight of the
grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence mirror a grievance or right
within the Declarations of Rights, including: the dissolving of representative houses
repeatedly,639 obstructing the administration of justice,640 keeping of standing
armies,641 quartering of troops,642 depriving trial by jury,643 abolishing the free system
of English laws, the abolishing of charters, and the suspending of the legislatures.644
634

Id. at 52.

635

See supra note 626.

636

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).

637

Id. For history on employment of Indians in the American Revolution by both sides
see CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES, supra note 9, at 213-70.
638
The modern consensus is that the English Declaration of Rights heavily influenced the
Declaration of Independence. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 104-07 (1997).
639

1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.) (listing “[a]nd that for Redresse of all Grievances, and
for the amending strengthening and preserving of the Lawes Parlyament sought to be held
frequently”).
640

Id. (listing “[b]y Prosecutions in the Court of Kings Bench for Matters and Causes
cognizable onely in Parlyament and by diverse other Arbitrary and Illegall Courses”).
641

Id. (listing “[b]y raising and keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdome in time of
Peace without Consent of Parlyament” it was proclaimed “[t]hat the raising or keeping a
standing Army within the Kingdome in time of Peace unlesse it be with Consent of
Parlyament is against law”).
642

Id. (listing “[q]uartering Soldiers contrary to Law”).
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Although none of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence expressly
referenced the grievances or rights in the Declaration of Rights, Thomas Jefferson,
the drafting committee, and the Continental Congress were clearly cognizant of the
rights of their forefathers. James Otis described the British constitution as coming
“nearest [to] the idea of perfection of any that has been reduced to practice.”645 He
viewed the “colonists, black and white” as being “freeborn British subjects, and
entitled to all the essential civil rights . . . not only . . . from the provincial charters,
from the principles of the common law, and acts of Parliament, but from the British
constitution, which was reestablished at the [Glorious] Revolution with a professed
design to secure the liberties of all the subjects to all generations.”646
What is of particular interest regarding Otis is that he briefly wrote upon the
“have arms” provision in his pamphlet entitled A Vindication of the British
Colonies.647 The tract was a response to Martin Howard’s Halifax Letter.648 It
outlined the rights of the American colonist, which included the “absolute liberties of
Englishmen” the right of personal security, personal liberty, and personal property.649
“Besides these three primary rights,” writes Otis, “there are others which are
secondary and subordinate (to preserve the former from unlawful attacks).”650 It is
here where Otis lists the “right of having and using arms for self-defense.”651 His
description of the “have arms” provision—standing alone—would seem to support
643

Id. (listing “[a]nd whereas of late yeares Partiall Corrupt and Unqualifyed Persons have
beene returned and served on Juryes in Tryalls and particularly diverse Jurors in Tryalls for
High Treason which were not Freeholders” it was proclaimed “[t]hat Jurors ought to be duely
impannelled and returned and Jurors which passe upon Men in Trialls for High Treason ought
to be Freeholders”).
644
Id. These last three can all be classified under the Suspending and Dispensing with the
law. It was “By Assumeing and Exerciseing a Power of Dispensing with and Suspending of
Lawes and the Execution of Lawes without Consent of Parlyament” that it was proclaimed
“[t]hat the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall
Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegall” and “[t]hat the pretended Power of
Dispensing with Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authoritie as it hath beene assumed
and exercised of late is illegall.” Id.
645

JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston,
Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at
408, 428 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965). James Otis published the Declaration of Rights in his
famous pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. He and the other
Founders were well aware of what the “have arms” provision entailed. See id. at 430-34.
646

Id.

647

JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (Boston, Edes & Gill 1765),
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545,
545.
648

MARTIN HOWARD, A LETTER FROM
RHODE-ISLAND (Newport, S. Hall 1765).

A

GENTLEMAN

AT

HALIFAX,

TO

HIS FRIEND

IN

649
JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (1765), reprinted in 1
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545, 558.
650

Id. at 558-59.

651

Id. at 559.
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the “individual right” theory. However, it does not. It is merely a portion of a larger
context, for Otis, like Samuel Adams did in defense of his invocation of the 1693
Militia Act, is paraphrasing Blackstone’s Commentaries.652 Just like Blackstone, he
lists the right to arms as the “fifth auxiliary right.” It is a right that may be used only
when the “three primary rights” are unlawfully restricted.653 When this happens the
people are provided with the following constitutional checks:
(1) The constitution or power of Parliament; (2) The limitation of the
King’s prerogative (and to vindicate them when actually violated); (3) The
regular administration of justice; (4) The right of petitioning for redress of
grievances; (5) The right of having and using arms for self-defense. See
Mr. Blackstone’s accurate and elegant analysis of the laws of England.654
The Individual Right Theorists will argue that, despite Otis’ reference to the
allowance to “have arms” as an auxiliary right, he expressly refers to it as a right to
have and use arms for self-defense. They would claim this proves that the colonists
and the Founding Fathers understood the allowance to “have arms” as one of armed
individual self-defense, especially in the home. This argument would fail for two
reasons. The first reason is that it is an auxiliary right. Otis limits the “right of
having and using arms” to only when the government unlawfully attacks the “three
primary rights.”655 He is simply restating Blackstone’s legal analysis of that limited
right—nothing more, nothing less.
The second reason the “individual right” argument fails is the grievances listed in
the Declaration of Independence. Otis’ pamphlet was well known by the signers of
the Declaration. If they interpreted Otis’ statement as a right to armed individual
self-defense, the disarming of the colonists certainly would have been added to the
Declaration’s list of grievances. This did not occur. There is no doubt that Otis
perfectly understood the “have arms” provision. He even cited Blackstone, thus,
making clear the limitations on the right he was articulating656—that individuals have
a right take up arms as a means to check tyrannical government when all other
constitutional safeguards have failed.
Otis’ use of “self-defense” in this broader and different context may be confusing
to Individual Right Scholars. Pamphleteers, however, were not immune from using
“self-defense” in a broader context. For example, in describing Thomas Gage’s
seizure of arms, James Macpherson wrote, “The great law of self-defence must
therefore have justified [him] for having deprived the former of arms, which they
almost avowedly intended to raise against all legal authority.”657 John Lind also
described Gage’s seizure as an act in “self-defence” of government. Lind felt that
652

Id.; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 188, at 139.

653

JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES (1765), reprinted in 1
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 545, 558-59.
654

Id. at 559 (citation omitted).

655

See id.

656

Id.

657

JAMES MACPHERSON, THE RIGHTS OF GREAT BRITAIN ASSERTED AGAINST THE CLAIMS
AMERICA: BEING AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE GENERAL CONGRESS 74
(London, T. Cadell 6th ed. 1776).
OF
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England was justified in its “acts of self-defence”658 because it was acting only “in
consequence of resistance already shewn.”659
Besides, in understanding the American perception of the English allowance to
“have arms,” one cannot forget that the Founding Fathers and the American
pamphleteers frequently referred to the 1689 Declaration of Rights to support their
arguments.660 The British Constitution was always on their minds. This is
significant because the Founders would have been particularly familiar with the
protective scope of the “have arms” provision. If the Individual Right Scholars are
correct in their interpretation, it does not make sense that the Founders did not list
the seizure of arms by Thomas Gage, Josiah Martin, Lord Dunmore, and the
restrictions on the importation of arms by Lord Dartmouth in the Declaration of
Independence. Any of these seizures would have unequivocally infringed on the
“individual right” theory of armed self-defense.
However, such an argument was never made in the Declaration of Independence.
One may argue that the mention of Gage’s seizure of arms in the 1775 Declaration
of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms661 already addressed this point, and
the Founders did not need to mention it again. This argument is diminished when
comparing the two Declarations, for the Declaration of Independence included the
majority of grievances listed in its 1775 predecessor.662 Not to mention, the taking of
arms was never stated as an infringement of their natural or constitutional right in the

658

JOHN LIND, AN ANSWER
(London, T. Cadell 1776).
659

TO THE

DECLARATION

OF THE

AMERICAN CONGRESS 129

Id. at 128.

660

The Declaration of Rights and Grievances, passed in October 1774, catalogues “the
principles of the English constitution.” THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES (U.S.
1774), http://usconstitution.net/intol. Many of the rights listed are in direct reference to the
1689 Declaration of Rights. See John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym (Jan.
13-27, 1866), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 158, 159-62 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977). There are
countless examples in the pamphlets of the American Revolution. See, e.g., A LETTER TO THE
PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, n. pub. 1760), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 257, 262, 269; JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in 1
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645, at 419, 428-29, 474;
STEPHEN HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONIES EXAMINED (Providence, William Goddard
1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645,
at 507, 511, 518; REASONS WHY THE BRITISH COLONIES, IN AMERICA, SHOULD NOT BE
CHARGED WITH INTERNAL TAXES, BY AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT (New Haven, B. Mecom
1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, supra note 645,
at 386, 387, 389, 406. Paul H. Smith compiled six pamphlets that incessantly refer to the
English Constitution to support the American grievances. See ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF
AMERICAN FREEDOMS 1774-1778, supra note 243. For the unconstitutionality of standing
armies see JAMES BOWDOIN ET AL., A SHORT NARRATIVE OF THE HORRID MASSACRE IN BOSTON
in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1776, at 211 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967).
661

THOMAS JEFFERSON & JOHN DICKINSON, DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY
FOR TAKING UP ARMS (Philadelphia, Continental Congress 1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 213, 213-18 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
662

Compare id. with THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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former.663 The English government’s deprivation of trial by jury—“in cases
affecting both life and property”—was described as an “accustomed and inestimable
privilege.”664 Meanwhile, the taking of arms was described as an “open violation of
Honour, in defiance of the obligation of Treaties, which even savage Nations
esteemed sacred.”665
The two descriptions are drastically different in their implications. The
Declaration’s description of trial by jury makes it clear that it was an affirmed
right.666 It was a right that the 1774 Bill of Rights described as “constitutional.”667
The same cannot be said about the possession of arms. In fact, Individual Right
Scholars have taken the true nature of the grievance completely out of context. The
“violation of honour” had nothing to do with the colonists’ forfeiture of personal
arms but, rather, dealt with the fact that Gage violated the terms of their
agreement.668

663

THOMAS JEFFERSON & JOHN DICKINSON, supra note 661, at 216.

664

This grievance was also mentioned in the 1774 Bill of Rights. That document stated:
An act for the better securing his Majesty’s dock-yards, magazines, ships,
ammunition and stores, which declares a new offence in America, and deprives the
American subject the constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage, by authorizing the
trial of any person, charged with the committing any offence described in the said act,
out of the realm, to be indicted and tried for the same in any shire or county within the
realm.
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES (U.S. 1774), http://usconstitution.net/intol.
665

Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration as Adopted by Congress (1776), in 1 THE PAPERS
note 661, at 213, 216 (emphasis omitted).

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON supra
666

See THE DECLARATION
stitution.net/intol.
667

OF

RIGHTS

AND

GRIEVANCES (U.S. 1774), http://uscon

1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 660, at 158, 162.

668

The original agreement permitted citizens to leave Boston on the condition that they
took no firearms or ammunition among their possessions. In response, the Provincial
Congress resolved to permit those wishing to live in Boston to do so on the same condition
and even to send out for their effects later. Letter From James Warren (May 7, 1775), in 3
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 6 n.8 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979).
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Both Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson’s drafts attest to this fact.669 The
inhabitants that wished to depart Boston entered into a treaty with Thomas Gage.
The terms agreed upon required those persons who were departing to deposit their
arms with the local magistrate.670 Gage violated this agreement by seizing these
arms and other personal effects from the magistrate.671 This is what the Declaration
of Independence referred to as being “in defiance of the obligation of treaties, which
even savage nations esteem sacred.”
Not even John or Samuel Adams—who were always critical of Gage’s actions—
made any mention of the seizure of arms as a violation of a right to “have arms.”
This is significant because it is John Adams’ legal and political works that Individual
Right Scholars quote as support for their stance.672 For example, Adams represented
the British soldiers that participated in the Boston Massacre.673 It is claimed that his

669
Dickinson wrote:
The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that Town by the General their
Governor & having in order to procure their Dismission entered into a Treaty with
him, it was stipulated (between the) that the said Inhabitants having deposited their
Arms with their own Magistrates, should have (free) Liberty to depart, (out of said
town) taking with them their other Effects. They accordingly delivered up their Arms,
but in open violation of Honor, in Defiance of the Obligations of (a) Treat(y)es, which
even savage Nations esteem sacred, the Governor ordered the Arms deposited
aforesaid that they might be preserved for their owners, to be seized by a Body of
(armed men) soldiers.

John Dickinson, John Dickinson’s Composition Draft (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON supra note 661, at 204, 210. Thomas Jefferson wrote:
The inhabitants of the town of Boston in order to procure their enlargement having
entered into treaty with (a certain Thomas Gage, principal instigator of these
enormities) General Gage their Governor (to procure their Enlargement), it was
stipulated that the said inhabitants, having first deposited their arms with their own
magistrates (their own arms [and] military stoers) should have free liberty to depart
out of the said town, taking with them their other (goods [and]) effects. Their arms
(and military stores) they accordingly delivered in, and claimed the stipulated license
of departing with their effects, But in open violation of plighted faith & honor, in
defiance of the sacred obligation of treaty which even savage nations observe, their
arms (and warlike stores), deposited with their own magistrates to be preserved as
their property, were immediately seized by a body of armed men under orders from
the said (Thomas) General [Gage].
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Fair Copy for the Committee (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 199, 201-02 (third alteration in original).
670

OF

See supra note 669.

671

The main grievance was that “provisions and merchandise were added to the list” on
top of arms. Not to mention, “arbitrary searches were made of all containers, and sometimes
passports were so drawn as to separate families.” Letter From Joseph Palmer (June 19, 1775),
in 3 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 668, at 27, 29 n.2.
672
HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 25-26; HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE
ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 58 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
HALBROOK, ARMED].
673

JOHN ADAMS, ADAMS’ ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENSE (Dec. 3-4, 1770), in 3 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242, 248 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
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closing argument affirms that individuals had a right to own arms.674 In his closing
argument Adams states, “Here every private person is authorized to arm himself, and
on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm
themselves at that time, for their defence.”675
Many assumptions are made from this quotation without putting it into the
context of Adams’ closing argument. First, Individual Right Scholars omit the
remainder of the quote,676 which stated, “[T]he inhabitants had a right to arm
themselves at that time, for their defence, not for offence, that distinction is material
and must be attended to.”677 Second, Adams was talking about the legality of selfdefense in the English Riot Act.678 He gives a lengthy and detailed account of how it
was lawful to “repel force with force,” especially when an armed mob is
approaching.679
Citing William Hawkins’ Pleas to the Crown, Adams stated: “[T]he killing of
dangerous rioters, may be justified by any private persons, who cannot otherwise
suppress them, or defend themselves from them; in as much as every private person
seems to be authorized by the law, to arm himself for the purposes aforesaid.”680
Adams was not saying that individuals have a right to own arms. Rather, he was
stating that when individuals are compelled to defend themselves, they “may be
justified” in using the “arms” that are available.681 This is made clear by Adams’ use
of “at that time.” Most importantly, though, Adams cited the Riot Act. He made no
reference to the 1689 Declaration of Rights’ “have arms” provision. He is merely
paraphrasing Hawkins’ statement that “justifiable homicide in the due advancement
of public justice.”682

674

HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 25-26; HALBROOK, ARMED, supra note 672,

at 58.
675

3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 673, at 248.

676

HALBROOK, FOUNDERS’, supra note 567, at 25.

677

3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 673, at 248.

678

See id. at 247-48.

679

Id. at 247.

680

Id. at 247-48 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, 1 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 74
(London, E. Nutt 1716)).
681

Id.

682

This portion of Hawkins reads:
If those who are engaged in a Riot, or a Forcible Entry, or Detainer, stand in their
Defence, and continue the Force in Opposition to the Command of a Justice of Peace,
& c. or resist such Justice endeavoring to arrest them, the killing of them may be
justified (a): and so perhaps may the killing of dangerous Rioters by any private
Persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or defend themselves from them,
inasmuch as every private Persons seems to be authorized by the Law to arm himself
for the Purposes aforesaid.
HAWKINS, supra note 680, at 71.
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Adams did not view arms ownership as right.683 He viewed it as a societal
allowance. While Adams’ legal knowledge made him an advocate for self-defense,
nothing proves that he viewed arms ownership as a right to accomplish that end. In
fact, if the Individual Right Theorists are correct, why did Adams not describe
Gage’s taking of arms in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up
Arms as infringing on their right to “have arms”? Not even the radical James Warren
mentioned Gage’s seizure of arms in such a fashion.684
Even if the main focus of the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking
Up Arms grievance was the seizure of arms, James Macpherson’s response did not
describe it as a constitutional grievance. In his pamphlet entitled The Rights of Great
Britain Asserted Against the Claims of America, Macpherson places the Declaration
of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms grievance in its proper historical
context.685 While the seizure of arms was certainly listed as part of a larger
grievance, it did not violate the guarantee that “Protestants Subjects may have arms
for their defence.” That limited right was being exercised by the colonists.
The 1775 pamphlet Resistance No Rebellion addressed this and the “fifth
auxiliary right” that the “have arms” provision affirmed. It was a right that was
exercised twice against the Stuart monarchy. The first time was against Charles I’s
“despotic measures, totally contrary to the laws of the land, and wholly inconsistent

683

See JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1787-1788). “Individual right”
proponents also argue that Adams’ Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United
States of America supports their stance. They believe Adams viewed arms ownership as a
right because he recognized the propriety of “arms in the hands of citizens, to be used . . . in
private self-defence.” Id. This is another quotation that Individual Right Scholars take out of
context. Adams was actually articulating a principle that undercuts the “individual right”
theory. He believed “arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion” would
be “to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by
no man—it is a dissolution of government.” Id. There were two exceptions to this rule that
society may allow. These were (1) “private self-defence” and (2) through the militia “by
partial orders of towns, counties, or districts of a state.” Id. While the former allowance—
self-defence—was not articulated as a right—fundamental, natural, or constitutional—the
latter was described as “the fundamental law.” As many proponents of the militia believed,
Adams felt that “[t]he arms of the commonwealth should be lodged in the hands of that part of
the people which are firm to its establishment.” Id.
684

See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 660, at 3, 4.

685

Macpherson wrote:
The assertions of the Congress concerning transactions within the town of Boston, are
as utterly devoid of truth, as their account of what happened in the country. The
hostile intentions of those WITHIN, were as apparent as the rebellion of their brethren
WITHOUT was certain. The great law of self-defence must therefore have justified
General Gage for having deprived the former of arms, which they almost avowedly
intended to raise against all legal authority. After the skirmish at Lexington and
Concord, all supplies from the country were cut off from the town of Boston. Many of
the inhabitants desired to remove, with their effects. Their request was granted; but it
was at the same time demanded, that they should deliver up their arms.
MACPHERSON, supra note 657, at 74.
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with the rights and freedom of the subject.”686 This forced “the people to have
recourse to that resistance, which they had an unquestionable right to make use of,
whenever it became absolutely necessary for the defence and preservation of their
constitution.”687
The second time occurred during the Glorious Revolution. James II’s despotic
acts “roused up the resentment of the nation, and obliged the people to make use of
their right to resistance, in defence of their laws, liberties and religion; when they
called over the Prince of Orange.”688 The American Colonies were justly entitled to
this right:
That all English subjects have a right to resist any attempt, to subvert
and set aside their laws, rights and the constitution; and that is their
undoubted duty to do so—That the people of England did, at the happy
Revolution, resist the tyrannical attempt of King James to subvert and
destroy their laws, rights, and liberties.689
This is why the colonists had taken up arms. As the Declaration of the Causes
and Necessity for Taking Up Arms stated, it was “in defence of the Freedom that is
our Birthright . . . for the protection of our Property” that they had “taken up
Arms.”690 The Olive Branch Petition similarly justified the colonists’ actions, stating
that the government’s “measures and proceeding to open hostilities for enforcing
them, have compelled us to arm in our own defence.”691 This is a description that
mirrors the language of the “have arms” provision—“arms for their defence.”692
686

RESISTANCE NO REBELLION: IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT TO TAX
AMERICAN COLONIES IS FULLY CONSIDERED, AND FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 21-22
(1775).
THE

687

Id.

688

Id. at 22.

689

Id. at 48. When the Boston Assembly gave instructions regarding the vote for
independence, its representatives were reminded that they were on “the verge of a glorious
Revolution.” Instructions of the Town of Boston to Their Representatives (1776), in 6
AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 556, 556 (Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter
Force 1846). In much the same light, Brunswick, Massachusetts legitimized its support for
autonomy due to “their attachment to the system of legal Government established by the
glorious Revolution.” John Ker, Address of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland
to the King (1776), in 6 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES, supra, at 604, 604.
Buckingham County, Virginia reminded its delegates regarding the vote for autonomy, that it
was by the Glorious Revolution, “and the choice of the people, that the present royal family
was seated on the throne of Great Britain.” Id. So it was that the Glorious Revolution came to
be revered as the most important political ideal of American independence; when government
becomes defective “or deviates from the end of its institution, and cannot be corrected, [be]
that the people may form themselves into another avoiding defects of the former.” Id.
690

John Dickinson, John Dickinson’s Composition Draft (1775), in 1 THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 204, 218.
691
Second Petition From Congress to the King (July 8, 1775), in 1 THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 661, at 219, 220.

OF

OF

692

A better example can be found in Robinson Morris’s pamphlet Considerations. He
states, “We possess a great and fine country; we have the most noble and beneficial
dependencies; we have a fleet; we have an army; we have several hundred thousands, and
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Even with this history readily available to them, Individual Right Theorists will
argue that the Founding Fathers wanted to prevent the future seizure of arms that
occurred in the American Revolution. To them, the Second Amendment was drafted
to protect against such an event. It fixed any disparity between the “having of arms”
and the right of resistance by stating that people’s right to “keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.” On its face, this argument would seem to make sense, but the
Amendment makes a distinct reference to a “well organized militia.” The Supreme
Court majority in Heller rationalized that such language helps explain the right and
does not determine it.693 In other words, the majority determined that the right was
separate and distinct from a “well organized militia.” It felt that the Founders’
terminology “keep and bear Arms” was a more precise and affirmative way to state
“Protestant subjects may have arm for their Defence.”694
There is little denying that the two constitutional guarantees are similar. What
separates the two is that the Second Amendment was not restricted by England’s
socio-economic and hierarchal structure.695 In addition, it was a right that “shall not
be infringed.” This is strong language that indicates just how limited the right is and
its undoubted connection to a “well regulated militia.”696 Nevertheless, the Heller
majority felt that “bearing arms” was synonymous with the carrying of arms, and
“keeping arms” was another way of affirming gun ownership.697 The thirteen
colonies’ use of these terms in their respective statutes undercuts this
interpretation.698
perhaps a million of men capable of bearing arms in their own defence.” ROBINSON MORRIS,
CONSIDERATIONS (1774), reprinted in ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF AMERICAN FREEDOMS 17741778, supra note 243, at 49, 89.
693

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (“The prefatory clause
does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient
right; most undoubtedly they thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”).
694

Id. at 2798.

695

The Founders agreed with the writings of such seventeenth and eighteenth-century
political philosophers as Algernon Sidney, James Harrington, David Hume, John Toland, John
Trenchard, Walter Moyle, Andrew Fletcher, and Robert Viscount Molesworth—all of who
agreed that the militia should consist of the free body of a nation’s people. See CHARLES,
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 107-12; IDEAL COMMONWEALTHS, supra note 419, at
183, 183; DAVID HUME, IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH, reprinted in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 512, 525 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985); Lawrence Delbert Cress,
Radical Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological Roots of the American
Revolutionary Militia, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 43, 47 (1979).
696

See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 8.

697

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-99.

698

The use of the phrase “bear arms” was only distinctly used in militia laws. There is
not one instance of “bear arms” appearing in any self-defense, gun, hunting, or slave law. It
is true that the Pennsylvania minority had proposed a “bear arms” provision that includes
hunting, but this amendment never reached the floor of Congress or the Constitution’s drafting
committee. There is also no proof that it even reached the floor of the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention. Moreover, the Supreme Court and Individual Right Theorists only selectively
incorporate the language of that proposal. See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14,
at 17-27, 39-40. The Supreme Court did not report one instance of the use of “keep arms” in a
colonial law. The phrase can be found in many different forms in militia laws. The keeping
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This includes the examples of Drayton’s Charge to the Grand Jury and the
Declaration of Independence. Both use “bear arms” in its proper military context.699
The Heller majority believes that the use of “bear arms” in examples such as these
were technical in meaning, but are they?700 It is more sensible to argue that the
phrase “keep and bear arms” was incorporated to remove any confusion that the
“have arms” provision conveyed. To further clarify the right—so it would not be
abused—it is just as rational to argue that the same is true with the phrase “well
regulated militia,” for these words and phrases were common only in the colonies’
militia laws or in State constitutions.701 It was England’s 1757 Militia Act which
of arms did not necessarily mean that one owned or possessed the arms. It was verbage to
describe the maintaining or servicing of military arms. See id. at 27-34.
699
Drayton accused Parliament and the king of passing a law “to make slaves of the crews
of such vessels, and to compel them to bear arms against their conscience, their fathers, their
bleeding country.” 1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, BY
THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619, at 50, 52. The charge even made
the grievances in the Declaration of Independence. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(U.S. 1776). It dually accused the king of constraining “our fellow Citizens taken Captive on
the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends
and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.” 1 AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION
OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA, supra note 619,
at 50, 52. Both grievances do not make sense other than to interpret the use of “bear arms” in
its military context. Even Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation used “bear arms” in the proper
military context. On November 7, 1775, he ordered “every Person capable of bearing Arms,
to resort to his Majesty’s STANDARD.” John Earl, A Most Disagreeable but Absolutely
Necessary Step, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 334, 334
(Robert L. Scribner & Brent Tarter ed., 1978). He further declared that “all inden[tured]
Servants, Negroes, or others, free that are able and willing to bear Arms.” Id. The promise of
freedom was meant to extend to only those who could perform military service—a fact that
American opponents made sure to address. Spotsylvania County Committee, Assembled
Freeholders Choose a Committee, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 417, 419 n.18. Many viewed Dunmore’s Proclamation as a trick to
lure slaves. John Johnson thought it would be used to “subject many of these poor Wretches
to the Loss of Life, [and] most severe punishment.” John Johnson, Portsmouth Virginia, to
Unidentified Addressee: An Intercepted Letter, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 414, 415 (citation omitted). An address to the people of
Williamsburg stated, “To none . . . is freedom promised, but such as are able to do Dunmore
service.”
A Few Anonymous Remarks on Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation, in 4
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, at 459, 461; see also PATRICK
CHARLES, WASHINGTON’S DECISION: THE STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S DECISION TO
REACCEPT BLACK ENLISTMENTS IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 52 (C. Thomas Long ed., 2005).
It was argued that slaves be “flattered with their freedom, if they be able to bear arms.” A
Few Anonymous Remarks on Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation, in 4 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA:
THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra, at 459, 461.
700

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2802 (2008).

701

The terminology was likely borrowed form the English militia laws. In the House of
Lords during the debates of the 1756 Militia Bill, the Earl of Stanhope stated, “[T]he only
proper military force of a free country is a well regulated and well disciplined militia.” 15
COBBETT, supra note 150, at 152. The language would become part of the 1757 Militia Act
that was passed by the English government. It stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and welldisciplined Militia is essentially necessary to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this
Kingdom.” 30 Geo. 2, c. 3 (1757) (Eng.). In an Amelia County Committee address in
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stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and well-disciplined Militia is essentially necessary
response to Dunmore’s seizure of gunpowder and neglect of the militia law, it was stated that
the militia should “be properly and regularly disciplined, and that the patrollers in every
neighborhood be constantly kept on duty.” Amelia County Committee, Preparations for
Armed Conflict (May 3, 1775), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE,
supra note 603, at 82, 83. Similar language was used in the colonies’ militia laws and
constitutions: “Whereas a well-regulated Militia, is the proper and natural Defence of a free
State.” Act of 1778, ch. 20 Del. Laws (for better regulating a militia within this state),
microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN); “Whereas a well regulated Militia is the
proper and natural Defence of a free State, and as the Laws heretofore made for the Regulation
thereof, are found to be inadequate for the good Purposes thereby intended.” Act of Feb. 5,
1782, Del. Laws (establishing a militia within the state), microformed on William S. Hein &
Co. (HEIN); “Whereas a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of every free
State: And as the several laws enacted by the Legislature of this state for the regulation of the
militia thereof have been found to require material alterations; in order to which it has been
thought more advisable to revise the whole system.” Act of June 18, 1793, ch. 36, 1793 Del.
Laws (establishing a militia in this state), microformed on William S. Hein & Co., (HEIN);
“That a well regulated Militia is the proper, natural and safe Defense of a free government.”
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776), available at
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/organic/1776-ddr.htm; “Whereas a well ordered and well
disciplined militia is essentially necessary to the safety, peace, and prosperity of this
province.” Act of Mar. 25, 1765, Ga. Laws 33, 33 (providing for better ordering the militia of
this province), microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN); “It is evident from the
experience of ages, that to be prepared for war, is the greatest security of peace of a nation;
and that a well organized Militia ought to be considered among the first objects of a free
people.” Act of Feb. 2, 1798, Ga. Laws 21 (providing more effectual training to the Militia of
this state), microformed on William S. Hein & Co. (HEIN); “Whereas the defence and safety
of republican states must greatly depend on their militia which cannot be well organized and
disciplined without arms and experienced officers.” Act of Feb. 18, 1799, Ga. Laws 76
(altering and amending the militia law of this state, and to provide arming the militia thereof),
microformed on William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (HEIN); “That a well-regulated militia is the
proper and natural defence of a free government.” MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XXV, available at
http://www.nhumanities.org/ccs/docs/md-1776.htm; “Whereas it is a Duty and Interest of
every State, to have the Militia thereof properly armed, trained and in compleat Readiness to
defend against every Violence or Invasion whatever.” Act of March 2, 1781, Mass. Laws (for
forming and regulating the Militia within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts), microformed
on Redgrave Information Resourced Corp. (RIR); “A well regulated militia is the proper,
natural, and sure defence of a state.” N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXIV, available at
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/organic/1784-nhr.htm; “Whereas it is necessary, in this time
of danger, that the militia be well regulated and disciplined.” Act of Apr. 14, 1757, ch. 1,
1757 Va. Laws (for better regulating and disciplining the militia), microformed on William S.
Hein & Co. (HEIN); “[D]ue regulation of the Militia is absolutely necessary for the defence
of this country.” Act of May 9, 1723, ch. 2, 1723 Va. Laws (providing for the settling and
better regulation of the militia), microformed on William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (HEIN);
“Whereas the defence and safety of the Commonwealth depend upon having its citizens
properly armed and taught the knowledge of military duty, and the differently laws heretofore
enacted being found inadequate for such purposes, and in order that the same may be formed
into one plain and regular system.” Act of Jan. 1, 1786, ch. 1, 1786 Va. Laws 1 (amending
and reducing into one act, the several laws for regulating and disciplining the militia, and
guarding against invasions and insurrections), microformed on Redgrave Information
Resourced Corp. (RIR); “That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of people trained
to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State.” DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art.
XIII (Va. 1776), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th _century/virginia.asp.
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to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this Kingdom.”702 Virginia followed this
language in its 1757 Militia Act when it proclaimed, “Whereas it is necessary, in this
time of danger, that the militia of this colony should be well regulated and
disciplined.”703 It should be stressed that the Constitution was written by the best
legal minds America had to offer. They undoubtedly understood how the phrases
“well regulated militia” and “keep and bear arms” were incorporated in their legal
system. This was in the militia laws.
Moreover, the Constitutional Convention debated the inclusion of the “well
regulated” language, which shows that the language was not just explanatory
rhetoric. Eldridge Gerry was not pleased with the Amendment reading that a well
regulated militia was the “best security of a free state.”704 He feared that although
this insinuated that a militia was the “best security,” it also admitted that a standing
army was a secondary choice.705 He moved that it should read, a “well regulated
militia, trained to arms,” because this would make it the federal government’s duty to
ensure that the militia was maintained.706 Although the motion was not seconded, the
language, reading “being the best security of a free state,” eventually would be
removed. The words “necessary to the” were put in place of “the best,” making the
Amendment imply what Gerry wanted it to—that a well regulated militia was the
only security of a free State.707
This limited interpretation of the Second Amendment is supported by the events
that occurred during the infamous Shays’ Rebellion—the same rebellion that has
been credited in aiding the formation of the United States Constitution.708 What has
been lost in the history of the event is the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. It
explicitly protected the “right of the people to keep and bear arms for the common
702

30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 1 (1757) (Eng.).

703

Ch. III, 7 LAWS OF VA. 93, 93 (Hening 1820) (enacted 1757).

704

THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 188-89
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). The Earl of Stanhope stated a similar phrasing in the House of
Lords during the debates of the 1756 Militia Bill. Stanhope stated, “[T]he only proper military
force of a free country is a well regulated and well disciplined militia.” 15 COBBETT, supra
note 150, at 706. The language would became part of the 1757 Militia Act that was passed by
the English government. It stated, “Whereas a well-ordered and well-disciplined Militia is
essentially necessary to the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of this Kingdom.” 30 Geo. 2, c. 3
(1757) (Eng.).
705

The debates of the Second Amendment support the idea that they were trying to
suppress the idea of standing armies. The colonists’ disdain for standing armies was reiterated
many times in eighteenth-century documents, including a letter by John Cartwright. He wrote,
“As for troops, a country containing millions of inhabitants, never can want any: let them rely
upon the natural, the best resource—a national militia; but, for heaven’s sake! [N]ever more
let the face of a British soldier be seen in North America.” John Cartwright, Letter X (Apr. 14,
1774), in ENGLISH DEFENDERS OF AMERICAN FREEDOMS 1774-1778, supra note 243, at 182,
186.
706

THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 704, at 188.

707

Id. at 175.

708

Matthew Spalding, The Formation of the Constitution, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (2005); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89, at 135-36
(3d ed. 1994).
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defence.”709 Despite this protection, the insurgents were forced to turn over their
arms for a period of three years710—a seizure that neither Benjamin Lincoln, James
Madison, George Washington, nor any of the Founding Fathers, viewed as an
infringement on a right to “have” or “keep and bear arms.”711 In fact, the right to
“keep and bear arms” was defined by the Massachusetts legislature during the
rebellion. In An Act for the more speedy and effectual suppression of tumults and
insurrections in the commonwealth, the Massachusetts legislature resolved:
Whereas in free government, where the people have a right to keep
and bear arms for the common defence, and the military power is held in
subordination to the civil authority, it is necessary for the safety of the
state that the virtuous citizens thereof should hold themselves in readiness,
and when called upon, should exert their efforts to support the civil
government and oppose attempts of factitious and wicked men who may
wish to subvert the laws and constitution of their country.712
The Act’s use of “keep and bear arms” clearly limits the right to service in the
militia and in defense of the State. Although the Massachusetts constitutional
protection did not expressly mention the militia, it was inherently understood, for the
“bearing of arms” was eighteenth-century language in reference to the military use of
arms.713 The use of this language in all the colonies’ militia laws supports this.
709

MA. CONST. of 1780 art. XVII.

710

On February 16, 1787, the Massachusetts government passed the following into law:
That they shall keep the peace for the term of three years . . . and that during that term
of time, they shall not serve as Jurors, be eligible to any town office, or any other
office under the Government of this Commonwealth, and shall be disqualified from . .
. giving their votes for the same term of time, for any officer, civil or military, within
this Commonwealth, unless such persons, or any of them, shall after the first day of
May, seventeen hundred and eighty-eight, exhibit plenary evidence of their having
returned to their allegiance . . .
....
That it shall be the duty of the Justice before whom any offender or offenders
aforesaid may deliver up their arms, and take and subscribe the oath aforesaid…and it
shall be the duty of the Justice to require such as shall take and subscribe the oath of
allegiance, to subjoin their names, their places of abode, and their additions, and if
required, to give to each offender who shall deliver up his arms . . . a certificate of the
same under his seal . . . . and it shall be the duty of such Major-General or
commanding officer, to give such directions as he may think necessary, for the safe
keeping of such arms, in order that they may be returned to the person or persons who
delivered the same, at the expiration of said term of three years, in case such person or
persons shall have complied with the conditions above-mentioned, and shall obtain an
order for the re-delivery of such arms, from the Governour.
Disqualifying Act, ch. 6, 1787 Mass. Laws, microformed on Redgrave Information Resources
Corp. (RIR).
711

See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 84-87.

712

Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Laws 564 (providing for the more speedy and
effectual suppression of Tumults and Insurrections in the Commonwealth), microformed on
Redgrave Information Resources Corp. (RIR).
713

See CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 23-27, 85-86.
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Meanwhile, the Second Amendment expressly mentions a “well-regulated militia,”
yet, the Supreme Court did not interpret that right as being limited to the militia.
This is understandable given the Court’s reliance on Joyce Lee Malcolm’s research
on the English “have arms” provision. Generally, any court that starts its legal
interpretation with inaccurate information will end up with a conclusion much
different than the original intent. One would think Article VI, Section 4 of the
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution’s, removes any doubt on this issue. It
read:
[N]or shall any body of forces be kept up, by any State in time of
peace, except such number only as, in the judgement of the United States,
in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts
necessary for the defence of such State; but every State shall always keep
up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and
accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public
stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of
arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.714
The Articles’ use of the language “well regulated and disciplined” mirrors the
prefatory language of the Second Amendment and may have been the latter’s
inspiration. The Supreme Court, however, failed to take notice of this connection.
XI. CONCLUSION
The idea that individuals have an Anglo-American constitutional right to “have
arms” for personal self-defense is one of the greatest historical myths of all time.
While Individual Right Scholars, supporters, and lobbyists have convinced the
majority of Americans that such a right existed during the Founding and preFounding eras, much of the credit should be given to the contemporary
understanding of the phrase “keep and bear arms.” Modern state constitutions have
used the language to protect an individual’s right to possess arms for self-defense.
There is no denying that some state constitutions undoubtedly protect such a right. It
is within each state’s constitutional structure to do so. This fact, however, should not
influence our interpretation of the Founders’ understanding of the right.
There exists no substantiating historical or legal evidence that Englishmen—of
all classes—had an affirmative right to “have arms” for personal defense. The legal
allowance to “have arms”—for all purposes—was based upon hierarchal and socioeconomic status.715 It cannot be stressed enough that the 1689 Declaration of Rights
“have arms” provision did not apply to all laws respecting firearms.716 It was not
intended to be a blanket provision covering game and gun laws.717 It was meant to
serve only two purposes. The first purpose was to speak to the philosophical
principle and the limited right of the people to rebel when all forms of redress against
a tyrannical government had been exhausted718—what Blackstone understood as the
714

ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added).

715

See supra pp. 363-65.

716

See supra pp. 356-83.

717

See supra pp. 386-403.

718

See supra pp. 382-83, 387-88.
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“fifth auxiliary right.”719 However, as history shows, individuals did not necessarily
need to possess the arms to exercise this right.720 The second purpose of the “have
arms” provision was an allowance through the militia to possess certain armaments
to defend the realm against invasion and to check unlawful standing armies721—an
interpretation supported by the works of Granville Sharp, St. George Tucker, and
Samuel Adams.722 In any case, it was an allowance that was intended to be regulated
by Parliament “suitable to [an indivdual’s] condition and as allowed by law.”723
Furthermore, “arms for their defence” did not speak to individual self-defense.724
It was terminology that referred to defending the realm. Although “individual right”
supporters can repetitively claim it spoke of an unfettered right to “have arms” for
personal defense, repetition of the same opinion without substantiated historical
evidence does not make it a fact. Their analysis of the history of the “have arms”
provision is full of assumptions and opinion—maybe more so than facts. They even
go so far to state that a parliamentary debate on the Gordon Riots of 1780 proves that
all individual’s had a right to own guns.725 Not only was this debate noncontemporaneous with the adoption of the English “have arms” provision, but
Individual Right Scholars understand neither the political climate of that debate nor
the history because they take it out of context.726
In closing, the historical evidence shows that the Supreme Court majority in
Heller and the Nordyke court were misled by Individual Right Scholars’
interpretation of the English “have arms” provision. Whether it will be reexamined
by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago is another issue. Both the
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals certainly felt the history was
still subject to litigation, and Supreme Court precedent supports this practice. It is
well-established that the Supreme Court may reexamine constitutional history when
recent scholarship shows historical disparities with the Court’s past decisions. Not to
mention, this constitutional issue should be reexamined because the first step in
deciding whether a right is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is whether it is “fundamental to the American scheme of
justice.”727 In determining this test, the Supreme Court has traditionally examined
719

See supra pp. 416-20.

720

See supra pp. 408-11; 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 32 (1757) (Eng.). The Founding generation
also practiced this principle. Some states controlled and distributed the militia arms.
CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 73-79. Moreover, the federal government
considered taking similar steps in enforcing its constitutional power to organize the militia,
including collecting and storing all the militias’ arms. Id. at 76-79.
721

See supra pp. 384-86. For American militia right, see supra pp. 433-34.

722

For Granville Sharp see supra pp. 410-18. For St. George Tucker, see supra 417-21.
For Samuel Adams see supra pp. 424-34.
723

See supra pp. 353-54, 403-04.

724

See supra pp. 371, 387-92, 414-16.

725

For the debates, see 21 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 726, 726-54 (London, T.C. Hausard 1813).
726

SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 207, 222-24.

727

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). See also Smith v. Alright, 321 U.S.
649, 665-66 (1944); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575
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the Anglo-American tradition of the right being asserted. Given that the Court only
briefly touched upon this in Heller, it is highly probable it will be addressed again.
If this happens, the weight of the historical evidence shows what the Court should
do—not incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause and possibly overturn Heller.
This history is also significant in understanding the Second Amendment as a
“privilege and immunity” of the citizens of the United States, for the privilege of all
citizens to defend the country predates even the 1689 Declaration of Rights and
continued up to the Reconstruction.728 Although the Second Amendment may not
have bound the states,729 the Founders were in agreement that the people must
participate in defending the nation to understand liberty.730—a privilege that the
Supreme Court has twice identified the Second Amendment as protecting. This
prevented a standing army and the creation of a soldier class of citizens who felt they
were superior to the citizens and liberties they protected.731
It must be noted that, by the Reconstruction Era, there were some in Congress
who viewed the Second Amendment as protecting the right to defend the home and
property.732 However, the Second Amendment was most frequently brought up in
(1985); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 604, 611 (1971); Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1985).
728
See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2420-21 (1809); 23 ANNALS OF CONG. 1023 (1812); 28
ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (1814); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 523 (1854) (“By
enrolling the slaves in the militia, and yielding to their Constitutional right ‘to keep and bear
arms’ . . . Congress would convert those foes into friends.”); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. at 482, 1070, 1078, 1090-91, 1122 (1856); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 73
(1857); Letter of Joseph Tallmadge (Dec. 29, 1809), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS 263, 266-67 (Walter Lowerie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales &
Seaton 1832); On the Subject of the Organization and Discipline of the Militia of the United
States (Feb. 27, 1827), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 597, 600 (Asbury
Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860); Report of the board of
officers relative to the militia (Nov. 28, 1826), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra at 388, 389; Application of New York for Amendments to the Militia System
of the United States (Dec. 24, 1833), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 240,
241 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860).
729

In 1863, Mr. Bayard described the Second Amendment “as a to guard the States.”
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 729 (1863).
730

CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 111-14; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252, 265 (1886) (The Amendment prevents the states from “prohibit[ing] the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for
maintaining the public security[.]”); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929)
(Citing the Second Amendment, the Court held “the common defense was one of the purposes
for which the people ordained and established the Constitution.”).
731

Id. at 34-39, 111-14.

732

Mr. Nye stated, “As citizens of the United States [Freedmen] have equal right to
protection, and to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1073 (1866). Mr. Pomeroy stated that Freedmen “should have the right to bear arms for the
defense of himself and family and his homestead.” Id. at 1182. Meanwhile, Mr. Davis stated
that the Founding Fathers “were for every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them
in his house, his castle, for his own defense.” Id. at 371; see also AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 325-26, 390-91 (2005).
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congressional debates on whether the Reconstruction states could maintain a
militia,733 granting Freedmen the right to vote,734 the disarming of Freedmen veterans
or soldiers,735 and the organization of the United States militia itself736—all of which
733

In defending against disarming the unlawful militias in the South, Mr. Saulsbury voted
against such a proposition because the Constitution “does not give power to Congress to
disarm the militia of the State, or destroy the militia of a State, because [of the] . . . second
amendment.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 914 (1866). No one questioned Saulsbury’s
interpretation of the Second Amendment. Mr. Wilson, however, thought the disarming of
southern militias in this instance lawful, despite the Second Amendment, because Congress
has “the power to disarm ruffians or traitors, or men who are committing outrages against
law.” Id. at 915. In other words, Congress had the power to disarm unlawful militias that
were not in support of the Constitution or just government. Such militias were engaged in
rebellion, as occurred in Shays’ Rebellion. CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at
83-87, 95. When Congress readdressed the issue of unlawful militias in 1868, Mr. Buckalew
and Mr. Warner turned to the Second Amendment as protecting the right of the states to
organize their militias. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 83-85 (1868). No one questioned
either Buckalew or Warner’s interpretation of the Second Amendment. Id. at 80-86. Mr.
Willey expressed similar sentiments in 1867. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1848-49
(1867). For the other 1867 debates on this issue, see id. at 1574-79.
734

In 1864, Mr. Holman defended the right of black soldiers to bear arms in service of the
militia when he stated, “[T]he right to bear arms is the peculiar right of the free citizen in a
free Republic.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1995 (1864). Holman went on to state
black soldiers have a “high appreciation of the right to bear arms for the defense of his
country.” Id. In 1866, Mr. Salusbury stated, “Those races who bear arms to defend a
Republic must be allowed to participate in its Government.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 145 (1866). Mr. Farnsworth stated:
[W]e compel them to bear arms in support and defense of the Government, and also to
that other important fact, that we tax them for the support of Government . . . [yet] that
man has no right to a voice in the choice of his rulers, and has no lot or part in the
Government.
Id. at 206. Thomas Williams stated, “He counts in the representation. He pays taxes, and
must bear arms if necessary, and he has done it. No sensible man now pretends to doubt that
he is a citizen, or can doubt it in view of these considerations.” Id. at 792. Mr. Pomeroy
stated, “The ‘right to bear arms’ is not plainer taught or more efficient than the right to carry
ballots.” Id. at 1183. In a report to defend the rights of Freedmen, the Address of the Swiss
Conventions read:
But what would most disturb all our hopes would be to see those freedmen who had
spilled their blood for the defense of the Union . . . [to be] deprived of those rights
which are, in all republican Governments, the appanage of those brave men who are
called to bear arms for their country.
Id. at 2801. In debating the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Barry stated, “The colored man
having won the right to bear arms for the Republic, his claim to the elective franchise was but
a logical sequence.” CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 266 (1871).
735
Congress was upset with the disarming of black Union soldiers and not allowing
Freedmen to serve in militias. Mr. Clarke stated, “[T]he brave black soldiers of the Union,
disarmed and robbed by this wicked and despotic order . . . Many of these brave defenders of
the nation paid for the arms with which they went to battle.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1839 (1866). On May 23, 1866, it was reported to Congress:
More than twenty-five thousand colored men of Kentucky have been soldiers in the
Army of the Union. . . . [I]n many instances [they] are scourged, beaten, shot at, and
driven from their homes and families. Their arms are taken from them by the civil
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discussed the limited nature of the Second Amendment in connection to the defense
of the country. Thus, few will deny the Reconstruction Congress viewed the right to
defend the nation as a privilege and immunity of United States citizens.737
Meanwhile, to argue that the Reconstruction Congress viewed “having arms” to
defend the home as a “privilege and immunity” is less certain. This is due to the fact
that there is substantial evidence in the congressional record that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers were more concerned about the equal protection of arms
laws738 rather than impeding on states’ and localities’ police power to regulate
overall arms possession.739

authorities and confiscated for the benefit of the Commonwealth. The Union soldier is
fined for bearing arms. Thus the right of the people to keep and bear arms as provided
in the Constitution is infringed.
Id. at 2774 (alterations in original). In 1866, the Committee of Reconstruction reported
that in South Carolina:
[P]ersons of color constitute no part of the militia of the State, and no one of them
shall, without permission in writing from the district judge or magistrate, be allowed to
keep a fire-arm . . . [and] not a pistol, musket or other fire-arm or weapon appropriate
for purposes of war.
Ex. Doc. No. 118, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (May 23, 1866).
736

In debating the appropriations of arms to the militias, Mr. Nye stated that the Second
Amendment protects “the right of the citizen to bear arms and the duty of the Government to
furnish them when organized regularly as militia of the States.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4325 (1868).
737
In 1861, Mr. Breckinridge stated, “The President has not only guaranteed, by his
action, the right to bear arms, but he has invited the patriotic citizens of the United States to
bear arms for the only noble purpose for which men can take arms—in defense of the
Constitution and liberties of the people.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 1473 (1861).
738
Mr. Grinnell stated, “A white man in Kentucky may keep a gun; if a black man buys a
gun he forfeits it and pays a fine of five dollars, if presuming to keep in his possession a
musket which he has carried through the war.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 651
(1866). Mr. McKee stated, “We have one code for the white man, another for the black. Is
this Justice?” Id. at 653. Mr. Trumbull stated, “The moment that any State does justice and
abolishes all discrimination between whites and blacks in civil rights, the judicial functions of
the Freedmen’s Bureau cease.” Id. at 941. Mr. Raymond stated, “[W]e have colored aliens
enjoying advantages that native colored persons cannot enjoy; the one class may be made
citizens by act of Congress and the other is absolutely debarred from it. Is it possible that the
Constitution ever intended a distinction so invidious?” Id. at 1266. Mr. Harlan stated:
If the fangs of slavery had not originally pierced the Constitution, then, in the first
days of the Union, when citizens were sent out to claim dominion over the unpeopled
Territories . . . those governments once admitted as States, it would have been to
organize their militia and bear arms, irrespective of color.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078-79 (1868).
739

Henry Brannon listed the right “to keep and bear arms” as a privilege of the citizens of
the United States, but stated that it “does not grant the right to carry a weapon” nor does it
“impair the state power of regulation and police in this respect.” HENRY BRANNON, A
TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 65, 92 (Cincinnati, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1901)
(1873).
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Not to mention, by 1868, only seventeen740 of the thirty-seven state constitutions
protected some form of an “individual right” to “keep and bear arms.” This means
that more than half the states did not view arms ownership in a light that supports the
Individual Rights Scholars stance and did not view arms to defend the home as a
right. Needless to say, incorporating a right to “have arms” for personal self-defense
through the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not as strong of a case as Individual
Right Scholars proclaim it is.741 Even the constitutional commentators, after the
740

ALA. CONST. of 1867 art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. of
1868 art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32; KAN.
CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25; MICH. CONST. of 1850
art. XVIII, § 7; MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST.
of 1868 art. I, § 24; OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 21; PA.
CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21; R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22; TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13;
VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. IX. This is looking at each state’s constitution in a light most
favorable to the “individual right” stance. However, out of these seventeen states, arguably
eleven of these “bear arms” provisions could be interpreted as merely a militia right. See FLA.
CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and the lawful
authority of the State.”); GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“[R]ight of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed.”); IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32 (“[R]ight to bear arms for
the defence of themselves and the State.”); KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25 (“[R]ight of the
citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); MO.
CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and of the lawful
authority of the State cannot be questioned.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“[R]ight of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4
(“[P]eople have the right to bear arms for their defense and security.”); OR. CONST. of 1857
art. I, § 21 (“[P]eople shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
State.”); PA. CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21 (“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms, in defence of
themselves and the State, shall not be questioned.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. IX.
(“[P]eople have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”). For
determining whether a state’s constitution possesses an “individual right” one should look at
the state’s laws, constitutional conventions, and legislative history. See CHARLES, SECOND
AMENDMENT, supra note 14, at 129-77.
741
There were certainly members of Congress that viewed the Second Amendment as
protecting an “individual right,” however, this has been overemphasized by Individual Right
Scholars. Similar to their arguments on the English “have arms” provision, Individual Right
Scholars ignore historical context in other areas of the legislative record to support their
stance. See HALBROOK, ARMED, supra note 672, at 107-53. For instance, Individual Right
Scholars argue the 1866 Freedman’s Bureau Act proves that the Reconstruction Congress
wanted to secure a right to possess arms in the home. Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237,
269 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE
RIGHT TO ARMS, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)). However, the drafters
may have been primarily concerned with protecting a militia right. The pertinent Freedman’s
Bureau Act section states that citizens shall “have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment,
and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms.” 14
STAT. 176-77 (1866). Notice how the text “constitutional right to bear arms” is separated from
the text “personal security.” Id. This is significant because Mr. Raymond also separated the
Second Amendment from self-defense when he stated before Congress: “He has a defined
status; he has a country and a home; a right to defend himself and his wife and children; a
right to bear arms; a right to testify in the federal courts; he has all those rights that tend to
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ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not view the Second Amendment as
protecting a right to possess arms in defense of the home.742
To its credit, the “individual right” argument of incorporation through the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is substantially stronger than through the Due
Process Clause, for while the history of the Anglo-American allowance to “have
arms” shows that incorporation through the Due Process Clause is futile, depending
on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction’s history and weighing
the interests of federalism, the Court majority could go either way on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.

elevate him.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1266 (1866). This separation of text
implies that the drafters were protecting the limited militia right. It must be remembered that
Freedmen were often exempt from serving in the militia. CHARLES, SECOND AMENDMENT,
supra note 14, at 58-60. Not to mention, it was the unlawful rebel militias that were
preventing Freedmen Union soldiers and militia from maintaining their arms. See supra note
735. It is likely that it was this constitutional right to bear arms that Congress was protecting.
742
BRANNON, supra note 739, at 65, 92; JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 558-677 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1873) (failing to
mention the Second Amendment as privilege and immunity of United States citizens);
THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 270-71 (Boston, Brown,
Little & Co. 1880) (stating that the Second Amendment “implies the right to meet for
voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order”); THEOPHILUS
PARSONS, THE PERSONAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 188-89
(Hartford, S.S. Scranton & Co. 1878) (classifying the Second Amendment as a military right
and duty); ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP 166, 179 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881) (“The right to bear arms is a matter of state regulation.”); JOSEPH STORY,
A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264-65 (Boston,
Lawbook Exch. 1999) (1871) (classifying the Second Amendment as a militia right); ROGER
FOSTER, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (Boston, Boston
Book Co. 1895) (declaring disbanding of state militias as a violation of the Second
Amendment); GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE END
OF THE FIRST CENTURY 359 (Boston, D.C. Heath & Co. 1895) (discussing how the Second
Amendment prevents the federal government from depriving States of public security).
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